United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Anderson (“Plaintiff”), pro se,
currently incarcerated at Oxford Federal Correctional
Institution, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 against Warden Herman Quay, Pl.
Petition, ECF No. 1, who was substituted by Warden D.K.
Williams on February 5, 2016. ECF No. 10. Mr. Anderson
alleges that the Defendant and Bureau of Prison
(“BOP”) officials violated his First, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendment rights, while he was incarcerated at Danbury
Federal Correctional Institution (“Danbury FCI”)
in Danbury, Connecticut. Id.
Anderson argues that BOP: (1) retaliated against him for
filing lawsuits and prison grievances by adding or retaining
a Public Safety Factor (PSF) of “greatest
severity” in his record, (2) denied him due process by
retaining the PSF of “greatest severity, ” and
(3) was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and
subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Anderson v. Williams, No. 3:15CV1364 (VAB), 2017 WL
855795, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2017). Essentially, Plaintiff
sought removal of the PSF from his record and relocation from
Danbury FCI. Pl. Mem. of Law, ECF. No. 2, at 5, 17-28. On
March 3, 2017, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's motion to dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 14; Anderson, 2017 WL 855795.
Court granted the motion to dismiss with regard to the second
ground of Plaintiff's petition, that BOP deprived him of
a “liberty interest in his security classification
based on the assignment of a particular PSF.”
Anderson, 2017 WL 855795, at *9. The Court found no
such liberty interest and therefore determined that Mr.
Anderson “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which his
request for relief may be granted.” Id.
Court simultaneously denied without prejudice the motion to
dismiss ground one, that BOP violated Mr. Anderson's
First Amendment rights by assigning him a PSF of
“greatest severity” in retaliation against his
constitutionally protect speech or conduct, id. at
*9, and the motion to dismiss ground three, BOP's
deliberate indifference to Mr. Anderson's medical needs
and unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Id.
18, 2018, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment under
Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 56(a). Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 28.
Defendant argues that there is no genuine issue to be tried,
in part, because: (1) Plaintiff's PSF was removed from
his record while he was at Danbury FCI; (2) Plaintiff's
transfer to Oxford FCI deprives the Court of jurisdiction;
and (3) Plaintiff's prison conditions claim was confined
to Danbury FCI. Id. at 2. The Court agrees.
reasons set forth below, the Court now
GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary
judgment, dismisses the remaining parts of Plaintiff's
petition, and orders the case closed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
every stage of a case, a court must consider whether it has
jurisdiction. “The rule in federal cases is that an
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review,
not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct.
2330, 2334, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975). A case is deemed moot
where the problem sought to be remedied has ceased, and where
there is “no reasonable expectation that the wrong will
be repeated.” Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504,
506 (2d Cir. 1996)(quoting Preiser, 422 U.S. at 401)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). “Under
this reasoning, a transfer from a prison facility moots an
action for injunctive and declaratory relief against the
transferring facility because the prisoner is no longer
located there.” Prins, 76 F.3d at 506; see
also Keitt v. New York City, 882 F.Supp.2d 412, 449
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[A] transfer from a prison facility
moots an action for injunctive and declaratory relief against
the transferring facility because the prisoner is no longer
review of Plaintiff's petition, Defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and Plaintiff's response in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment, the Court finds Mr.
Anderson's petition moot. Pl. Petition, Mot for Summ. J.,
Pl. Resp. in Opp. to Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 29. Before
leaving Danbury FCI, BOP removed Mr. Anderson's PSF. Mem.
in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., ECF 28-5, at 7. That removal
made Mr. Anderson eligible for transfer out of Danbury FCI to
a prison camp. Id. On August 15, 2017, BOP
transferred Mr. Anderson to a camp in Duluth, Minnesota.
Id. Danbury FCI therefore no longer has control over
Mr. Anderson's medical care because Mr. Anderson is no
longer incarcerated at Danbury FCI.
Mr. Anderson concedes that his medical care, living
condition, and PSF claims all originate from his
incarceration at Danbury FCI, and that the Court “does
lack jurisdiction over [the] claims in his § 2241
petition since he is no longer housed at FCI Danbury. [Mr.
Anderson] does not desire to have his complaint transferred .
. .” Pl. Resp. in Opp. to Mot. Summ. J. at 2, 4.
Plaintiff further contends that he would prevail on his
§ 2241 claim, but does not indicate what relief would
Court finds that the case is moot. Mr. Anderson's desired
remedy of removal of the PSF designation has been achieved
and he has been transferred as a result away from Danbury
FCI, resulting in the mooting of any other claims based on
conditions at that facility. Prins, 76 F.3d at 506
(“a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for
injunctive and declaratory relief against the transferring
facility because the prisoner is no longer located
there.”). As a matter of law, Mr. Anderson no longer
has any viable claims. Defendants' motion for summary
judgment therefore must be granted.