COMMISSIONER OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND PUBLIC PROTECTION ET AL.
v.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.
Argued
March 1, 2018
Procedural
History
Appeal
from the decision of the named defendant determining that the
named plaintiff et al. had violated the requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act and ordering, inter alia, that
they comply with those requirements by disclosing certain
records to the defendant The Hartford Courant Company et al.,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New
Britain, where the court, Schuman, J.,
granted the motion to intervene as a plaintiff filed by the
Division of Criminal Justice; thereafter, the case was tried
to the court, Schuman, J.; judgment sustaining the
appeal, from which the named defendant and the defendant The
Hartford Courant Company et al. filed separate appeals, which
were subsequently consolidated. Reversed;
judgment directed
Victor
R. Perpetua, principal attorney, for the appellant (named
defendant).
William S. Fish, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Alexa T.
Millinger, for the appellants (defendant The Hartford Courant
Company et al.).
Steven
M. Barry, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the
brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, and Jane R.
Rosenberg, solicitor general, for the appellees (named
plaintiff et al.).
Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, Mullins and Kahn, Js. [*]
OPINION
MULLINS, J.
Pursuant
to statute (§ 1-210 [a]), ‘‘[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all
records maintained or kept on file by any public agency . . .
shall be public records and every person shall have the right
to . . . receive a copy of such records . . . .''
The
plaintiffs, the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public
Protection and the Department of Emergency Services and
Public Protection, appealed from the decision of the named
defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission, ordering
the disclosure, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act
(§ 1-200 et seq.), of certain documents to the defendant
newspaper and the defendant reporter. The documents related
to a high profile school shooting in this state and were
lawfully seized as part of a criminal investigation. In
ordering disclosure, the commission concluded that, in light
of heightened public interest in the shooting, the documents
related to the conduct of the public's business, and,
therefore, constituted public records under the act. The
commission also concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove that the documents were otherwise exempt from
disclosure. On appeal from the commission's decision, the
trial court concluded that the documents constituted public
records under the act because they related to the conduct of
the public's business. The trial court further concluded,
however, that the statutes (§§ 54-33a through
54-36p) governing searches and seizures by the police
shielded from disclosure all seized property not used in a
criminal prosecution, and, therefore, the state law exception
set forth in § 1-210 (a) was satisfied. The trial court
thus determined that the documents were exempt from
disclosure and rendered judgment sustaining the
plaintiffs' administrative appeal, from which the
defendants appealed. Held:
The
trial court incorrectly concluded that the requirements of
the state law exception set forth in § 1-210 (a) were
satisfied and that the documents, therefore, were exempt from
disclosure under that exception: the search and seizure
statutes are entirely silent on the issues of
confidentiality, copying, and disclosure to the public and,
accordingly, could not form the basis for an exception under
§ 1-210 (a), as this court's review of relevant case
law established that, in order for the
‘‘otherwise provided . . . by state
statute'' language in § 1-210 (a) to apply, the
underlying statute, by its express terms, must address
confidentiality or otherwise limit the disclosure, copying,
or distribution of the documents at issue; moreover, although
limiting the disclosure of seized documents to protect the
privacy of their owner may be preferable, particularly if a
criminal proceeding does not ensue, this court could not
impose a duty of confidentiality or a restriction on
disclosure that was not expressly required by the search and
seizure statutes, and this court's conclusion was also
supported by the statute (§ 1-215 [b]) regulating the
disclosure of personal possessions seized during an arrest
and by the statute (§ 1-210 [b] [3]) providing other
detailed exemptions for records of law enforcement agencies.
The
plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the judgment
of the trial court could be affirmed on the alternative
ground that the documents were not subject to disclosure
because they did not constitute public records under the act;
documents that are not created by an agency but come into its
possession because there was probable cause to believe that
they constitute evidence of a criminal offense relate to the
conduct of the public's business and, therefore,
constitute public records within the meaning of the act.
The
central issue in this appeal is whether the search and
seizure statutes, General Statutes §§ 54-33a
through 54-36p, provide a basis for an exemption from the
disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act
(act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. Specifically, we
must decide whether the trial court improperly concluded that
the search and seizure statutes satisfy the requirements set
forth in General Statutes § 1-210 (a), [1] which exempts
documents from disclosure under the act that are
‘‘otherwise provided by any federal law or
state statute . . . .'' (Emphasis added.) We
conclude that the search and seizure statutes do not meet the
requirements set forth in § 1-210 (a) and, accordingly,
reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The
following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural
history are relevant to the present appeal. In January, 2014,
the plaintiffs, the Commissioner of Emergency Services and
Public Protection and the Department of Emergency Services
and Public Protection, [2] received a request under the act from
the defendant The Hartford Courant Company (Courant), and its
reporter, the defendant David Altimari. In this request, the
Courant and Altimari sought copies of certain documents
referred to in the report prepared by the Connecticut State
Police on the shooting that took place at Sandy Hook
Elementary School on December 14, 2012. More specifically,
the trial court's memorandum of decision notes that this
request sought, inter alia, the following documents from the
department: a spiral bound book written by the shooter, Adam
Lanza, entitled ‘‘The Big Book of Granny,
'' ‘‘a photo of the class of 2002-2003 at
Sandy Hook Elementary School, '' and a
‘‘spreadsheet ranking mass murders by name,
number killed, number injured, types of weapons used, and
disposition.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The
department did not file a timely response to this request. As
a result, the Courant and Altimari filed a complaint with the
named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission
(commission). After they filed that complaint, the department
responded to the initial request by letter. In that letter,
the supervisor of the department's legal affairs unit,
Christine Plourde, stated that ‘‘there are no
documents responsive to your . . . request'' because
the request sought ‘‘access to or copies of . . .
items of evidence that were seized or otherwise collected as
part of the criminal investigation of the incident. Evidence
collected as part of a criminal investigation does not
constitute a public record under the [act].''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notwithstanding this
response, the commission held a hearing on the complaint.
