Argued
March 27, 2018
Procedural
History
Substitute
information charging the defendant with the crimes of felony
murder, murder and robbery in the first degree, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven,
where the defendant was presented to the court, Clifford,
J., on a plea of guilty to the charge of murder;
thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to the
charges of felony murder and robbery in the first degree;
subsequently, the court denied the defendant's motion to
withdraw the plea and rendered judgment in accordance with
the plea, from which the defendant appealed to this court;
thereafter, the appeal was transferred to the Appellate
Court, Beach, Keller and Bear,
Js., which reversed the judgment of the trial court
and remanded the case for further proceedings, and the state,
on the granting of certification, appealed to this court.
Reversed; judgment directed.
James
M. Ralls, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the
brief, were Michael Dearington, former state's attorney,
and Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney, for the
appellant (state).
Deren
Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellee (defendant).
Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, D'Auria, Mullins and Kahn,
Js. [*]
OPINION
KAHN,
J.
This
appeal presents us with a common scenario: a trial court
accepts a guilty plea after a proper canvass, but the
defendant subsequently seeks to withdraw the plea due to a
change of heart. The question that often emerges from this
familiar context is the extent to which the trial court must
inquire into the defendant's request. In this case, the
Appellate Court concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to conduct (1) an evidentiary hearing
on the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, and (2)
an adequate inquiry into the defendant's request for new
counsel. The state appeals[1] from the judgment of the Appellate
Court reversing the judgment of conviction of the defendant,
Earl C. Simpson III, following his guilty plea entered under
the Alford[2] doctrine of murder in violation of General
Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a) and 53a-8.[3] State v.
Simpson, 169 Conn.App. 168, 171-72, 150 A.3d 699
(2016). The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly
concluded that the trial court was required to hold hearings
on the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and
his request for new counsel. Alternatively, the state claims
that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the trial
court did not conduct such hearings. The defendant counters
that hearings on both the motion and the request were
required, and that the Appellate Court properly concluded
that the trial court failed to conduct them. We conclude that
the trial court, after conducting a hearing on the
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, properly
denied the motion to withdraw, and, therefore, no evidentiary
hearing was required. We also conclude that, under the
circumstances of this case, no hearing was required on his
request for new counsel. Therefore, the judgment of the
Appellate Court is reversed.
The
Appellate Court set forth the following facts and procedural
history. ‘‘The defendant, represented by counsel,
entered an Alford plea[4] in this case on September 19,
2014. The state, by way of a long form information, filed on
June 29, 2012, charged the defendant in count one with felony
murder under General Statutes §§ 53a-54c and 53a-8,
in count two with murder as an accessory under §§
53a-54a (a) and 53a-8, and in count three with robbery or
attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (1).'' (Footnote
added and omitted.) State v. Simpson,
supra, 169 Conn.App. 172.
The
defendant pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine
to murder in violation of § 53a-54a and admitted that he
had violated his probation in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-32. Then, ‘‘[t]he prosecutor addressed
the court to set forth the factual basis underlying the plea
with respect to the murder count, as follows: ‘[W]ith
respect to the plea on the second count of murder, the state
is prepared to prove the following facts: On July 9, 2011, at
about 6 p.m., New Haven police officers responded to the area
of Howard Avenue and Putnam Street based upon a report of
shots fired. They located the body of John Claude James, age
twenty-six. It was evident to them that he had been shot
several times. A later autopsy determined that he had been
shot five times in the back area. All but one bullet had
exited the body. [Those bullets] were never located.
‘‘
‘During the investigation, a witness stated she was in
her apartment nearby. Moments after hearing the shots, Cody
Franklin and the defendant . . . ran into her apartment.
Franklin said that he had just shot someone. The witness also
said [the defendant] offered her weed to say that he and
Franklin had not been in her apartment. [The defendant] then
called his sister, Isis Hargrove, asking her to pick them up.
Franklin and the defendant . . . were a short time later seen
getting into Isis' car and leaving the area. Also, a
witness told [the] police he saw Franklin shoot . . . James
and [the defendant] was with Franklin at the time.
‘‘
‘The crime scene investigation resulted in the location
of six shell casings found in the immediate area where
witnesses saw the shots being fired. A ballistics examination
disclosed that five casings had been ejected from the same
gun, while the sixth casing was ejected from a different gun.
Such [evidence] is clearly consistent with there being two
shooters. Another witness told police that he saw Franklin
and [the defendant] together just before the shooting and saw
. . . Franklin fire shots, but he did not admit that he had
seen [the defendant] fire any shots.
‘‘
‘On May 19, 2014, the defendant . . . was being
interviewed by a member of the State's Attorney's
Office in Waterbury in connection with another shooting. When
asked about the previous shooting of . . . James, the
defendant . . . admitted that he was one of the
shooters.'[5]
''Thereafter,
the court canvassed the defendant with respect to his [murder
and probation] pleas. During the canvass, the defendant
stated that he was not under the influence of any alcohol,
drugs or medication; he had had a sufficient opportunity
prior to the plea canvass to discuss his pleas with counsel;
he was satisfied with his counsel's advice; he was
entering his ‘guilty plea' and his ‘probation
plea' voluntarily; and nobody was forcing or threatening
him to enter the pleas. The defendant stated that he
understood the rights he was giving up by entering his pleas,
including his right against compulsory self-incrimination,
his right to a trial by jury, and his right to confront his
accusers.
