United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RICARDO M. GROSS, Petitioner,
WARDEN D.K. WILLIAMS, Respondent.
RULING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
W. THOMPSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Ricardo M. Gross commenced this habeas corpus action pro se
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the
computation of his sentence. The respondent contends that the
petitioner's sentence was properly calculated. For the
reasons that follow, the petition is being denied.
2241 affords relief only if the petitioner is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A
petition filed pursuant to section 2241 may be used to
challenge the execution of a prison sentence. Thus, section
2241 petitions are appropriately used to challenge conditions
of confinement or sentence calculations. See Poindexter
v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 2003). Before filing
a habeas petition pursuant to section 2241, prisoners are
required to exhaust internal grievance procedures. See
Carmona v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d
629, 634 (2d Cir. 2001).
January 31, 1996, the petitioner was arrested by law
enforcement officers for the District of Columbia on charges
of armed bank robbery, use of a firearm during a crime of
violence, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, armed
carjacking, and “theft of a senior citizen”. On
February 1, 1996, the petitioner was arrested by the United
States Marshals Service on federal charges arising from the
petitioner remained in continuous custody pending resolution
of those federal charges. On September 12, 1996, the Superior
Court in the District of Columbia revoked the
petitioner's probation on a prior conviction and
sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 15 to 45 months.
27, 1997, the petitioner was sentenced in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in No.
CR-96-57-1. He received concurrent sentences of 108 months
for armed robbery, 108 months for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, 15 to 45 years for armed carjacking, and 5
to 15 years for “theft of a senior citizen”. The
petitioner also received a 10-year consecutive sentence for
use of a firearm during a crime of violence. The crimes of
armed carjacking and “theft of a senior citizen”
were D.C. Code violations. The other crimes were federal
November 3, 1997, the petitioner was paroled from the
District of Columbia Superior Court sentence for violation of
probation. On the same day, he began serving his sentence on
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) applied 225 days of
prior-custody credit, covering the period from January 31,
1996, through September 11, 1996, to the concurrent portion
of the petitioner's sentence. This resulted in a parole
eligibility date of March 22, 2012, rather than November 2,
2012. On March 22, 2012, the petitioner was paroled from the
concurrent portion of the sentence and began serving the
consecutive 10-year portion of the sentence.
petitioner currently is confined at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. He commenced this action
by petition filed March 1, 2018, after exhausting his
petitioner argues that the 225 days of prior-custody credit
should be applied to each count reflected in the judgment.
Thus, in his view, the 225 days of credit should be applied
to the 10-year consecutive portion of his sentence in
addition to the concurrent portion of the sentence.
Attorney General has delegated exclusive authority to
calculate federal sentences to the BOP. See United States
v. Wilson,503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). A federal sentence
commences on the day the individual is received into custody.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). The prisoner is given credit toward
his federal sentence for time during which the prisoner was
detained prior to the commencement of the federal sentence
provided that the time has not been credited toward another
sentence. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 333 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585(b)). Inmates are precluded by ...