Argued
May 17, 2018
Procedural
History
Action
to foreclose municipal tax liens on certain real property
owned by the named defendant, and for other relief, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford,
where the court, Robaina, J., granted the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability
only; thereafter, the court, Dubay, J., rendered
judgment of foreclosure by sale and awarded attorney's
fees to the plaintiff; subsequently, the court, Dubay,
J., granted the named defendant's motion to
reconsider only as to the issue of attorney's fees;
thereafter, the court, Dubay, J., entered an order
confirming the initial amount of attorney's fees awarded,
and the named defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
John
Sakon, self-represented, the appellant (named defendant).
Latonia C. Williams, with whom was Patrick M. Fahey, for the
appellee (plaintiff).
Bright, Moll and Sullivan, Js.
OPINION
SULLIVAN, J.
In this
tax lien foreclosure action, [1] the defendant John Alan
Sakon[2] appeals from the judgment of the
trial court granting the plaintiff's request for
attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the defendant
claims that the attorney's fees awarded by the court were
excessive and unreasonable. We conclude that the amount of
attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff did not
constitute an abuse of discretion and, accordingly, affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
This
court's recent decision in the same matter,
Glastonbury v. Sakon, 172 Conn.App. 646,
161 A.3d 657 (2017) (per curiam), sets forth the following
facts: ‘‘The defendant is the record owner of two
properties [described in the complaint as the Griswold Street
property and the Main Street property, respectively, ] in
Glastonbury. The defendant failed to pay the property taxes
on his properties for the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and
2013. As a result, the plaintiff, the town of Glastonbury,
assessed tax liens against the defendant's properties for
the unpaid real property taxes (tax liens).
‘‘On
November 6, 2012, the plaintiff commenced this action to
foreclose on the 2009, 2010, and 2011 tax liens for the
defendant's two properties by filing a two count
complaint, in which each count pertained to one of the
defendant's two properties. On August 27, 2013, the
plaintiff filed a motion for default for failure to plead,
which was granted on September 4, 2013. On December 10, 2013,
the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment of foreclosure by
sale. On December 18, 2013, the defendant filed his answer to
the plaintiff's complaint, which contained six special
defenses and seven counterclaims (original special defenses
and counterclaims). On January 29, 2014, the defendant filed
a motion to open the default, which was granted on February
10, 2014. On March 12, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion to
strike the original special defenses and counterclaims (first
motion to strike).
‘‘On
August 13, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended two count
complaint, in which it additionally sought to foreclose on
the 2012 and 2013 tax liens for the defendant's two
properties and clarified its description of the
defendant's properties (operative complaint).
‘‘On
November 21, 2014, the court, Robaina, J., granted
the plaintiff's first motion to strike. On December 10,
2014, the defendant filed a revised motion for
reconsideration of the court's order granting the
plaintiff's first motion to strike. On December 11, 2014,
the defendant filed an amended answer in response to the
operative complaint, which contained special defenses and
counterclaims that were substantially similar to those raised
in his original answer (amended special defenses and
counterclaims). On December 24, 2014, the plaintiff filed a
motion to strike the defendant's amended special defenses
and counterclaims (second motion to strike).
‘‘On
December 29, 2014, the court denied the defendant's
revised motion for reconsideration of the court's order
granting the plaintiff's first motion to strike. On
January 5 and 6, 2015, and February 4, 2015, the defendant
filed motions for extension of time to file a substitute
pleading pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44. On February
11, 2015, the defendant filed a substitute answer, in which
he raised four special defenses and two counterclaims
(substitute special defenses and counterclaims). On March 16,
2015, the court concluded that the second motion to strike
[filed on December 24, 2014] was moot because ‘[t]he
operative substitute special defenses and counterclaims are
those filed on February 11, 2015.'
‘‘On
March 31, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the
substitute special defenses and counterclaims (third motion
to strike) and a motion for judgment of nonsuit as to the
counterclaims. On July 9, 2015, the court, Vacchelli,
J., applying the law of the case doctrine, granted the
third motion to strike because the substitute special
defenses and counterclaims ‘all attempt the exact same
challenges previously ruled to be legally insufficient'
by the court on November 11, 2014. The court also entered
default against the defendant as to ...