‘‘The
following colloquy between the court and the defendant
ensued:
***
‘‘
‘The Court: . . . On the crime of murder, the state
would have to prove that with the intent to cause the death
of another person, you caused the death of such person or of
a third person, and that is punishable by up to sixty years
in prison, twenty-five years at the minimum or nonsuspendable
portion. Do you understand that?
‘‘
‘[The Defendant]: Yes.'
‘‘The
court proceeded to ask the defendant if he understood the
nature of an Alford plea and if he understood the
sentence to which he was exposed as well as the agreement in
place with the state for a sentence of thirty-two and
one-half years imprisonment, with a twenty-five year minimum
sentence. The defendant stated that he understood these
matters and that no additional promises had been made to him
with respect to the pleas. The court stated: ‘Once I
accept these pleas, you can't change your mind later on
unless there's some valid legal reason. Do you understand
that?' The defendant replied affirmatively. At the
conclusion of the canvass, the defendant stated that he had
understood the questions directed to him by the court and
that there was nothing that he wished to raise to the court
or his attorney prior to the court's acceptance of the
pleas.
‘‘The
court accepted the defendant's pleas, finding that they
were ‘understandably made with the assistance of
competent counsel.' The court found that the defendant
was ‘guilty' and that he had violated his
probation. The court then continued the matter to a later
date.
‘‘By
handwritten letter dated October 27, 2014, and addressed to
the court, the defendant stated that he wanted to withdraw
his [murder] plea and that he desired a new attorney. In
relevant part, the letter, signed by the defendant, stated:
‘I request to withdraw my guilty plea. I have a
legitimate claim. I am not guilty of murder. I am claiming
ineffective counsel. I was not explained all elements of the
crime of murder. There was no testimony at . . .
Franklin's trial that I assisted, aided, or conspiracy.
There was no intent on my part. The mere fact that I did not
assist and help . . . Franklin from the testimony of the
state witnesses is enough to have the charges against me
dismissed.
‘‘
‘Had my attorney investigated and told me all the facts
I wouldn't have pled guilty to a charge that I didn't
commit. I felt pressured to take the plea because I was told
I had ‘‘no chance'' of winning [at]
trial. Individuals trying to say I confessed to things I did
not. I didn't sign anything or state anything on the
record. (About this so-called confession.)
‘‘
‘I need a new attorney and I need for him to request a
‘‘[m]otion to vacate'' and a[n]
‘‘evidentiary hearing.'' My counsel also
failed to file a ‘‘motion to dismiss''
the murder charges after . . . Franklin's trial. Please
look into this matter.'
‘‘Additionally,
the defendant wrote: ‘My attorney never told me the
difference between accessory after the fact and obstruction
of justice, and aiding and abetting. I never and did not
encourage, and or facilitate or participate in the crime by
the testimony of the state witness. I had
‘‘NO'' knowledge that anyone was going to
kill anyone. I request a new attorney and to withdraw my
plea. Also a[n] evidence hearing on this matter. Ineffective
counsel and evidence hearing. Please withdraw my plea. I
couldn't make an intelligent decision. Please look into
this matter.'
‘‘On
December 4, 2014, through counsel, the defendant filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Practice Book
§§ 39-26 and 39-27. In relevant part, the motion
stated: ‘In subsequent written and oral communications
between the defendant and undersigned counsel, the defendant
has indicated he did not possess knowledge or fully
understand the sentence that could be imposed or the
consequences thereto at the time he entered the guilty
plea.' The state filed a written opposition to the
defendant's motion. . . .
‘‘By
a second handwritten letter, dated December 8, 2014, and
addressed to the court, the defendant renewed his request to
withdraw his plea and for new counsel. The letter, signed by
the defendant, stated in relevant part: ‘[T]here are a
few things I would like to bring to your attention. First and
foremost, I was in (special aid) in school and didn't
have enough time to be fully explained anything about my
charges. I just came and it was on the table. (Accept or
reject.) My lawyer never explained the full conditions to . .
. such charge I was suppose[d] to plea to in which any
evidence points to me as an accessory to. I never had a legal
visit or anything. I would really like to take this plea
back. My lawyer talked me into something I didn't want to
do. I was confused. When I came to court I've told him
this personally and that I would like a new lawyer.
([In]effective counsel.) He didn't put any motions in to
try to get any hearings when I asked for some. When I was
explained about my charge after the fact I told him to
withdraw my plea. He wants to wait until the last minute
going against my wishes. This is my life on the line and I
would like to withdraw and go to trial. Because I'm not
responsible for this charge that's against me. Please. I
would really appreciate it a lot. Also requesting a new
lawyer. I told my old lawyer, Thomas Farver, [that] I wanted
to request a new one and I don't think he put it in and
went around what I said. I have [a] court [appearance on
December] 19, 2014 that is suppose[d] to be a sentencing
date. I really hope you grant the motion for my plea to be
withdrawn.'
‘‘The
defendant, represented by counsel, appeared in court on
December 19, 2014, for sentencing. At the beginning of the
hearing, the court stated: ‘I know the defendant had
sent some letters to me which seemed to indicate that,
possibly, he was interested in with drawing his plea.' .
. . The following colloquy then occurred:
‘‘
‘The Court: So, I guess I should . . . ask [the
defendant] . . . is he still pursuing a ...