Argued
April 19, 2018
Procedural
History
Amended
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the
court, Oliver, J.; thereafter, the petition was withdrawn in
part; judgment denying the petition; subsequently, the court
granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the
petitioner appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment
directed; further proceedings.
Pamela
S. Nagy, assistant public defender, for the appellant
(petitioner).
Laurie
N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state's attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's
attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, senior assistant
state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Sheldon, Bright and Bear, Js.
OPINION
SHELDON, J.
The
petitioner, Marcello Edwards, appeals from the judgment of
the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his
criminal trial, which resulted in his conviction of assault
in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §
53a-59 (a) (1) and the revocation of his probation as a
result of his violation of General Statutes § 53a-32. On
appeal, the petitioner claims that because his trial counsel,
Raul Davila, failed to subject the state's case against
him to any meaningful adversarial testing, his claim is
controlled by United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), and
prejudice should be presumed.[1] On that basis, he claims that the
habeas court should have granted his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, set aside his conviction and the revocation of
his probation, and remanded his case for a new trial. We
agree, and therefore reverse the judgment of the habeas
court.[2]
On
December 11, 2012, the petitioner was convicted of assault in
the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (1). On
December 12, 2012, he was found in violation of his
probation. In affirming the petitioner's conviction and
the revocation of his probation, this court set forth the
following relevant factual and procedural history.
‘‘The victim[3] . . . met the [petitioner] when she was
fifteen and he was twenty or twenty-one years old. They began
dating at that time and eventually had two children together,
[J] and [S]. The [petitioner] physically abused the victim
during their relationship. On one occasion, the [petitioner]
attacked the victim while she was at work, forcing her to
lock herself in the office of a coworker to escape physical
harm. On another occasion, when the [petitioner] and the
victim argued, he punched her in the head, splitting her lip
and rupturing her eardrum. In August, 2009, the relationship
ended, and the [petitioner] moved out of the victim's
home.
‘‘On
November 16, 2011, the [petitioner] took [S] to
McDonald's after school and later brought her back to his
mother's house, where he then lived. Shortly thereafter,
the victim arrived to pick up [S] and take her home. Upon
returning home, the victim called [J], who was home alone,
and asked him to unlock the door to let them in the house. As
the victim approached the house, however, the [petitioner]
accosted her and stabbed her repeatedly in the head, chest,
arm, and thigh. When the victim cried out for help, the
[petitioner] fled. [J] ran to the entry of the house, where
he saw the victim, lying on the ground, bleeding. He dragged
his mother into the house and called 911. After the victim
was taken to a hospital, [J] texted the [petitioner],
‘You're not gonna get away with it. You're
going to jail.' The [petitioner] responded by text,
‘Fuck you.'
‘‘Thereafter,
the [petitioner] was arrested and charged with assault in the
first degree and violation of probation. The [petitioner]
pleaded not guilty to both charges and elected a jury trial
on the assault charge.'' (Footnote added.) State
v. Edwards, 158 Conn.App. 119, 121-22, 118 A.3d
615, cert. denied, 318 Conn. 906, 122 A.3d 634 (2015).
‘‘On
the charge of assault in the first degree, the court
sentenced the [petitioner] to a term of twenty years of
incarceration, of which five years was a mandatory minimum
sentence that could not be suspended or reduced. On the
charge of violation of probation, the court sentenced the
[petitioner] to a term of thirty-seven months incarceration,
to be served consecutively to his sentence for first degree
assault.'' Id., 130-31.
On
August 9, 2013, the petitioner filed his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in this matter. At his trial before the
habeas court, the petitioner made three specific claims as to
ways in which Davila was ineffective, namely, that Davila
failed to request an additional competency evaluation; that
Davila failed to cross-examine the state's witnesses; and
that Davila failed to investigate his claimed alibi.
By way
of memorandum of decision filed July 13, 2016, the habeas
court rejected the petitioner's claims of ineffective
assistance, and thus denied the petitioner's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court determined that the
petitioner failed to prove that an additional competency
evaluation ‘‘would have yielded a result
favorable to the petitioner, '' and thus that the
petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by
Davila's alleged failure to seek an additional competency
evaluation. The court determined that Davila's decision
not to cross-examine the state's witnesses was a
strategic decision as to which he could not have been found
to be deficient. The court further found that the petitioner
failed ‘‘to point out a line of inquiry on
cross-examination of these witnesses that would have been
beneficial to the defense . . . .'' Finally, the
court found the petitioner's claimed alibi
‘‘unavailing, '' and that the petitioner
failed to prove that if ...