United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §
1915A
JEFFREY ALKER MEYER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
TyJuan Reed was a prisoner in the custody of the Connecticut
Department of Correction at the time of the filing of his
complaint. He has filed a complaint pro se and
in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Lieutenants Roberts and Wojcik and Correctional
Officers Aiello, Lis, Carey, Herbert, Wright, Pascarella, and
Dejackome. After an initial review, I conclude that the
complaint should proceed against all defendants on
plaintiff's claim of excessive force in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
Background
The
following facts are alleged in the complaint and are accepted
as true only for purposes of this initial ruling. On August
11, 2015, plaintiff was confined at the Manson Youth
Institution in Cheshire, Connecticut. That day, correctional
officials informed him that he was being transferred to
another Department of Correction (DOC) facility. At
approximately 4:45 p.m., Correctional Officer Fernandez (not
a defendant) came to plaintiff's cell and removed all of
his personal items. The majority of the property was stored
in the facility's property room. Doc. #1 at 4-5
(¶¶ 14-17).
At
approximately 8:30 p.m., plaintiff was escorted to the
Admitting and Processing Room. There, a correctional
transport unit driver placed him in transport restraints,
including wrist restraints, leg irons, and a tether chain
with a lock. After being placed in the restraints, plaintiff
began looking for the boxes that contained his property. He
found only one, half-filled box, which he believed could not
possibly contain all of his property. When plaintiff asked
the officers in the room where the rest of his property was
located, they were unable to tell him. Plaintiff then
requested to speak with a supervisor before he was
transferred. Correctional Officer Schulz called Lieutenant
Roberts. Id. at 5 (¶¶ 18-23).
When
Roberts arrived, plaintiff tried to explain the situation to
her, but she said that she “did not want nor need to
talk to [plaintiff], because regardless of what [he] said,
[he] was still going to be transferred.” While
plaintiff was attempting to explain the problem, Roberts
ordered Correctional Officers Schulz and Aiello to transfer
plaintiff to the transport van. Schulz grabbed
plaintiff's right arm, Aiello grabbed his left arm, and
the two officers escorted plaintiff to the van. While en
route, Aiello tightly squeezed plaintiff's arm, which
prompted an exchange of words between him and plaintiff. When
they reached the “sallyport, ” the area just
inside the door leading to the transport van, Aiello grabbed
plaintiff's head and slammed it against the window,
stating, “I'll put you through this window you
little mother (expletive)!” Roberts witnessed
Aiello's actions but did not intervene. Schulz and Aiello
then pinned plaintiff against the wall with the intent to
hurt him, as Roberts called an emergency code. Plaintiff was
then escorted back inside and placed in a restrictive housing
unit (“RHU”). Id. at 6-7 (¶¶
24-35).
While
plaintiff was housed in the RHU, Lieutenant Wojcik asked him
if he was going to comply with orders. Plaintiff did not
respond because he was in a lot of pain due to the actions of
Aiello and Schulz. Wojcik then stated, “I'm going
to take your non-response as a yes, ” and instructed
plaintiff to kneel on the floor. But plaintiff was unable to
comply with the instruction because of the restraints he had
on. Consequently, Correctional Officers Carey and Lis
physically forced plaintiff to kneel. While Carey and Lis
pinned plaintiff's knees to the floor and chest to the
bed, Wojcik tried to spray mace in plaintiff's face.
Plaintiff turned his head such that that Wojcik sprayed him
in the back of his head instead. Carey and Lis then held
plaintiff's body and head in a fixed position while
Wojcik sprayed plaintiff directly in his eyes, nose, and
mouth. The chemical agent caused plaintiff to vomit and lose
his breath. When he finally caught his breath, he said,
“I couldn't breathe and I'm hurt!”
Id. at 7-8 (¶¶ 36-47).
With
the restraints still on, plaintiff was escorted to a shower
area by Correctional Officers Herbert and Wright. While
flushing the chemicals out of plaintiff's eyes, Herbert
starting choking him while Wright held his head under water.
The two officers yelled, “Get some water!” and
plaintiff stated that he “was being choked!”
Officers Herbert, Wright, Pascarella, and Dejackome then
escorted plaintiff to another RHU cell. Once again, the
officers forced plaintiff to kneel and then began hurting him
by pulling and twisting his arms and legs. This caused the
restraints to cut into plaintiff's skin on his wrists and
ankles. Id. at 8 (¶¶ 48-54).
Afterward,
the officers removed the transport restraints that plaintiff
had on and placed him in in-cell restraints. Plaintiff was in
a lot of pain and was unable to see. The officers removed the
transportation jumper and T-shirt that plaintiff was wearing
and left him in the RHU cell wearing only wet boxer shorts.
Id. at 9 (¶¶ 56-59).
Discussion
Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a
prisoner's civil complaint against a governmental entity
or governmental actors and “identify cognizable claims
or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if
the complaint-(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” If the prisoner is proceeding pro se,
the allegations of the complaint must be read liberally to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See
Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010).
In
recent years, the Supreme Court has set forth a threshold
“plausibility” pleading standard for courts to
evaluate the adequacy of allegations in federal court
complaints. A complaint must allege enough facts-as distinct
from legal conclusions-that give rise to plausible grounds
for relief. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Notwithstanding the
rule of liberal interpretation of a pro se
complaint, a pro se complaint may not survive
dismissal if its factual allegations do not meet the basic
plausibility standard. See, e.g., Fowlkes v.
Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff
has brought his claims against each of the defendants in
their individual capacities for money damages and in their
official capacities for injunctive relief. Plaintiff has
since been released from prison. Doc. #9. Accordingly, his
request for injunctive relief is moot. All that remains for
me to consider are his claims for money damages against
defendants in their individual capacities.
Plaintiff
alleges that the actions of the various defendants
constituted excessive force, racial bias/discrimination,
physical assault, physical injuries, cruel and unusual
punishment, retaliation, and due process ...