United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
VICTOR
A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Daniel
Wine (“Plaintiff”), pro se, currently
incarcerated at MacDougall Walker Correctional Institution
(“MacDougall Walker”) in Suffield, Connecticut,
filed a civil Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Compl.,
ECF no. 1, against Commissioner of the Department of
Correction (“DOC”) Scott Semple and MWCI Warden
William Mulligan for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Compl. Mr. Wine seeks damages against both
Defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Id; Mot. to Am. Compl., ECF No. 11. On June 22,
2018, Magistrate Judge William I. Garfinkel granted Mr.
Wine's motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
See Order Granting Mot. for Leave to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 9. On September 14, 2018, Mr. Wine
filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief against
Warden Mulligan. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Relief, ECF No. 10.
Mr. Wine requested a status update on that motion on October
15, 2018. Letter motion re: Mot. for Prelim. Injunct., ECF
No. 12.
For the
following reasons, the Complaint is
DISMISSED without prejudice subject to
amendment. The motion for leave to amend the complaint is
DENIED AS MOOT. The motion for preliminary
injunctive relief is DENIED. The Court
advises the Plaintiff that if he fails to file an amended
complaint in accordance with the instructions in this Order,
within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, the case
will be dismissed with prejudice.
I.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
On
April 24, 2017, Warden Mulligan wrote and distributed a
written memorandum to all MacDougall Walkerstaff and inmates
stating “that, effective immediately, when staff are
delivering incoming legal mail they shall retain the
envelope/envelopes. (The inmate does not get to keep the
envelope/envelopes.)” Compl. ¶ 7; Pl.'s Ex. A
(ECF No. 1) at 6. The memo also provided that photocopies of
the incoming envelope can be made should an inmate need the
return the address. Pl.'s Ex. A. During one of Warden
Mulligan's facility tours, Mr. Wine asked him about the
new policy, specifically how the policy could be legal if
“the enclosure is [the] private property of the person
[to whom] it is addressed.” Compl. ¶ 9. Mr. Wine
also contended that the policy did not comply with DOC
Administrative Directive 10.7. Id. at ¶ 10.
According to Mr. Wine, Warden Mulligan responded that it was
his policy and that there were no exceptions. Id. at
¶ 11. The new policy could permit correction officers to
take inmate legal documents during cell searches because the
documents are no longer kept in envelopes marked
“privileged” or “confidential.”
Id. at ¶ 13.
On
January 19, 2018, Mr. Wine wrote to the Admitting and
Processing (“A&P”) room asking for a box in
which to store his legal documents, but the request was
denied. Compl. ¶ 14. He followed up with a letter to
Deputy Warden Roach, asking for boxes to store his legal
paperwork because Warden Mulligan's new policy prevents
him from organizing all of it. Id. at ¶ 15;
Pl.'s Ex. D, ECF No. 1, at 17. Mr. Wine also submitted an
informal inmate request and administrative grievances
regarding the matter and spoke with an attorney in the Inmate
Legal Aid Program (“ILAP”). Compl. ¶¶
17-19. The ILAP attorney informed Mr. Wine that Commissioner
Semple had assured her that all inmates would
“receive[] new replacement enclosures.”
Id. at ¶ 21. Thereafter, Mr. Wine asked for a
replacement “enclosure” from his unit counselor
but was told that it was not facility policy to provide such
items. Id. at ¶ 22.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court
must review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any portion
of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Although detailed
allegations are not required, the complaint must include
sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice of the
claims and the grounds upon which they are based and to
demonstrate a right to relief. Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167
L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Conclusory allegations are not
sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A plaintiff
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570. It is well-established, however, that pro
se complaints “must be construed liberally and
interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399,
403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also
Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010)
(discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se
litigants).
II.
DISCUSSION
Mr.
Wine claims that the mail policy, instituted by Warden
Mulligan and permitted by Commissioner Semple, and the denial
of boxes or “enclosures” for his legal papers
violate his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. He has failed to state a
plausible claim, however, under either constitutional
amendment.
A.
Fourth Amendment Search
Mr.
Wine has alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable search and seizure. The Court finds that
Mr. Wine has failed to state a sufficient Fourth Amendment
claim upon which relief may be granted.
The
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353,
88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). The Fourth
Amendment governs when the person has an actual or subjective
expectation of privacy and that expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable. Id. at 361. If
those conditions are satisfied, the Court must determine
whether the search or seizure at issue was reasonable.
Id.
It is
well-established that prisoners have limited, if any,
reasonable expectations of privacy because of their
confinement status. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 524-30, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3199 et seq., 82 L.Ed.2d 393
(1984) (loss of privacy is an inherent incidence of
confinement); United States v. Roy, 734 F.2d 108,
111 (2d Cir. 1984) (legitimate privacy expectations
“severely curtailed” during incarceration).
Courts in the Second Circuit have routinely held that an
inmate's limited expectation of privacy in his or her
prison correspondence must yield to the legitimate
penological interests of the prison facility. See
Dillhunt v. Theriault, No. 9:07-cv-0412 (GTS/DEP), 2009
WL 4985477, *10 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009). “[T]he
interception of a defendant's prison correspondence does
not violate that individual's . . . Fourth Amendment
right[] if prison officials had ‘good' or
‘reasonable' cause to inspect the mail.”
United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 108 (2d ...