United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MICHAEL P. GALIAN, Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER SELWYN SEBOURNE, ET AL. Defendants.
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MICHAEL P. SHEA, U.S.D.J.
I.
Introduction
This
action arises from the arrest of Plaintiff Michael Galian by
Defendants Selwyn Sebourne and Michael B. McClain, both
Shelton police officers. The plaintiff alleges that Officer
Sebourne instructed officers of a neighboring police
department to arrest the plaintiff without a warrant on a
charge of breach of peace. He contends that Officer Sebourne
took these actions despite his knowledge that the plaintiff
was innocent of this charge. Further, he avers that Officer
McClain assisted Officer Sebourne in carrying out this
unlawful scheme. Based upon these allegations, the plaintiff
sets out a claim of false arrest against both defendants and
a claim of malicious prosecution against Officer Sebourne.
Now before me is the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 27.) In their motion, the defendants
contend that the plaintiff's claims fail because, among
other things, Officer Sebourne had probable cause to arrest
the plaintiff for breach of peace. For the reasons that
follow, the defendant's summary judgment motion is
granted.
II.
Background
A.
Factual Background
The
following facts, which are taken from the parties' Local
Rule 56(a) Statements and the exhibits, are undisputed unless
otherwise indicated. At the time of his arrest, the plaintiff
resided in “Monroe, Connecticut, with his son, Brian
Galian, and his son's girlfriend, Amanda Ely
(‘Ely').” (ECF No. 27-2, Defendants'
Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement (“Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1
Stmt.”) at ¶ 1; ECF No. 28-1, Plaintiff's
Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement (“Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2
Stmt.”) at ¶ 1.) At all relevant times, the
defendants were acting in their “capacities as police
officers in the Shelton Police Department
(‘SPD').” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at
¶ 2; Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶ 2.)
“On
February 13, 2015, Ely pled guilty to two felony drug charges
. . . .” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 3;
Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶ 3.) An order was
subsequently issued in a “separate pending custody
dispute between Ely and Dwayne Anderson, Sr., which awarded
the latter full legal custody of their minor son.”
(Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 4; Pl.'s L.R.
56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶ 4.) The parties dispute the exact
wording of that order. The defendants contend that the order
provided that “Ely was allowed supervised visitation .
. . on [specific] weekdays between 3:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.
during the school year, including the date [at issue in this
case], September 8, 2015 (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at
¶ 5); the plaintiff contends that the “order
during the school year provided that Ms. Ely's visitation
during school days began at the time the child was dropped
off at the bus stop, regardless of the specific time.”
(Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 5.) This dispute
between the parties would prove key in the events leading to
the plaintiff's arrest, although it is not a dispute over
a material fact for purposes of summary judgment.
“[B]eginning
in March, 2015, and up to and including September 8, 2015,
plaintiff had been granted permission by the minor son's
guardian ad litem to supervise Ely's visits [with]
him.” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 6;
Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶ 6.) “On September
8, 2015, plaintiff, who was acting as the court-assigned
supervisor of Ely's visits with her minor son, drove Ely
to the Anderson residence . . . in Shelton to pick him
up.” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 7;
Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶ 7.) The minor son's
school had let him out early due to excessive heat.
(See ECF No. 27-4, Deposition of Michael Galian
(“Galian Depo.”) at 33 (“So, on this
particular day, . . . school was cancelled because it was
just too darned hot to be in school.”).) The plaintiff
“pulled his vehicle up in front of the Anderson
residence at approximately 1:00 p.m. on September 8, 2015; at
that point, Ely exited the backseat and walked up
Anderson's driveway, where she encountered Leanne
Anderson, who was holding her three-year old daughter.”
(Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 8; Pl.'s L.R.
56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶ 8.) Ely and Ms. Anderson
“engaged in [an] . . . exchange of words, after which
Ely walked down the driveway, past plaintiff's vehicle,
and across Longmeadow Street; she stopped and stood in front
of [the house next to the Anderson residence], the location
where her minor son was dropped off by his school bus on
school days.” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶
9; Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶ 9.) The dispute
between Ely and Ms. Anderson mirrored the parties'
dispute over the court order above-Ely felt the court order
allowed her to pick up her minor son whenever school let out
while Anderson felt that Ely's visitation began at 3:30
P.M. (See Galian Depo. at 33-34.)
The
parties differ on what happened next. The defendants contend
that “Leanne Anderson then approached plaintiff's
vehicle and the two of them had a heated exchange, the
specific tone and language of which is disputed by plaintiff
and Ms. Anderson” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at
¶ 10); the plaintiff contends that “Ms. Anderson
was screaming hysterically at the plaintiff, but the
plaintiff did not raise his voice to her and did not use any
inappropriate language.” (Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt.
at ¶ 10.) “Shortly thereafter, the school bus
pulled in front of [the house next to the Anderson
residence], at which point Ely took her minor son of[f] the
bus and the two of them entered plaintiff's vehicle
without interference from Ms. Anderson; plaintiff then drove
his vehicle away from the scene.” (Def.'s L.R.
