United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Michael P. Shea United States District Judge.
The
plaintiff, Felix Ramirez, commenced this civil rights action
asserting claims for violation of various federal and state
constitutional rights and state tort law. Following the
Court's initial review of the complaint, the following
claims remained: Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims against
defendant Allen for the October 30, 2015 pat down search; a
supervisory liability claim against defendant Guadarrama for
failing to prevent defendant Allen's acts on October 30,
2015, when he knew of past sexual misconduct allegations
against her including similar conduct; an Eighth Amendment
failure to protect claim against defendant Nordby for failing
to protect the plaintiff from defendant Allen's improper
touching on October 30, 2015; First Amendment retaliation
claims against defendants Allen, Williams and several Does
based on defendant Allen's issuance of an allegedly false
disciplinary report when the plaintiff told her he intended
to file a PREA complaint and the use of tight handcuffs under
defendant Williams' supervision; Eighth Amendment
excessive force claims and state tort claims against
defendant Williams and several Does for tight handcuffs and
painfully manipulating his arms on October 30, 2015; Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claims against defendants
Botas, Greene and doctor Doe for failure to provide or
arrange for mental health treatment on October 30, 2015;
Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against defendants
Richardson and Claudio relating to the November 16, 2015
disciplinary hearing; an Eighth Amendment failure to protect
claim against defendant Blatchelly; an Eighth Amendment
failure to protect claim and state tort claims against
defendant Doe for ordering the plaintiff to return to his
cell after he reported that inmate Dobson had threatened his
life; Eighth Amendment excessive force claims and state tort
claims against defendants Guadarrama and several Does
relating to the altercation with inmate Dobson; and
Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against defendants
Dubuque, Claudio, Hall and a Doe relating to the disciplinary
report for fighting. See ECF No. 7 at 26.
The
remaining named defendants, Deputy Warden Guadarrama,
Lieutenants Williams and Richardson, Captains Claudio and
Hall, Correctional Officers Allen, Nordby, and Dubuque, Nurse
Dionne Botas, CHNS Heidi Greene, and Blatchelly move for
summary judgment. Instead of a response, the plaintiff filed
a motion for appointment of counsel. For the reasons that
follow, the plaintiff's motion is denied, the
defendants' motion is granted, and the case is dismissed
as to the unidentified Doe defendants. The plaintiff's
state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
I.
Standard of Review
A
motion for summary judgment may be granted only where there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(a),
Fed. R. Civ. P.; see also Redd v. New York Div. of
Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2012). “When
the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial,
the moving party can satisfy its burden at summary judgment
by ‘pointing out to the district court' the absence
of a genuine dispute with respect to any essential element of
its opponent's case: ‘a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's
case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.'” Cohane v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 612 Fed.Appx. 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2015)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986)).
Once
the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266
(2d Cir. 2009). He cannot “‘rely on conclusory
allegations or unsubstantiated speculation' but
‘must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating
the existence of a genuine dispute of material
fact.'” Robinson v. Concentra Health
Servs., 781 F.3d 42, 34 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted). He must present such evidence as would allow a jury
to find in his favor in order to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230
F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). Although the court is required to
read a self-represented “party's papers liberally
and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest, ” Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51,
62 (2d Cir. 2015), “unsupported allegations do not
create a material issue of fact” and do not overcome a
properly supported motion for summary judgment. Weinstock
v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).
II.
Facts[1]
The
plaintiff, a Connecticut prisoner, has been housed at
MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution
(“MacDougall”) since October 30, 2015. ECF No.
36-6, ¶ 1. On October 30, 2015, defendant Allen
conducted a pat search of the plaintiff and, allegedly,
groped the plaintiff's genitals during the search.
Id., ¶ 2.
That
same day, the plaintiff made a complaint to defendants
Williams against defendant Allen. The plaintiff argued that
defendant Allen violated the Prison Rape Elimination Act
(“PREA”) when she groped his genitals during the
pat search. Id., ¶ 3. Also on October 30, 2015,
the plaintiff saw defendant Botas in the medical unit. He
told her about the PREA complaint and complained of emotional
distress. Defendant Botas told defendant Greene, the head
nurse, and the on-call physician. The plaintiff contends that
these three individuals failed to provide or arrange for
mental health treatment. Id., ¶ 4.
While
he was in the medial unit on October 30, 2015, the plaintiff
saw Licensed Clinical Social Worker (“LCSW”)
Maniram about his claim that defendant Allen had groped his
genitals during the pat search. He was nervous and angry. The
plaintiff told LCSW Maniram that he felt violated. LCSW
Maniram determined that the plaintiff was mentally stable and
coherent, and did not need further mental health treatment.
