Argued
May 15, 2018
Procedural
History
Action
to recover damages for the defendant's alleged
negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court,
Scholl, J., granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,
from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Reversed; further proceedings.
Anne
Jasorkowski, with whom, on the brief, was Angelo Maragos, for
the appellant (plaintiff).
Lauren
A. MacDonald, with whom, on the brief, was Timothy R.
Scannell, for the appellee (defendant).
DiPentima, C. J., and Prescott and Eveleigh, Js.
OPINION
PRESCOTT, J.
In
Jewish Home for the Elderly of Fairfield County,
Inc., v. Cantore, 257 Conn. 531, 532, 543-44,
778 A.2d93(2001) (Jewish Home), our Supreme Court
recognized that a nursing home that has been harmed by the
negligence of a conservator is entitled to recover, through
an action on a probate bond, the losses it suffered as a
result of the conservator's failure to timely file an
application for Medicaid benefits on behalf of his or her
ward. This appeal asks us to determine whether to recognize a
similar right of recovery in a case where no probate bond was
obtained.
This
appeal arises out of an action by the plaintiff, Bloomfield
Health Care Center of Connecticut, LLC, in which it alleged
that the defendant, Jason Doyon, breached a duty to use
reasonable care in managing the estate of his ward, Samuel
Johnson. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the
defendant was negligent by failing to apply for and to obtain
on a timely basis Medicaid benefits that were necessary to
pay the plaintiff for the cost of Johnson's care at the
plaintiff's nursing home. The plaintiff now appeals from
the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of
the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
improperly concluded that the defendant did not owe it a duty
of care and, thus, was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse
the judgment of the court.
The
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
as the nonmoving party, reveals the following facts. The
plaintiff operates a chronic care and convalescent nursing
home facility in Bloomfield. On April 19, 2013, Johnson was
admitted as a resident to the plaintiff's facility.
Thereafter, the plaintiff provided care and services to
Johnson at a rate of $360 per day. On October 1, 2013, the
cost of care increased to $370 per day.
On
September 26, 2013, Johnson's daughter, who at the time
was acting as his attorney-in-fact, filed an application for
Medicaid benefits on behalf of Johnson. On November 26, 2013,
Johnson's daughter sold his home. The net proceeds from
the sale of the home totaled $48, 000.
On
January 8, 2014, the Department of Social Services
(department) denied Johnson's application for Medic-aid
benefits for failure to provide required information. The
information missing from the application included the
disposition of the proceeds from the sale of his home, copies
of bank statements, information regarding the surrender of
his stocks, and proof that his assets totaled less than
$1600.
On
February 26, 2014, the plaintiff petitioned the Probate Court
to appoint an involuntary conservator to oversee
Johnson's estate for the purpose of assisting him with
his finances and Medicaid application, and to ensure that it
would be compensated for the necessary care it provided to
him.[1]
On April 8, 2014, the court adjudicated Johnson incapable of
managing his financial affairs, granted the plaintiff's
petition, and appointed the defendant as the conservator of
Johnson's estate. The court dispensed with the
requirement of a probate bond.
On
April 15, 2014, the defendant tendered the $48, 000 in
proceeds from the sale of Johnson's home to the plaintiff
to be applied to Johnson's outstanding bill, which
totaled $124, 000 at that time. After the proceeds from the
sale of Johnson's home were paid to the plaintiff, his
only other source of income was $1363 that he received in
social security benefits each month, which the defendant
subsequently began paying over to the plaintiff.
Although
Johnson did not have sufficient remaining funds or income to
pay for his care, it was not until nine months later, on
January 21, 2015, that the defendant submitted Johnson's
application for Medicaid benefits. On February 17, 2015, the
department told the defendant that Johnson's application
was incomplete and requested that the defendant provide it
with additional information by February 28, 2015, including
the value of any of Johnson's remaining real property and
bank account statements. The defendant failed to provide the
department with the requested information, and, on March 24,
2015, Johnson's application was denied.
The
defendant filed Johnson's second application for Medicaid
benefits on August 12, 2015. The application was granted on
September 24, 2015, and Johnson's Medicaid benefits were
made retroactive to May 1, 2015. Johnson did not receive any
Medicaid benefits for the cost of his care prior to that
date. On October 21, 2015, Johnson died.
On
February 1, 2016, the plaintiff commenced the present action.
The plaintiff alleged in the operative complaint that the
defendant's failure to apply for and to obtain on a
timely basis Medicaid benefits for Johnson had violated a
duty of care that he owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
further alleged that the defendant's negligence caused it
to suffer financial harm and loss, and therefore it requested
monetary damages.[2]
On July
19, 2016, the defendant filed an answer to the
plaintiff's complaint and special defenses. On September
21, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.
In his memorandum of law in support of his motion, the
defendant argued that he did not owe a duty of care to the
plaintiff. Specifically, he argued that he owed a duty of
care only to Johnson, his ward, and thus the plaintiff did
not have standing to bring the action. The defendant also
argued that he was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for
his actions.
