United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED
A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Kollar (“Plaintiff”) brings this suit against
Allstate Insurance Company and Allstate Financial Services,
LLC (collectively “Defendants”), with whom he was
affiliated as a licensed insurance agent. He raises five
claims in his Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”).
Am. Compl., ECF No. 46. Specifically, he asserts that both
Defendants are liable for breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of
the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
(“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a, et
seq., tortious interference with Mr. Kollar's business
expectancy, and violation of the Connecticut Franchise Act
(“Connecticut Franchise Act”). Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 42-133e, et seq. Defendants move to dismiss all
reasons set forth below, the Court now
GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss as
to Counts I-IV, and DENIES Defendants'
motion to dismiss as to Count V. Counts I-IV are dismissed
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Court assumes that the parties have familiarity with the
original allegations in this lawsuit and therefore only
addresses any new and relevant allegations in Mr.
Kollar's Amended Complaint below.
Court has presided over this case since 2016.
13, 2016, Mr. Kollar filed a Complaint in the Superior Court
of Connecticut. Compl., ECF No. 1. On November 22, 2016,
Defendants removed the case to this Court. Id. On
January 5, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. ECF
No. 20. On January 20, 2017, the Court held a status
conference and motion hearing. ECF No. 25.
28, 2017, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss
without prejudice and granted Mr. Kollar leave to file an
Amended Complaint addressing the legal deficiencies
identified by the Court thirty days from Court's Order.
Order granting motion to dismiss without prejudice. ECF No.
39; Kollar v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 3:16-CV-01927
(VAB), 2017 WL 3222535 (D. Conn. July 28, 2017).
Kollar filed an Amended Complaint on September 1, 2017. Am.
Compl. Mr. Kollar's Amended Complaint alleges myriad new
facts. Am. Compl. Though the Court has reviewed the Amended
Complaint in its entirety, the Court considers those facts
that could change the outcome of the defendants' motion
to dismiss. See Muhammad v. Bonner, No.
05CV1851(RJD)(LB), 2008 WL 926574, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2008) (Denying Plaintiffs' motions for further discovery
and a proposed amended complaint because the facts therein
would not change the outcome of defendants' motion for
Defendants' policies on production requirements, Mr.
Kollar alleges that a 2014 memorandum “expressly stated
that insurance applications written on a spouse would count
towards 2014 production requirements.” Am. Compl.
¶ 13. Mr. Kollar also cites the Executive Agency
Independent Contractor Manual (“EAIC Manual”),
stating: ‘The Company will evaluate your agency's
results . . . On a moving 12-month period, a formal
consultation will be offered to you if you do not achieve ABO
results . . .'” Id. at ¶ 14b.
the pulling of Mrs. Kollar's life insurance policy, Mr.
Kollar contends that Bill Christie “sent Mr. Kollar an
email stating: ‘According to the underwriter, they
[Allstate Financial Services] pulled the case due to
persistency problems. Persistency is an industry term
referring to controlled business.” Id. at
¶ 21h. Mr. Kollar further alleges that he informed
Defendants about the pulling of the policy. Id.
the location of another Allstate agency in close proximity to
Mr. Kollar's agency, Mr. Kollar contends that the EAIC
Manual discourages the merging of satellite locations.
Id. at ¶ 14c-d. Further, Defendants'
Reference Guide on requirements for Sales Locations states:
“once you become an R3001 Agent or purchase an R3011
Agency, you will continue to operate from the same office in
which your agency is currently doing business.”
Id. at ¶ 14c.
Kollar contends that “the Territorial Sales Leader
permitted the relocation because of a personal relationship
with the Field Sales Leader and the relocation of the
competing agency would benefit the Field Sales Leader.”
Id. at ¶ 19b. According to Mr. Kollar, the
Territorial Sales Leader ignored Mr. Kollar's pictures
and proof of his sign and street exposure, which would have
made the relocation impermissible. Id. at ¶
19c. Relatedly, Mr. Kollar claims that Alton Davis of
Allstate's New England Region said that the relocation of
a competing agency in close proximity to Mr. Kollar's was
“against pattern” Id. at ¶ 19g.
the sale of the agency, Mr. Kollar alleges that he
“presented Allstate Insurance Co. with multiple,
qualified, previously-approved Allstate agents who sought to
purchase the agency.” Id. at ¶ 24a. After
rejecting those agents, Defendants purportedly “refused
to afford Mr. Kollar additional time to sell the
agency.” Id. at ¶ 24d. Then, an Allstate
employee named Robert Dunn bought the agency “at a
greatly discounted price, ” Id. at ¶ 24e,
allegedly depriving Mr. Kollar of $250, 000, Id. at
¶ 34d, and violating EAIC Manual guidance that “.
. . Allstate is never the buyer or seller.”
Id. at ¶ 30d.
regard to black-listing, Mr. Kollar now claims that he
“has been unable to obtain employment or an independent
contractor relationship with at least nine different
insurance agencies.” Id. at ¶ 26.
Mr. Kollar now contends that he “relied upon . . . the
Exclusive Agency Agreement, Supplement, Agency Standards, and
other written memoranda in purchasing his economic interest
in the agency and operating his agency.” Id.
at ¶ 15.
now have pending a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.
Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., ECF No. 51.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A court will dismiss any
claim that fails “to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court applies a
“plausibility standard” guided by “two
working principles.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“While a
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.”) (internal citations
omitted). Second, “only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the
complaint must contain ...