SHIRLEY P.
v.
NORMAN P.[*]
Argued
January 16, 2018
Procedural
History
Action
for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Hartford, where the trial court, Albis, J., denied
the defendant's motions for a stay and to preclude
certain evidence; thereafter, the case was tried to the
court, Albis, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage
and granting certain other relief, from which the defendant
appealed. Reversed in part; new trial.
Frank
W. Russo, with whom, on the brief, was Jon D. Berman, for the
appellant (defendant).
Adam
J. Teller, with whom, on the brief, was Brandy N. Thomas, for
the appellee (plaintiff).
Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and
Vertefeuille, Js.
OPINION
MULLINS, J.
The
plaintiff, Shirley P., brought the present action, seeking
the dissolution of her marriage to the defendant, Norman P.,
after the defendant allegedly sexually assaulted her. While
this dissolution action was pending, the defendant was
convicted of several criminal offenses arising from the
alleged assault. The defendant appealed from the judgment of
conviction in that case to the Appellate Court. Thereafter,
while the criminal appeal was pending, the dissolution trial
commenced. At that trial, the court allowed the plaintiff to
present evidence of the criminal conviction. More
specifically, the court ruled that the defendant's
conviction had pre-clusive effect in this dissolution action
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Consequently,
following the trial in the present case, the court concluded,
solely on the basis of the evidence of the criminal
conviction, that the defendant exclusively was responsible
for the marital breakdown. Accordingly, the court entered a
property division award that heavily favored the plaintiff.
The defendant then filed the present appeal.[1]
In this
appeal, the defendant claims that, because the judgment of
conviction was subject to a pending appeal at the time of the
dissolution trial, that judgment was not final. The defendant
contends that, therefore, the trial court improperly gave the
criminal judgment collateral estoppel effect in the present
dissolution action.
Subsequently,
the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of conviction in
the criminal case. See State v. Norman P., 169
Conn.App. 616, 151 A.3d 877 (2016), aff'd, 329 Conn. 440,
A.3d (2018). As a result, the parties were ordered to submit
supplemental briefs on the effect, if any, of the reversal of
the defendant's criminal conviction on the
defendant's claim in the present appeal from the
dissolution judgment. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Thus,
given the reversal of the defendant's criminal
conviction, which this court has recently upheld; see
State v. Norman P., 329 Conn. 440, 465, A.3d (2018);
the precise issue now before us is whether the property
award, which was based on that conviction, must also be
reversed. To answer that question, we are guided by the
principles established in Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S.
240, 242-44, 11 S.Ct. 985, 35 L.Ed. 713 (1891), which held
that a second judgment based upon the preclusive effect of
the first judgment should be reversed if the first judgment
is reversed. Therefore, under the circumstances presented, we
conclude that the reversal of the defendant's criminal
conviction strips that judgment of any collateral estoppel
effect that it may have had in this dissolution action.
Because the fact of the criminal conviction was the sole
basis for the property division award, we also conclude that
the award must be reversed.
The
record reveals the following procedural history and facts
that were either found by the trial court or are undisputed.
On August 10, 2012, the defendant was arrested and charged
with sexual assault of the plaintiff and other felony
offenses in connection with an incident that took place at
the parties' residence on August 2, 2012. On October 20,
2012, the plaintiff commenced the present action seeking
dissolution of her marriage to the defendant. The plaintiff
consented to the defendant's request to delay the divorce
trial until the completion of his criminal trial.
The
defendant ultimately was convicted of several criminal
charges and, on February 26, 2015, was sentenced to a lengthy
term of incarceration. He filed an appeal from the judgment
of conviction on May 14, 2015. See State v. Norman
P., supra, 169 Conn.App. 616.
On May
21, 2015, the day before the dissolution trial was scheduled
to commence, the defendant filed three motions: a motion to
stay the trial until the appeal from his criminal conviction
was resolved; a motion to preclude the admission of evidence
of his criminal conviction; and a motion for a pretrial
hearing to present evidence concerning the unfairness of the
criminal proceeding. In his motion for a pretrial hearing,
the defendant contended that it would be unfair to give
collateral estoppel effect to his criminal conviction in the
dissolution action because the conviction was the result of
‘‘numerous erroneous trial court
rulings.'' Attached to his motion for a pretrial
hearing were copies of the appeal from his conviction as well
as his motion for a new trial in the criminal proceeding. In
those filings, the defendant set forth, at length, claims
that the trial court in his criminal case had made numerous
erroneous rulings that affected the validity of the verdict.
On May
22, 2015, just before the trial began, the trial court
conducted a hearing on the defendant's three motions. The
court denied the defendant's motion for a stay on the
ground that the dissolution action had been pending since
November 6, 2012, and any further delay would prejudice the
plaintiff. With respect to the motions to preclude evidence
of the criminal conviction and for a pretrial hearing on the
fairness of that conviction, the court concluded that,
‘‘[i]n any dissolution action, the [c]ourt is
called upon to evaluate the situation as it exists at the
time of trial. And there are ...