In its
memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that the defendant
owed it a duty of care under a common-law theory of
negligence. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that it was
readily foreseeable that Johnson would be unable to pay it
for the cost of his care if the defendant failed to timely
submita Medicaid application on his behalf and, further, that
the plaintiff would suffer harm as a result. The plaintiff
also argued that public policy supported its claim that the
defendant owed it a duty of care and that there was
‘‘no principled reason why a conservator should
avoid liability for his negligence simply because there is no
probate bond in a particular case.'' Finally, the
plaintiff argued that the defendant was not entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity because the Probate Court never
expressly approved the defendant's actions with respect
to Johnson's Medicaid application.
On
March 13, 2017, the court issued its memorandum of decision
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
concluding that ‘‘the law does not support the
plaintiff's claim that the defendant, solely as a result
of his appointment as a conservator, owed any duty to the
plaintiff.'' The court reasoned that
‘‘the defendant's duty, and, in fact, his
authority to pursue Medicaid benefits on behalf of his ward,
does not arise out of any relationship between the plaintiff
and him, but solely from his appointment by the Probate Court
as conservator, and his duties pursuant to that
appointment.'' The court thus determined that the
defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care because
‘‘[t]he purpose of a conservator is not to manage
the ward's estate for the benefit of his creditors but
for the benefit of the ward.'' On March 31, 2017, the
plaintiff timely filed the present appeal.
The
plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court improperly
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
because it incorrectly concluded that the defendant did not
owe it a duty of care. Specifically, the plaintiff argues
that the defendant owed it a duty to use reasonable care in
managing Johnson's estate because (1) the harm caused to
the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligence
was foreseeable, and (2) public policy supports recognizing a
duty of care in this context. We agree with the plaintiff
that the defendant owed it a duty to use reasonable care to
timely secure Medicaid benefits for Johnson.
We
begin by setting forth the relevant standards that govern our
review of a court's decision to grant a defendant's
motion for summary judgment. ‘‘Practice Book
§ [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other
proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The
party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the
absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under
the applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to
a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing
such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact. . . . [I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination,
is key to the procedure. . . . Our review of the decision to
grant a motion for summary judgment is plenary. . . . We
therefore must decide whether the court's conclusions
were legally and logically correct and find support in the
record.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Barbee v. Sysco Connecticut, LLC, 156 Conn.App. 813,
817-18, 114 A.3d 944 (2015).
We
begin our analysis by first considering the defendant's
role and general duties as conservator of Johnson's
estate. General Statutes § 45a-655 sets forth the
statutory duties of a conservator of an estate. Section
45a-655 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A
conservator of the estate appointed under section 45a-646,
45a-650, or 45a-654 shall, within two months after the date
of the conservator's appointment, make and file in the
Probate Court, an inventory, under penalty of false
statement, of the estate of the conserved person, with the
properties thereof appraised or caused to be appraised, by
such conservator, at fair market value as of the date of the
conservator's appointment. Such inventory shall include
the value of the conserved person's interest in all
property in which the conserved person has a legal or
equitable present interest, including, but not limited to,
the conserved person's interest in any joint bank
accounts or other jointly held property. The conservator
shall manage all the estate and apply so much of the net
income thereof, and, if necessary, any part of the principal
of the property, which is required to support the
conserved person and those members of the conserved
person's family whom the conserved person has a legal
duty to support and to pay the conserved person's
debts, and may sue for and collect all debts due the
conserved person. . . .'' (Emphasis added.)
Under
certain circumstances, if a conservator is appointed to
manage an individual's estate, a probate bond is issued.
A probate bond is a ‘‘bond with security given to
secure the faithful performance by an appointed fiduciary of
the duties of the fiduciary's trust and the
administration of and accounting for all moneys and other
property coming into the fiduciary's hands, as fiduciary,
according to law.'' General Statutes § 45a-139
(a). Every probate bond is ‘‘conditioned for the
faithful performance by the principal in the bond of the
duties of the principal's trust and administration of and
accounting for all moneys and other property coming into the
principal's hands, as fiduciary, according to law . . .
.'' General Statutes § 45a-139 (b). If the
assets of the ward's estate total twenty thousand dollars
or more, the issuance of a probate bond is required. General
Statutes § 45a-139 (c). A judge has discretion to waive
the requirement of a probate bond if the assets of the estate
total less than that amount, or under certain circumstances.
See Probate Court Rules § 35.1 (b).
If a
probate bond is issued and the conservator breaches his or
her duties as fiduciary of the estate, a third party may
bring an action on the bond to recover for the harm caused by
the conservator's breach. In Jewish Home, our
Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff in that case,
a nursing home facility, had ‘‘a right to bring
an action on a probate bond when it suffer[ed] a loss as a
result of a conservator's failure to ensure payment to
the nursing home for his ward's care.''