As part of the standard PREA complaint procedure, LCSW
Maniram ordered the plaintiff transferred to the restrictive
housing unit (RHU). He was not ordered to the medical unit
because he had no mental health issues, such as suicidal or
homicidal ideation. Id., ¶ 5.
Defendant
Williams supervised the plaintiff's escort to RHU. The
plaintiff alleges that the handcuffs were too tight and that
the officers manipulated his arms to cause him pain.
Id., ¶ 6.
On
October 30, 2015, defendant Allen issued the plaintiff a
disciplinary report for disobeying a direct order to submit
to a pat search. Id., ¶ 7. The disciplinary
hearing was held on November 16, 2015. Defendant Richardson
found the plaintiff guilty of disobeying a direct order. The
plaintiff alleges that defendant Richardson did not permit
him to call witnesses and intentionally misrepresented his
testimony at the hearing. Id., ¶ 8.
In
April 2016, the plaintiff received a new cellmate, inmate
Dobson. The plaintiff believed that inmate Dobson was
mentally ill. Id., ¶ 9. The plaintiff alleges
that he repeatedly told defendant Blatchelly that he was
afraid of inmate Dobson, but defendant Blatchelly refused to
move the plaintiff to another cell. Id., ¶ 10.
The
plaintiff alleges that, on May 7, 2016, he told a
correctional officer that inmate Dobson had threatened his
life, but the officer ordered the plaintiff to return to his
cell. Inmate Dobson assaulted the plaintiff. Id.,
¶11. During the assault, defendant Dubuque and several
officers responded to the cell. The plaintiff was holding
inmate Dobson in a bear hug on the floor. Defendant Dubuque
ordered the plaintiff to release inmate Dobson. Once Dobson
was released, defendant Dubuque sprayed the plaintiff with a
chemical agent and the other officers assaulted him or failed
to intervene to prevent the assault. Id., ¶ 12.
The
same day, defendant Dubuque issued the plaintiff a
disciplinary report for fighting. On May 19, 2016, the
plaintiff was found guilty of fighting. The hearing officer
mitigated his sanctions. Id., ¶ 13. The guilty
finding was upheld on appeal. Id., ¶ 14. The
plaintiff alleges that defendant Claudio did not respond to
his request for a copy of the appeal decision and defendant
Hall refused to investigate his version of the events
underlying the fight and ripped up his Inmate Request
describing his version of the events. Id., ¶
15.
III.
Discussion
The
defendants move for summary judgment on three grounds: (1)
the plaintiff has not exhausted all available administrative
remedies as to any of the claims asserted in this action; (2)
the plaintiff was provided appropriate mental health care on
October 30, 2015; and (3) defendants Dubuque, Claudio, Hall
and one Doe defendant did not participate in the May 19, 2016
disciplinary hearing.
A.
Motion for Appointment of Counsel
As an
initial matter, the Court notes that, rather than opposing
the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed a motion
for appointment of counsel. He states that he needs
assistance filing an objection and calling witnesses at a
hearing on the motion. The motion is denied for several
reasons.
As the
Court explained in the ruling denying the plaintiff's
previous motion, the Second Circuit repeatedly has cautioned
the district courts against the routine appointment of
counsel. See, e.g., Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care
Center, 323 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 2003); Hendricks
v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 393 (2d Cir. 1997). The
Second Circuit also has made clear that before an appointment
is even considered, the indigent person must demonstrate that
he is unable to obtain counsel. Saviano v. Local
32B-32J, 75 Fed.Appx. 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 173 (2d
Cir. 1989)). In this motion, the plaintiff identifies the
same three law firms he included in his first motion and
repeats that Inmates' Legal Aid Program will not
represent him. As the Court explained, Inmates' Legal Aid
Program can provide assistance in responding to motions and
would have been able to assist the plaintiff in responding to
the defendants' motion for summary judgment. However, the
plaintiff does not indicate that he requested such
assistance. Thus, he cannot demonstrate an inability to
obtain legal assistance on his own.
In
addition, the plaintiff states that he needs assistance
filing an objection to the motion for summary judgment and
having a hearing on it. The Court does not generally hold
hearings on motions for summary judgment and no hearing was
scheduled in this case. Thus, assistance with such a hearing
is not needed. The defendants served a notice with their
motion for summary judgment including directions for
responding to the motion and warning that if he did not file
opposition papers the motion would be granted.[2] ECF ...