United States District Court, D. Connecticut
Vincent P. Di Masi, et al., Plaintiffs,
Selene Finance LP, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION (23) AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (39)
A. Dooley, U.S.D.J.
court has reviewed the following: Plaintiff's complaint
(1); plaintiff's Motion for Injunction (2)
Plaintiff's request for Preliminary Injunction (23);
Plaintiff's request for a Temporary Restraining Order
(39). Each of these pleadings seek essentially the same
relief - an order from this court which would prevent the
foreclosure action in the State Court from proceeding any
further. The court has also reviewed various defendants'
motions to dismiss and memorandum in support thereof
(27)(31)(36)(37). The court has reviewed defendant Selene
Finance LP's objection to the plaintiff's motion for
a Preliminary Injunction (42). Finally, the court has
reviewed the plaintiff's opposition to the motion to
dismiss. All of these pleadings are relevant to the question
of whether this court should grant preliminary injunctive
relief under the standards for doing so.
court does not herein determine whether the court is
constrained from granting the relief requested by virtue of
either the Rooker-Feldman or the Younger
abstention doctrine, though acknowledges that each may well
be applicable under these circumstances. see, McKithen v.
Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2007); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Nor does the court
decide herein whether the court should appropriately abstain
from exercising its jurisdiction in order to grant the relief
requested by the Colorado Water abstention doctrine.
See, Colorado River Water Conservation District
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976), though
again, acknowledging that its application may counsel against
the exercise of jurisdiction in this matter. These issues
will be adjudicated in due course.
plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction is DENIED, because even assuming,
arguendo, that these doctrine did not bar the court from
granting such relief, the plaintiffs have utterly failed to
even allege facts which would support the standard for
granting such relief.
“Temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions are extraordinary and drastic remedies, which are
‘never awarded as of right,' or ‘as a routine
matter.' ” Whitfield v. Lopez, No.
15-CV-4827 (DLI) (LB), 2015 WL 6128866, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
16, 2015) (citations omitted). “In the Second Circuit,
where a party seeks preliminary injunctive relief …
courts apply the four-factor test set forth by the Supreme
Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 390, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006).”
Mrs. U.S. Nat. Pageant, Inc. v. Miss U.S. Org., LLC,
875 F.Supp.2d 211, 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). Under this test,
a district court must determine that a plaintiff has shown:
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that absent an
injunction [the p]laintiff is likely to suffer irreparable
injury that cannot be remedied with monetary damages; (3)
that the balance of hardships tips in favor of [the
p]laintiff; and (4) that “the public interest would not
be disserved” by the issuance of an injunction.
Furthermore, this four-part test is also applied by courts in
reviewing a request for a temporary restraining order
because, “[i]n the Second Circuit, the standard for a
temporary restraining order is the same as for a preliminary
injunction.” Wik v. City of Rochester, No.
07-CV-6541-CJS, 2008 WL 11251593, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 6,
2008); … see also Comprehensive Cmty. Dev. Corp.
v. Sebelius, No. 12 Civ. 0776 (PAE), 2012 WL 738185, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2012) (“[A] plaintiff seeking a
temporary restraining order ‘must establish that he is
likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.' ” (citation
Rush v. Hillside Buffalo, LLC, 314 F.Supp.3d 477,
483-84 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).
motions contain only bare conclusions as to the issue of
irreparable harm. They simply rely on the allegations in
their complaint to satisfy the criteria for the relief
sought. They did not file any memorandum of law in support of
either motion as required under Local Rule 7(a)(1). Indeed,
this failure may be deemed sufficient basis upon which to
deny the relief requested. Id. In short, without
citation to any authority, plaintiffs ask this court to
summarily block the State court foreclosure action.
offer no compelling reason for this court to take such an
extraordinary step. In addition, it is clear they have
remedies available to them in the State court foreclosure
proceedings which they continue to pursue. Moreover, they
have not demonstrated likely success on the merits because
the defenses raised by the defendants: the doctrine of
res judicata, the Younger abstention
doctrine, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the
Colorado Water abstention doctrine are, in this
courts view, individually or in tandem, likely to defeat many
of the plaintiffs' claims on their merits. Finally, the
plaintiffs have not identified any public interest served by
such a drastic intervention by this court. The court further
notes that Title 28, U.S.C. §2283 provides: “A
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.” While the plaintiffs seek to enjoin the
defendants from proceeding with the foreclosure, insofar as
the foreclosure has already gone to judgment, the effect of
such an injunction could, though it is not certain, serve to
effectively enjoin the state court.
foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs' Request for
Preliminary Injunction (23) and Request for Temporary
Restraining Order (39) are DENIED.
 It is worth noting that the Law Day in
the foreclosure file is October 16, 2018. Notwithstanding any
of the above, it is not clear to this court, and the
plaintiff has not demonstrated, that granting the relief he
seeks would effect in any manner ...