United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER
STEFAN
R. UNDERHILL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Douglas
Leniart-a prisoner currently incarcerated at Northern
Correctional Institution- filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Warden Chapdelaine, Deputy Warden Mudano,
Captains Bayman and Saulus, and Correctional Officers Kravies
and Bertrane. Leniart also has moved for appointment of
counsel and for disclosure of confidential information. For
the reasons set forth below, I deny Leniart's motions and
dismiss his complaint in part.
I.
Motions for Appointment of Counsel and for Disclosure of
Confidential Information [Docs. Nos. 8 &
9]
Leniart
has filed a motion designated as “Motion for the court
to appoint legal service by a court appointed lawyer.”
Leniart asserts no facts, allegations or information in
support of the motion. To the extent that Leniart seeks the
appointment of pro bono counsel, I deny his motion without
prejudice. Leniart fails to indicate whether he has made any
attempts to find an attorney willing to represent him or an
attorney who might be willing to provide him with legal
assistance. Leniart may renew the motion at a later stage of
the litigation after he has made attempts to secure the
assistance or representation of counsel.
Leniart
has filed a second motion designated as “Motion for
disclosure and discovery for confidential information and
documents.” Leniart asserts no facts, allegations or
information in support of the motion. Nor are there any
discovery requests attached to the motion. Accordingly, there
is no basis on which to grant relief, and I deny
Leniart's motion.
II.
Complaint [Doc. No. 1]
Under
section 1915A of Title 28 of the United States Code, I must
review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any portion of
the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Although detailed allegations
are not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts
to afford the defendants fair notice of the claims and the
grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate a
plausible right to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory
allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. Nevertheless, it is well-established that
“[p]ro se complaints ‘must be
construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.'” Sykes v. Bank of
Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,
474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater,
623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules
of solicitude for pro se litigants).
Leniart
alleges that prior to January 3, 2017, he had been placed in
phase one of the Security Risk Group program at Walker
Correctional Institution (“Walker”) because he
was a member of the Los Solidos gang. See Compl.,
Doc. No. 1, at ¶ 3. In phase one of the Security Risk
Group program, inmates from different gangs are not to be
housed in the same cell. See Id. at ¶ 5. As of
January 3, 2017, Kravies and Bertrane had worked in the block
in which Leniart had been housed at Walker for over a year
and knew that Leniart was a member of the Los Solidos gang.
See Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.
On
January 3, 2017, in preparing to transfer all inmates who had
been placed in phase one of the Security Risk Group program
at Walker to Northern Correctional Institution, Correctional
Officers Kravies and Bertrane moved Leniart to a holding cell
with an inmate who was a member of gang called the Bloods.
See Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. When Leniart and his
cellmate informed Kravies and Bertrane that they could not be
housed together because they were from different gangs, the
officers told them to “have fun.” See
Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. At some point during his
confinement in the holding cell, Leniart's cellmate
slipped his handcuffs and assaulted Leniart in the face using
the handcuffs. See Id. at ¶ 6. Prison officials
transported Leniart to the University of Connecticut Health
Center and medical personnel stitched up his wounds. See
Id. ¶ 8. Leniart has scars from his injuries and
continues to suffer from headaches and neck pain. See
Id. at ¶¶ 7- 9. For relief, Leniart seeks
$150, 000 in damages.
A.
Official Capacity Claims
The
Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits against states absent an
express waiver of immunity by the states or abrogation of the
immunity by Congress. See Va. Office for Prot. &
Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254 (2011). That
immunity extends to suits against state officials in their
official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (Eleventh Amendment prohibition on
damages actions against states “remains in effect when
State officials are sued for damages in their official
capacity”). Leniart has not alleged, nor are there
facts to suggest that the State of Connecticut or any
defendant in his or her official capacity has waived its
immunity from suit under section 1983. In addition, section
1983 does not abrogate the immunity of the states, including
Connecticut. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342
(1979).
Accordingly,
I dismiss Leniart's claims for monetary damages against
the defendants in their official capacities as barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(2).
B.
Individual Capacity Claims
1.
Chapdelaine, Mudano, ...