United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Courtney Green ("Plaintiff" or "Green"),
is an inmate currently incarcerated at Osborn Correctional
Institution ("Osborn") in Somers, Connecticut.
Green's Second Amended Complaint, filed pro se,
alleges that Defendants Warden Edward Maldonado, Deputy
Warden Gary Wright, Dr. Johnny Wright, Correctional Officer
Kopacz, and the Connecticut Department of Correction
("DOC"), (collectively, "Defendants")
have discriminated against him on the basis of his disability
and have subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. On June 6, 2018, the Court granted
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint, in part, and dismissed certain claims and
Defendants from the action. Doc. 41. Familiarity with the
Court's Ruling is assumed. Plaintiff now moves for
reconsideration of the Court's June 6, 2018, Ruling. For
the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
STANDARD FOR REVIEW
standard for granting a motion for reconsideration "is
strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data
that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d
255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Schonberger v.
Serchuk, 742 F.Supp. 108, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). The
Second Circuit has adhered to the strict standard for
reconsideration set forth in Shrader. See, e.g.,
Oparah v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 670
Fed.Appx. 25, 26 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Shrader, 70
F.3d at 257). The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in this
District dictate that "[m]otions for reconsideration
shall not be routinely filed and shall satisfy the strict
standard applicable to such motions. Such motions will
generally be denied unless the movant can point to
controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked in
the initial decision or order." D. Conn. L. Civ. R.
well-settled that a motion for reconsideration is "not a
vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case
under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or
otherwise taking a 'second bite at the apple.'"
Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P.,
684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sequa Corp. v.
GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.1998)), as
amended (July 13, 2012). See also Shrader, 70
F.3d at 257 ("[A] motion for reconsideration should not
be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate
an issue already decided."); Lopez v. Smiley,
375 F.Supp.2d 19, 21-22 (D. Conn. 2005) ("A motion for
reconsideration may not be used to plug gaps in an original
argument or to argue in the alternative once a decision has
been made." (quotation marks and citation omitted));
Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90
F.Supp.2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[A] motion for
reconsideration is appropriate only where the movant
demonstrates that “the Court has overlooked controlling
decisions or factual matters that were put before it on
the underlying motion . . . and which, had they been
considered, might have reasonably altered the result before
the court." (emphasis in original) (citation and
quotation marks omitted)). It thus follows that the
"major grounds justifying reconsideration are an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of
new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice." Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v.
Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d
Cir.1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See
also Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL
Irrevocable Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013)
contends that the Court should reconsider that part of its
June 6, 2018, Ruling that dismissed Plaintiff's section
1983 claims based on the Eighth Amendment against Defendant
Edward Maldonado. Plaintiff contends that "this Court
may have overlooked certain documents that establishes Warden
Edward Maldonado's culpability in this action."
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Doc. 42 at 2
(sic). Plaintiff argues that under the DOC's
Administrative Directives, Maldonado, the Unit Administrator,
failed to act within the scope of his authority in rejecting
Plaintiff's Administrative Remedy. See Id. at 3.
Plaintiff contends that Maldonado "worked in
concert" with Defendant Kopacz to subject Plaintiff to
unsafe and hazardous conditions, and that Maldonado was the
"level 1 reviewer who ultimately made the decision to
continue to subject Plaintiff to hazardous shower
conditions." Id. Plaintiff also argues that
Maldonado "knew that when he rejected Plaintiff's
Administrative Remedies the plaintiff was able to appeal. The
plaintiff could not appeal due to Edward Maldonado
intentionally lying to plaintiff by informing him that he had
exhausted his Administrative Remedies." Id. at
3-4 (citations omitted).
Court expresses no present view as to whether such facts, if
pled, would be sufficient to state a plausible section 1983
claim against Maldonado. For the present purposes, it is
sufficient to state that such allegations appear nowhere in
Plaintiff's pleadings. Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint contains just one factual allegation regarding
Maldonado: Plaintiff alleges that Maldonado signed the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") appeal.
See Doc. 19, ¶10 ("The ADA appeal was
signed by Warden Maldonado."). The remainder of the
allegations regarding Plaintiff's appeal in his Second
Amended Complaint concern Defendant Kopacz. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Kopacz returned the appeal, provided
Plaintiff with a reason for its rejection, signed the appeal,
and wrongfully and intentionally informed Plaintiff that he
had exhausted his administrative remedies. See Id.
There are no such allegations regarding Maldonado. Further,
although Plaintiff contends that the Court "overlooked
certain documents," no documents are attached to
Plaintiff's original or amended Complaint.
careful review, the Court finds that it did not overlook any
information in dismissing Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment
claims against Maldonado. The allegations that Plaintiff
asserts against Maldonado in his motion for reconsideration
do not appear in the Second Amended Complaint, which,
construing all factual allegations in Plaintiff's favor,
provides no basis to find supervisory liability or deliberate
indifference on behalf of Maldonado. Accordingly,
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration will be denied. To
the extent Plaintiff believes that, consistent with his
obligations under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, he can assert factual allegations that, if proven
true, would impose liability on Maldonado, Plaintiff may
avail himself of his right to seek to amend his complaint,
either with Defendants' consent, or with the court's
leave. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).
foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
is SO ORDERED.