Argued
September 13, 2018
Procedural
History
Amended
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the
court, Oliver, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which
the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Deren
Manasevit, for the appellant (petitioner).
Melissa Patterson, assistant state's attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Matthew Gedansky, state's attorney,
and David Carlucci, assistant state's attorney, for the
appellee (respondent).
DiPentima, C. J., and Elgo and Bear, Js.
OPINION
BEAR,
J.
The
petitioner, Raul Diaz, appeals from the judgment of the
habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the
habeas court erroneously denied his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Specifically, the petitioner claims that his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
file a motion to dismiss a home invasion charge, to which he
pleaded guilty pursuant to the Alford
doctrine.[1] We affirm the judgment of the habeas
court.
The
following factual and procedural background is relevant to
our resolution of the petitioner's appeal.[2]On October 27,
2011, the petitioner entered the Ellington home of the
seventy-seven year old victim when he was not there. While
the petitioner was still in the home, the victim returned.
The petitioner asked the victim to step aside so that he
could flee the home, but the victim refused. The petitioner
struck the victim with a jewelry box, resulting in a
laceration on his head and a broken nose and cheekbone. After
taking the victim's wallet and car keys, the petitioner
fled in the victim's car, but was later apprehended.
The
petitioner was charged in a substitute information with two
counts of home invasion in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-100aa, [3] two counts of burglary in the first degree
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1) and
(2), one count of larceny in the third degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-124, one count of larceny in the
fourth degree in violation of General Statutes §
53a-125, one count of assault in the second degree in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-60b, and one count
of robbery in the first degree involving a dangerous
instrument in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134
(a) (3). On April 26, 2013, after the petitioner entered into
a plea agreement with the state, he pleaded guilty under the
Alford doctrine to one count of home invasion in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (2). After
a thorough canvass, the court accepted the plea, rendered a
judgment of conviction and sentenced the petitioner in
accordance with the plea agreement to twenty-five years
imprisonment. The petitioner did not appeal from the judgment
of conviction.
Thereafter,
the petitioner commenced this habeas action. On February 25,
2016, the petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging, among other claims, that his trial
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
file a motion to dismiss the home invasion charge on the
ground that it was duplicative of the first degree burglary
charge. After a trial, the habeas court issued a memorandum
of decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish that
his trial counsel deficiently performed by not filing a
motion to dismiss the home invasion charge. The habeas court
found that although the petitioner's trial counsel agreed
with the state's assessment that the petitioner violated
the home invasion statute, he nonetheless argued, although
unsuccessfully, to the court and the prosecutor that the home
invasion charge should be dropped, and in any event that the
petitioner should be allowed to plead to the first degree
burglary charge instead of the home invasion charge.
Moreover, the habeas court agreed with his trial
counsel's testimony stating that there was no good faith
basis on which to bring a motion to dismiss the home invasion
charge in the trial court. The habeas court further concluded
that, even if the petitioner's trial counsel had
deficiently performed, which he had not, the petitioner was
not prejudiced. The habeas court granted certification to
appeal its denial, and this appeal followed. Additional facts
will be set forth as necessary.
The
petitioner's sole claim on appeal is that the habeas
court erroneously denied his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus because it concluded that trial counsel's failure
to file a motion to dismiss the home invasion charge did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude
that, as a matter of law, the petitioner waived his right to
raise this claim when he pleaded guilty under the
Alford doctrine.
We
first set forth the applicable legal principles that guide
our analysis. ‘‘A plea of guilty, voluntarily and
knowingly made, waives all nonjurisdictional defects and
defenses in the proceedings preliminary thereto.''
Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10, 22, 355
A.2d 49 (1974). ‘‘In general, the only allowable
challenges after a plea are those relating either to the
voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea or the exercise
of the trial court's jurisdiction.'' State
v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 80, 751 A.2d 298
(2000). ‘‘[A] guilty plea represents a break in
the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal
process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in
open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with
which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights
that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty
plea.'' Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). Moreover,
‘‘[i]t is . . . not necessary for the trial court
to canvass the defendant to determine that [he] understands
that [his] plea of guilty or nolo contendere operates as a
waiver of any challenge to pretrial proceedings.''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Johnson, supra, 42.
In
Savage v.Commissioner of Correction, 122
Conn.App. 800, 802, 998 A.2d 1247 (2010), this court
dismissed an appeal in which the petitioner, after pleading
guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine, claimed that
his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to file a motion for a speedy trial and a motion to
dismiss. Id. The court concluded that the petitioner
waived his right to raise the claim when he pleaded guilty
under Alford. Id.; see also Henderson
v.Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn.App.
778, 796-99, 189 A.3d 135 (petitioner waived claims unrelated
to guilty plea, including ineffective assistance of counsel),
cert. denied, 329 Conn. 911, 186 A.3d 707 (2018); State
v.Hanson, 117 Conn.App. 436, 456-57, 979 A.2d
576 (2009) (declining to review nonjurisdictional claims made
after voluntary and intelligent plea), cert. denied, 295
Conn. 907, 989 A.2d 604, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 986, 131
S.Ct. 425, 178 L.Ed.2d 331 (2010); McKnight v.Commissioner of Correction, 35 Conn.App. 762, 765
n.6, 646 A.2d 305 (guilty plea would have waived ineffective
assistance claim stemming from probable cause hearing), cert.
denied, 231 Conn. 936, 650 A.2d 173 (1994). Additionally, in
State v.Christensen, 157 Conn.App. 290,
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