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Gross v. Williams

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

July 9, 2018

RICARDO M. GROSS, Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN D.K. WILLIAMS, Respondent.

          RULING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

          ALVIN W. THOMPSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Petitioner Ricardo M. Gross commenced this habeas corpus action pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the computation of his sentence. The respondent contends that the petitioner's sentence was properly calculated. For the reasons that follow, the petition is being denied.

         I. Legal Standard

         Section 2241 affords relief only if the petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A petition filed pursuant to section 2241 may be used to challenge the execution of a prison sentence. Thus, section 2241 petitions are appropriately used to challenge conditions of confinement or sentence calculations. See Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 2003). Before filing a habeas petition pursuant to section 2241, prisoners are required to exhaust internal grievance procedures. See Carmona v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 2001).

         II. Background

         On January 31, 1996, the petitioner was arrested by law enforcement officers for the District of Columbia on charges of armed bank robbery, use of a firearm during a crime of violence, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, armed carjacking, and “theft of a senior citizen”. On February 1, 1996, the petitioner was arrested by the United States Marshals Service on federal charges arising from the same incident.

         The petitioner remained in continuous custody pending resolution of those federal charges. On September 12, 1996, the Superior Court in the District of Columbia revoked the petitioner's probation on a prior conviction and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 15 to 45 months.

         On June 27, 1997, the petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in No. CR-96-57-1. He received concurrent sentences of 108 months for armed robbery, 108 months for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 15 to 45 years for armed carjacking, and 5 to 15 years for “theft of a senior citizen”. The petitioner also received a 10-year consecutive sentence for use of a firearm during a crime of violence. The crimes of armed carjacking and “theft of a senior citizen” were D.C. Code violations. The other crimes were federal violations.

         On November 3, 1997, the petitioner was paroled from the District of Columbia Superior Court sentence for violation of probation. On the same day, he began serving his sentence on No. CR-96-57-1.

         The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) applied 225 days of prior-custody credit, covering the period from January 31, 1996, through September 11, 1996, to the concurrent portion of the petitioner's sentence. This resulted in a parole eligibility date of March 22, 2012, rather than November 2, 2012. On March 22, 2012, the petitioner was paroled from the concurrent portion of the sentence and began serving the consecutive 10-year portion of the sentence.

         The petitioner currently is confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. He commenced this action by petition filed March 1, 2018, after exhausting his institutional remedies.

         III. Discussion

         The petitioner argues that the 225 days of prior-custody credit should be applied to each count reflected in the judgment. Thus, in his view, the 225 days of credit should be applied to the 10-year consecutive portion of his sentence in addition to the concurrent portion of the sentence.

         The Attorney General has delegated exclusive authority to calculate federal sentences to the BOP. See United States v. Wilson,503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). A federal sentence commences on the day the individual is received into custody. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). The prisoner is given credit toward his federal sentence for time during which the prisoner was detained prior to the commencement of the federal sentence provided that the time has not been credited toward another sentence. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 333 (quoting 18 U.S.C. ยง 3585(b)). Inmates are precluded by ...


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