United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff
Cara Tangreti moves to amend her complaint in order to make
several minor substantive and stylistic changes. (ECF No.
37.) Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2), a party may amend its
complaint more than 21 days after service only with the
consent of the opposing party or with leave of the Court. The
rule instructs that “[t]he court should freely give
leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).
Thus, “[a]bsent undue delay, bad faith, dilatory
tactics, undue prejudice to the party to be served with the
proposed pleading, or futility, the motion should be freely
granted.” Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71
F.3d 58, 66 (2d Cir. 1995).
Defendants
consent to the majority of Tangreti's amendments, but
object to her request to add a clause to one paragraph. The
paragraph, with the contested addition italicized, reads:
The sexual abuse and harassment inflicted on Cara, and
allowed and encouraged by the defendants, did cause severe
physical and psychological harm, including, but not limited
to: fear of being impregnated by Gillette; infection with
vaginal herpes by one or more of her assaulters;
infection of her minor daughter with herpes;
terrifying nightmares; anxiety; depression; and severe and
chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
(ECF No. 37-1 ¶ 117.)
Defendants
argue that this addition would be futile because Tangreti
does not have standing to add a claim based on her minor
daughter's infection. They assert that the infection is
not an injury that Tangreti herself suffered and third-party
standing is disfavored. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). Their
argument is unavailing. To meet the standing requirements of
Article III, “[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested
relief.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818
(1997). Tangreti does not bring the claim on her
daughter's behalf, but rather seeks damages for the
psychological harm she has suffered personally as a
result of her daughter's infection. Indeed, her
daughter's infection is listed among six other items in
the same paragraph that Tangreti alleges have caused her
“physical or psychological harm.” (ECF No. 37-1
¶ 117.) Thus, regardless of whether Tangreti would have
standing to collect damages for her daughter's pain and
suffering, she may seek damages for the psychological harm
she herself suffered when she allegedly passed the infection
she contracted during her sexual assault on to her daughter.
Next,
Defendants argue that Tangreti's claim is futile because
it does not meet the requirements in Connecticut for
bystander emotional distress. Defendants mischaracterize the
proposed amendment. “An amendment to a pleading is
futile if the proposed claim could not withstand a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Lucente
v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d
Cir. 2002). I thus apply the same standard as I would in
considering such a motion, taking the plaintiff's factual
allegations “to be true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Harris v.
Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009).[1] A plaintiff
seeking damages for bystander emotional distress must show
that he or she witnessed a tortfeasor causing serious bodily
injury to another person with whom the plaintiff had a close
familial relationship and suffered severe distress as a
result. See Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Ass'n, 316
Conn. 558, 571 (2015). Tangreti's theory, however, is
more direct. She alleges that Defendants caused her to become
infected with vaginal herpes by failing to prevent her sexual
assaults. She then suffered additional psychological anguish
when she passed the infection to her daughter. While
Defendants contend that the chain of causation from their
failure to protect Tangreti from sexual assault to her
daughter's infection is attenuated, it is not so
attenuated that the amendment is futile. Tangreti will need
to convince a jury that the Defendants' conduct
proximately caused the psychological trauma she suffered when
she passed the infection to her daughter. She need not and
does not make any recourse to Connecticut's doctrine of
bystander emotional distress. See Krayeski v. Greenwich
Hosp., No. FSTCV146022177S, 2015 WL 9595345, at *8
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 2015) (holding that plaintiff
suing for emotional distress caused by harm to her daughter
from medical malpractice during childbirth did not have to
establish the elements for bystander emotional distress
because the “longstanding principals governing
negligence and medical malpractice” supported
defendants' liability).
For the
foregoing reasons, Tangreti's motion to amend her
complaint is GRANTED. Defendants shall have fourteen days
from the posting of this order to file a responsive pleading
or pre-answer motion.
IT IS
SO ORDERED.
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Notes:
[1] I do not express an opinion on the
merits of any later motion to dismiss the complaint. The
parties have briefed the merits of one specific clause in
isolation, and I consider only those ...