The
parties in that administrative proceeding presented
testimony, exhibits, and argument.[3] Specifically, the department
asserted that the documents were not subject to disclosure
because they were not public records[4] under the act insofar as
they (1) do not relate ‘‘to the conduct of the
public's business, '' (2) ‘‘are
evidence under the control of the [J]udicial [B]ranch
pursuant to the statutory scheme governing search warrants
and seized property, '' (3) are the private property
of Adam Lanza or his mother, Nancy Lanza, and
‘‘disclosure would constitute an invasion of
[their] personal privacy, '' and (4) are not included
in the department's public records retention schedule
because they are documents seized pursuant to a search
warrant.
The
commission rejected the department's claims and concluded
that the documents were public records under the act.
Specifically, the commission rejected the department's
claim that the documents did not relate ‘‘to the
conduct of the public's business'' for purposes
of § 1-200 (5). Instead, the commission determined that
‘‘in the aftermath of the shootings, there was
heightened public interest in the shootings, in determining
how and why such shootings occurred, and in preventing such a
horrific crime from happening again.''
The
commission also found that, ‘‘[a]lthough the
[department was] provided the opportunity to offer evidence
that the requested documents are exempt from disclosure, [it]
declined to do so. Instead, [the department] offered an
affidavit from Plourde [averring] that, although she had not
looked at the requested documents, she believed that some of
the documents might be exempt from disclosure under [§]
1-210 (b) [(2), (10), (11) and (17)].'' Consequently,
the commission found that the department ‘‘failed
to prove that any of the requested documents are exempt from
disclosure pursuant to any exemption.'' Accordingly,
the commission ordered the department to provide a copy of
the documents to the Courant and Altimari.
Thereafter,
the department filed an appeal from the commission's
decision to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes
§ 4-183 of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act
(UAPA). The department also filed an application to stay
enforcement of the final decision of the commission pending
appeal, which was granted. The Division of Criminal Justice
then filed a motion to intervene in the present case as a
party plaintiff, which was granted by the trial court. See
footnote 2 of this opinion.
The
trial court ultimately agreed with the commission that the
documents were public records, concluding that
‘‘documents seized pursuant to a search warrant
‘[relate] to the conduct of the public's
business' and, therefore, constitute public records under
the act.'' Unlike the commission, however, the trial
court then concluded that the documents were exempt from
disclosure pursuant to § 1-210 (a).[5] Specifically, the
trial court concluded the search and seizure statutes
‘‘act as a shield from public disclosure of all
seized property not used in a criminal prosecution.''
These appeals followed.[6]
On
appeal to this court, the defendants assert that the trial
court improperly concluded that the documents were exempt
from disclosure pursuant to § 1-210 (a). Specifically,
the defendants assert that the trial court improperly failed
to follow this court's existing precedent interpreting
§ 1-210 (a), which requires that the express terms of
federal law or state statute must address confidentiality or
otherwise limit the copying or disclosing of the documents at
issue. The defendants further assert that the trial court
improperly failed to construe the exemption in § 1-210
(a) narrowly, as required by the act.
In
response, the department asserts that the trial court
properly concluded that property seized pursuant to a search
warrant is exempt from disclosure under the act. More
particularly, the department claims that this court's
existing precedent establishes that state statutes that
conflict or create conflicting obligations with public
disclosure fall within the exemption from disclosure under
§ 1-210 (a). The department further asserts, as an
alternative ground for affirmance, that the documents are not
public records under the act. We agree with the defendants.
We
begin with the relevant legal principles and standard of
review. ‘‘This court reviews the trial
court's judgment pursuant to the . . . UAPA . . . . Under
the UAPA, it is [not] the function . . . of this court to
retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency. . . . Even for conclusions of law,
[t]he court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in
light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably,
arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . .
[Thus] [c]onclusions of law reached by the administrative
agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted
from a correct application of the law to the facts found and
could reasonably and logically follow from such facts. . . .
[Similarly], this court affords deference to the construction
of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered
by law to carry out the statute's purposes. . . . Cases
that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader
standard of review than is . . . involved in deciding
whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted
unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its
discretion. . . . Furthermore, when a state agency's
determination of a question of law has not previously been
subject to judicial scrutiny . . . the agency is not entitled
to special deference. . . . We have determined, therefore,
that the traditional deference accorded to an agency's
interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the
construction of a statute . . . has not previously been
subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] a governmental
agency's time-tested interpretation . . . .
Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v.
Freedom of Information Commission, 310 Conn. 276,
281-82, 77 A.3d 121 (2013). Even if time-tested, we will
defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute only if
it is reasonable; that reasonableness is determined by
[application of] our established rules of statutory
construction. . . . Dept. of Public Safety v.
State Board of Labor Relations, 296 Conn. 594, 599,
996 A.2d 729 (2010).
‘‘When
construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the
legislature. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such
relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is
whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation. . . . When a statute
is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive
guidance to the legislative history and circumstances
surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was
designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing
legislation and common law principles governing the same
general subject matter . . . . Chairperson, Connecticut
Medical Examining Board v.Freedom of Information
Commission, supra, 310 Conn. 283. The issue of statutory
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