April 19, 2018
seeking to recover damages as a result of the defendant's
alleged legal malpractice, and for other relief, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where
the court, Bright, J., granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
P. Taylor, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Stephen R. Finucane, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney gen- eral, Jane R.
Rosenberg, solicitor general, and Terrence M. O'Neill,
assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
Alvord, Keller and Beach, Js.
plaintiff, David Taylor, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court dismissing his one count complaint sounding in
legal malpractice against the defendant, Anthony Wallace. On
appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in
(1) dismissing the complaint; (2) concluding that the
plaintiff lacked standing to assert his claim of fraud; and
(3) denying the plaintiff's motion for reargument. The
defendant claims that the action was not ripe because the
underlying conviction had not been vacated. We affirm the
following facts and procedural history are pertinent to our
decision. In a previous criminal case, the plaintiff pleaded
guilty to murder under the Alford
doctrine on September 12, 2001, and was sentenced
to twenty-five years imprisonment. In the following years, he
has brought at least twelve petitions seeking posttrial
relief and has included as grounds for the relief claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant was appointed
to represent the plaintiff in one of the habeas proceedings;
the representation occurred between February 16, 2011, and
January 28, 2014.
present complaint alleging legal malpractice, dated April 18,
2016, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant provided
deficient representation and used the plaintiff's name
and circumstance to commit fraud against the state. On June
8, 2016, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the
basis that the plaintiff's claims were barred by
statutory immunity. At oral argument on the motion, the
defendant claimed additionally that the plaintiff lacked
standing to claim that the defendant had defrauded the state.
After oral argument, the court granted the motion to dismiss,
concluding that the defendant was entitled to statutory
immunity as to the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim.
The court also addressed the plaintiff's claim that the
defendant committed fraud against the state, and concluded
that the plaintiff did not have standing to pursue that
claim. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set
forth as necessary.
begin with generally applicable legal principles.
‘‘[In reviewing] the trial court's decision
to grant a motion to dismiss, we take the facts to be those
alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily
implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner
most favorable to the pleader. . . . [A] motion to dismiss
admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that
accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that
contain undisputed facts.'' (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) May v.
Coffey, 291 Conn. 106, 108, 967 A.2d 495 (2009).
determination regarding a trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . . the trial court
draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must
decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically
correct and find support in the facts that appear in the
record. . . .
matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court
to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action
before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the
merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . .
. The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any
time . . . [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own
motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is
called to its attention. . . . The requirement of subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be
raised at any stage in ...