United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §
1915A
Jeffrey Alker Meyer United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Shawn Milner is a prisoner in the custody of the Connecticut
Department of Correction. He has filed a complaint pro
se and in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the Board of Pardons and Paroles, as well as
several parole officers and parole hearing officers,
including Kendell Howlett, Jason Bedard, Steve Noto, Carleton
Giles, and John Does 1, 2, and 3. After an initial review, I
will dismiss the complaint.
Background
In July
of 2015, plaintiff was living in the Maple Street halfway
house in Bridgeport, Connecticut. On July 7, 2015, as
plaintiff was signing out of the house to go to work, the
director of the residence requested that plaintiff report to
her office. When plaintiff arrived at the office, he was
asked to close the door and sit down. Shortly thereafter,
defendant Howlett and several other parole officers entered
the office and placed him in handcuffs. Plaintiff asked
Howlett why he was being handcuffed, and Howlett responded
that plaintiff had “violated program provisions”
by receiving phone calls from other inmates. Plaintiff argued
that there was no such provision forbidding receiving calls
from inmates, but Howlett dismissed his argument and stated
that she was taking him back to jail and giving him a ticket.
Doc. #1 at 11 (¶¶ 8-11).
Plaintiff
was then placed in a parole vehicle and brought to Bridgeport
Correctional Center. After being admitted and processed,
plaintiff received an inmate handbook. Soon thereafter, he
was interviewed by a disciplinary report officer, who
affirmed that there were no rules prohibiting inmates from
calling each other. Id. at 11-12 (¶¶
12-13).
After a
three-week investigation, the report issued by Howlett was
dismissed. Plaintiff's family then called defendants
Bedard and Noto, Howlett's supervisors, and asked that
plaintiff be immediately released from custody. Both
defendants refused to release plaintiff despite the dismissal
of the disciplinary report. Plaintiff wrote to defendant
Giles, the chairperson of the Board of Pardons and Paroles,
and notified him that he was being falsely detained, but
Giles never responded to plaintiff's letter or took any
corrective action. Id. at 12 (¶¶ 14-15)
In
September of 2015, defendants Doe 1, 2, and 3-all members of
the parole board- held a rescission hearing in
plaintiff's case. Plaintiff informed these defendants
that the report which caused his re-incarceration had been
dismissed because there were no agency rules prohibiting
telephone communications between inmates. Plaintiff requested
that he be released immediately because the only basis
Howlett had for re-incarcerating plaintiff was the dismissed
ticket. He requested to present witnesses in support of his
position, but defendants refused. Instead, they sentenced
plaintiff to four months of incarceration. As a result,
plaintiff lost his job and suffered emotional distress.
Id. at 13-14 (¶¶ 16-20).
Discussion
Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a
prisoner's civil complaint against a governmental entity
or governmental actors and “identify cognizable claims
or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if
the complaint-(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” If the prisoner is proceeding pro se,
the allegations of the complaint must be read liberally to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See
Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010).
In
recent years, the Supreme Court has set forth a threshold
“plausibility” pleading standard for courts to
evaluate the adequacy of allegations in federal court
complaints. A complaint must allege enough facts-as distinct
from legal conclusions-that give rise to plausible grounds
for relief. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Notwithstanding the
rule of liberal interpretation of a pro se
complaint, a pro se complaint may not survive
dismissal if its factual allegations do not meet the basic
plausibility standard. See, e.g., Fowlkes v.
Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015).
Claims
against the Board of Pardons and Paroles
I will
dismiss plaintiff's claim against the Board of Pardons
and Paroles because a state agency like the Board of Pardons
and Paroles is not a person subject to suit for money damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);
Hannon v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 2015 WL
3849474, at *2 (D. Conn. 2015). Although plaintiff also seeks
injunctive relief in the nature of “jail credit for
each day he was falsely incarcerated, ” Doc. #1 at 17,
this request for injunctive relief from a state agency or
official is not cognizable consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment absent an allegation of an ongoing
constitutional violation. See, e.g., Va. Office
for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 536 U.S. 247, 254
(2011) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
Claims
against Parole Board Members
The
complaint names as defendants three anonymous members of the
Board of Pardons and Paroles who conducted plaintiff's
rescission hearing in September of 2015. Parole board members
have absolute immunity against § 1983 actions when
performing the quasi-judicial role of presiding over
violation hearings. See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d
757, 760-61 ...