United States District Court, D. Connecticut
OMNIBUS RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO STRIKE
Charles S. Haight, Jr. Senior United States District Judge.
Pending
before the Court is Plaintiff Erin Murphy's Motion to
Strike Defendant's Reply Memorandum of Law in
Further Support of its Motion to Compel Arbitration
[Doc. 31] (the "Motion to Strike"). Plaintiff
argues that Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Further
Support of its Motion to Compel Arbitration
[Doc. 27] (the "August 23 Memorandum"), submitted
in response to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration [Doc.
26] (the "Opposition Brief"), should be stricken in
its entirety because it contains new arguments and was filed
without conferring with Plaintiff's counsel or seeking
leave from the Court. [Doc. 31 at 1.] In the alternative,
Plaintiff seeks permission to file a surreply. [Id.]
Defendant Glencore Ltd. ("Glencore" or
"Defendant") opposes Plaintiff's Motion to
Strike. [Doc. 32.]
Plaintiff
has also moved for the Court to reconsider and vacate its
Order dated September 7, 2018 [Doc. 29], in which the Court
reserved judgment on Plaintiff's Motion Seeking
Permission to File First Amended Complaint [Doc. 23]
(the "Motion to Amend") pending resolution of
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration [Doc.
13] (the "Motion to Compel Arbitration"). Defendant
also opposes Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
[Doc. 34.]
For the
reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration [Doc. 33] and Motion to Strike [Doc. 31] are
both denied.
I.
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiff
seeks reconsideration of an Order issued on September 7, 2018
[Doc. 29] (the "September 7th Order"),
in which the Court reserved judgment on Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend pending resolution of Defendant's Motion
to Compel Arbitration.[1] Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate the
September 7th Order and grant leave to file the
proposed Amended Complaint [Doc. 23, Ex. A] (the
"Proposed Amended Complaint") submitted with
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. Because Plaintiff has failed
to raise any controlling law or facts that the Court
overlooked in its September 7th Order,
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
A.
Background
Plaintiff
filed her initial Complaint on June 18, 2018, alleging
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, the
Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. [Doc. 1.] At the time, one of the two
discrimination charges that Plaintiff had filed with the
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities
(CHRO) remained pending, and Plaintiff had not received a
Release of Jurisdiction authorizing suit on the second
charge. [Id. at ¶ 11.] Shortly thereafter,
Defendant filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration of
Plaintiff's claims and stay the proceedings pending
completion of the arbitration. [Doc. 13.] The Motion to
Compel Arbitration is now fully briefed.
The
CHRO issued a Release of Jurisdiction for Plaintiff's
second charge on July 30, 2018 [Doc. 23, Ex. A at ¶12],
and Plaintiff subsequently sought leave to amend her
Complaint to "include [the] additional claims"
released by the CHRO [Id. at 1]. Plaintiff's
Proposed Amended Complaint stated that the Release of
Jurisdiction letter had been received and appended a copy of
the letter. [Id., Ex. A at ¶12, Ex. D.] It did
not, however, include any additional factual allegations or
new claims for relief arising from the newly released
charges. [See id.] The Proposed Amended Complaint
also added factual allegations concerning the enforceability
of the arbitration provision (Count IX of the Complaint),
which were unrelated to the CHRO's Release of
Jurisdiction. [See id.] These include allegations
that Ms. Murphy had never seen the employment application
form she was asked to sign prior to her job interview, that
Ms. Murphy was not asked if she would like to consult an
attorney prior to signing the application, and that Ms.
Murphy had been unfamiliar with what an arbitration agreement
was. [Id. at ¶¶ 199-215.] The proposed
Amended Complaint included no additional charges or other
material changes. Defendant opposed Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend. [Doc. 34.]
On
September 7, 2018 the Court entered an electronic order
staying proceedings and reserving judgment on Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend pending resolution of Defendant's Motion
to Compel Arbitration [Doc. 29.] The Court explained that
because Plaintiff's Motion to Amend would become moot if
Defendant's pending Motion to Compel were granted,
judicial economy counseled in favor of staying the Motion to
Amend. [Id.] Plaintiff then filed the present Motion
for Reconsideration. [Doc. 33.]
B.
Standard for Reconsideration
The
standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is
"strict," and reconsideration will "generally
be denied unless the moving party can identify controlling
decisions or data that the court overlooked-matters, in other
words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing
Schonberger v. Serchuk, 742 F.Supp. 108, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1990)). This exacting standard is codified in the
District of Connecticut Local Rules of Civil Procedure, which
dictate that motions for reconsideration "shall satisfy
the strict standard applicable to such motions" and
"will generally be denied unless the movant can point to
controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked in
the initial decision or order." D. Conn. Civ. R. 7(c).
The Second Circuit has identified three major grounds that
may justify reconsideration: "an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice." Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l
Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Kolel
Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable
Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (same).
Importantly,
a motion for reconsideration is not a "second bite at
the apple" for a party dissatisfied with a court's
ruling, Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners,
L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sequa
Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.1998)),
nor is it an opportunity to "advance new facts, issues,
or arguments not previously presented to the court,"
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, PA v. Las
Vegas Prof'l Football Ltd. P'ship, 409 Fed.Appx.
401, 403 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Davidson v. Scully,
172 F.Supp.2d 458, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). "A motion for
reconsideration may not treat the court's initial
decision as the opening of a dialogue in which that party may
then use such a motion to advance new theories or adduce new
evidence in response to the court's rulings."
Ambac Assur. Corp. v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 08 CIV.
9464 RMB THK, 2011 WL 308276, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2011)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, the
"sole function of a proper motion for reconsideration is
to call to the Court's attention dispositive facts or
controlling authority that were plainly presented in the
prior proceedings but were somehow overlooked in the
Court's decision; in other words, an obvious and glaring
mistake. Motions for reconsideration allow the district court
to correct its own mistakes, not those of the
[p]arties." Id. (quoting Levin v. Gallery
63 Antiques Corp., No, 04 Civ. 1504 (KMK), 2007 WL
1288641, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2007); see also Lopez
v. Smiley, 375 F.Supp.2d 19, 21-22 (D. Conn. 2005)
("A motion for reconsideration may not be used to plug
gaps in an original argument or to argue in the alternative
once a decision has been made." (quotation marks and
citation omitted)); Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. Music Sales
Corp., 90 F.Supp.2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[A]
motion for reconsideration is appropriate only where the
movant demonstrates that "the Court has overlooked
controlling decisions or factual matters that were put
before it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had
they been considered, might have reasonably altered the
result before the court." (citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
C.
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