56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 12; Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at
¶ 12.)
“After
plaintiff drove off with Ely and her minor son in his
vehicle, ” Ms. Anderson called the Shelton Police
Department and “Officer Sebourne was dispatched to [the
Anderson residence].” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at
¶ 13; Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶
13.)[1]
The parties' accounts diverge again on what took place
next. The defendants contend that upon Officer Sebourne's
arrival at the Anderson residence, he “proceed[ed] to
interview and obtain[] a sworn statement from Leanne Anderson
regarding her encounter with Ely and plaintiff prior to his
arrival.” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 14.)
The plaintiff contends that “[t]he evidence shows that
defendant Sebourne arrived at the Anderson house after the
others involved had departed and that he wrote out a
statement which he had Ms. Anderson sign.” (Pl.'s
L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 14.) Although the plaintiff
“disputes certain assertions made by Ms. Anderson in
her statement, [he] does not dispute that she made them or
signed the statement in front of Officer Sebourne” and
he does not contest that the copy of the statement in the
record is accurate. (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at
¶¶ 15-16; Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at
¶¶ 15-16.)
In her
statement, Ms. Anderson alleged that she walked over to speak
with the plaintiff because he was “the mediator and
should have his own copy of the custody agreement.”
(See ECF No. 27-6, Statement of Leanne Anderson
(“Anderson Stmt.”) at 2.) She claims in her
statement that she “asked what [the plaintiff] was
doing here, because the court paperwork clearly states to
resume previous [visitation] hours of 3:30pm-7pm when
[Ely's minor child] was back in school.”
(Id.) According to Ms. Anderson's statement, the
plaintiff's “response was ‘I don't know
shit.'” (Id.) She claims that she
“then asked why he was talking to [her] like that since
we never had a conversation before.” (Id.) She
claims that she then stated that she “wasn't sure
exactly what was going on here and that's when [the
plaintiff's] tone of voice escalated and he replied with,
‘well if you don't know anything then you need to
get the fuck back in your house.'” (Id.)
Ms. Anderson's statement notes that “[a]t this
point [she] took a step back from the car” and became
“fearful.” (Id.) According to her
statement, she let the plaintiff and Ely take the minor child
away when he arrived on the bus “because [Ms. Anderson]
had no idea what they were capable of.” (Id.)
Ms. Anderson's statement ends with the claim that she
“then called the police” and informed them that
she wished to “pursue criminal charges against [the
plaintiff].” (Id.)
After
taking Ms. Anderson's statement, the defendants claim
that Officer Sebourne “interviewed and took a sworn
statement from her neighbor, Cynthia Formato, who lived
across the street . . ., and [who] was waiting for two
children to get off the bus during Ms. Anderson's
encounter with Ely and plaintiff.” (Def.'s L.R.
56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 21.) The plaintiff claims that Officer
Sebourne “wrote out a statement which Ms. Formato
signed.” (Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶ 21.)
The plaintiff does not dispute, however, that “Ms.
Formato provided Officer Sebourne with the sworn statement .
. . .” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 23;
Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶ 23.) Nor does he
dispute the accuracy of the copy of that statement in the
record. (See Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶
22; Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at ¶ 22.) Ms.
Formato's statement reads as follows:
I, Cynthia Formato am sitting here in my kitchen at [my home]
in Shelton with Officer Sebourne. I am making this statement
under my own free will and have not be[en] coerced in any
way. On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, I was sitting on my front
porch at approximately 12:55 waiting for my two sons to get
off the bus. It was an early dismissal day due to heat. I
observed my neighbor Leanne getting upset. She was telling
[Ely] that she didn't belong there-Amanda walked towards
my house and stood at the end of the driveway. I then heard
Leanne plead with whomever was in the vehicle to do the right
thing for the child. This is not direct quote, but she said
something like, “Don't you want to keep him
safe?” I don't know what else was said. I heard
loud voices but couldn't make out the words. Then I heard
Leanne ask that the car be moved away from her home. They
pulled the car up to the next house. The bus arrived. I felt
a bit stressed and nervous. I was unaware of what could
transpire so I took my children and one of their friends in
the house immediately. This is a true account of what I
observed.
(ECF No. 27-2, Statement of Cynthia Formato (“Formato
Stmt.”) at 1-2.) “Based on the information and
conduct reported and sworn to by Ms. Anderson and Ms.
Formato, Officer Sebourne concluded that there was probable
cause to arrest plaintiff for breach of peace in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-181.” (Def.'s L.R.
56(a)1 Stmt. at ¶ 24; Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. at
¶ 24 (noting that defendant makes this claim).) Officer
Sebourne then “radioed and asked his dispatcher to
contact the Monroe Police Department and request that they
send officers to plaintiff's residence to check on the
welfare of Ely's minor son, and take plaintiff into
custody for Breach of Peace.” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1
Stmt. at ¶ 25; Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 Stmt. At ¶
25.) “Officer Sebourne did not observe, speak to or
interact with plaintiff on September 8, 2015, and has never
done so on any other date.” (Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1
Stmt. ...