Jewish Home, supra, 257 Conn. 532. J. Michael
Cantore, Jr., had been appointed conservator of the person
and estate of Diana Kosminer, a patient of the plaintiff
nursing home. Id., 534. Cantore subsequently
executed and filed with the Probate Court a probate bond in
the amount of $50, 000, which ‘‘was conditioned,
as required by § 45a-139, on Cantore faithfully
per-form[ing] the duties of his trust and administer[ing] and
account[ing] for all monies and other property coming into
his hands, as fiduciary, according to law . . . .''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 534-35.
Cantore, however, failed to use the assets of Kosminer's
estate to pay the nursing home for her care or to timely
secure Medicaid benefits for her, which resulted in an unpaid
balance to the nursing home of $63, 000. Id., 536.
The
nursing home subsequently brought an action against Cantore
on the probate bond, alleging that he had a duty,
‘‘as Kosminer's conservator, to use the
assets of her estate to pay for the care and services she had
received from the plaintiff.'' Id., 533-34,
536. The nursing home further alleged that Cantore had a duty
to apply promptly for Medicaid assistance when the
estate's assets approached the $1600 Medicaid eligibility
mark. Id., 536. Cantore filed a motion to strike the
nursing home's complaint for failure to state a legally
sufficient cause of action. Id. The trial court
granted Cantore's motion to strike, and this court
affirmed the court's judgment. Id.
On
appeal to our Supreme Court, the nursing home argued that
‘‘the law imposed certain duties upon Cantore, as
conservator of Kosminer's estate and person; he breached
those duties by failing to ensure timely payment to the
plaintiff through either the estate or through public
assistance; the breach of those duties constituted a breach
of the probate bond; and the plaintiff was aggrieved by those
breaches.'' Id., 537. Cantore argued,
however, that the ‘‘[nursing home] had no
authority to bring an action for the breach of the probate
bond because only parties acting as a representative of the
estate or seeking recovery for the estate are entitled to
bring such actions.'' Id.
In
evaluating the plaintiff's claim, our Supreme Court first
considered Cantore's duties as a conservator of the
estate and conservator of the ward, respectively.
Specifically, our Supreme Court noted that
‘‘[t]he statutory duties of a conservator are
clearly defined in . . . § 45a-655, which delineates the
duties of a conservator of the estate, and General
Statutes § 45a-656, which prescribes the duties of a
conservator of the person. A conservator of the
estate shall manage all of the estate and apply so much of
the net income thereof, and, if necessary, any part of the
principal of the property, which is required to support the
ward and those members of the ward's family whom he or
she has the legal duty to support and to pay the
ward's debts . . . . A conservator of the person has
the duty to provide for the care, comfort, and maintenance of
the ward . . . and the duty shall be carried out within the
limitations of the resources available to the ward, either
through his own estate or through private or public
assistance. . . . In addition, where a statute imposes a duty
and is silent as to when it is to be performed, a reasonable
time is implied.'' (Citations omitted; emphasis in
original; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 539-40.
Our
Supreme Court then considered whether the complaint properly
alleged a breach of Cantore's duties as conservator of
Kosminer's estate and person. Id., 541. The
complaint alleged that ‘‘Cantore failed to make
timely payment to the plaintiff for the care and services it
provided to Kosminer and failed to apply for [M]edicaid
benefits on Kosminer's behalf once timely payment for the
plaintiff's services had exhausted the assets of the
estate. The complaint further alleged that these actions by
Cantore resulted in a breach of his fiduciary duties as
conservator of Kosminer's estate and person. Kosminer
incurred a substantial debt as a result of the services she
received from the [nursing home]. Cantore's failure to
pay this debt, despite the estate's ample resources,
constituted a breach of his duty under § 45a-655 (a) to
use the assets of the estate to pay Kosminer's debts.
Furthermore, Cantore's failure to ensure timely payment
to the [nursing home] constituted a breach of his duty under
§ 45a-656 (a) to provide for Kosminer's care through
the estate or through other private or public
assistance.'' Id. Our Supreme Court
concluded, therefore, that the nursing home had properly
alleged facts that, if proven, would establish that Cantore
failed to fulfill his duties as conservator of Kosminer's
estate and person. Id.
Our
Supreme Court then considered the categories of plaintiffs
that can bring an action on a probate bond to recover loss
suffered as a result of a conservator's breach of his or
her fiduciary duties pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to
1995) § 45a-144. Id., 543. Specifically, our
Supreme Court determined that the language of the statute
‘‘evince[d] the legislature's intent to
create three separate categories of potential plaintiffs in a
suit on a probate bond: first, a plaintiff bringing an action
as representative of the estate; second, a plaintiff bringing
an action in his own right; and third, a plaintiff bringing
an action in the right of himself and all others having an
interest in the estate . . . .'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 543. Our Supreme Court found
that ‘‘[t]he [nursing home] fit squarely in the
second category of potential plaintiffs authorized by §
45a-144 (a) to ...