United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE
AMENDED
MICHAEL P. SHEA, U.S.D.J.
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Alicia Morgan filed this action against Defendant,
the State of Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles
(“the DMV”), under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In Count One of
her amended complaint, Morgan alleges that the DMV
discriminated against her by subjecting her to a hostile work
environment because of her race. In Count Two, she alleges
that she was terminated in retaliation for filing a complaint
of racial discrimination with the Connecticut Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities (“CCHRO”) and the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). The DMV moves to dismiss both counts
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). It asserts that Morgan failed to
allege facts showing the existence of a hostile work
environment in support of Count One. The DMV also argues that
Morgan failed to allege facts suggesting a causal connection
between her EEOC/CCHRO complaint and her termination in
support of Count Two. For the reasons discussed below, the
motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Count One and
DENIED with respect to Count Two.
I.
Factual Allegations
The
following facts are taken from Morgan's amended complaint
(ECF No. 21) and are treated as true for the purposes of the
motion to dismiss:
Plaintiff
Alicia Morgan is an African American woman. (Id. at
1 ¶ 3.) Defendant, the DMV, is an agency in the
Executive Branch of the State of Connecticut. (Id.
at 1-2 ¶¶ 4.) The DMV employed Morgan as an
Inspector from February 2013 through April 2017.
(Id. at 2 ¶ 6; Id. at 7 ¶ 15.)
Morgan's performance evaluations were always
“satisfactory or better” (Id. at 2
¶ 6), but in 2014 she was denied “selective and
preferred job assignments.” (Id. at 2 ¶
7.) The DMV Chief explained “that she was lacking in
certain qualifications, ” but he did not provide
further detail. (Id.) The job assignments were given
to Caucasian men. (Id.)
On
February 14, 2016, Morgan attended a mandatory training on
the use of force taught by three Caucasian men. (Id.
at 2 ¶ 7.) Although she believed she had completed the
training properly, she was notified a month later by a
Caucasian lieutenant that the instructors had “stated
that her attitude was negative” and “that she did
not take the training seriously.” (Id. at 2
¶ 8.) The instructors accused Morgan of saying
“that she would shoot first and let the courts decide
the outcome.” (Id. at 2-3 ¶ 8.) Morgan
denies the instructors' claims. (Id.) She was
required to complete a remedial training program after March
27, 2016, and she was notified that she had completed the
program successfully on April 7, 2016. (Id. at 3
¶ 9.) On April 10, 2016, though, she was required to
“submit to another meeting” about her attitude
and statements at the original February training.
(Id. at 3 ¶ 9.) She asserts that the meeting
was “contrary to established practice within” the
DMV. (Id.)
In the
summer of 2016, Morgan was involved in two traffic incidents
while on duty. First, she was “involved in an early
morning pursuit of a speeding vehicle” on June 21,
2016. (Id. at 3 ¶ 11.) She reported the pursuit
to her supervisors as required. (Id.) Second, she
was involved in a “traffic incident in which she
required backup support from other officers” on July
26, 2016. (Id. at 3 ¶ 12.) She states that she
“handled the situation appropriately and within
departmental guidelines.” (Id.) The same day,
she was placed on indefinite paid administrative leave.
(Id. at 3 ¶ 13.) She was required to attend a
fact-finding hearing on September 16, 2016. (Id.) A
lieutenant with the DMV later testified that no Inspector had
ever been disciplined for engaging in a pursuit like the
incident on June 21. (Id. at 4 ¶ 16.) He also
stated that Morgan “had not violated any appropriate
procedures in her handling of the incident on July 26 . . .
.” (Id. at 9 ¶ 22.)
Morgan
filed a racial discrimination complaint with the EEOC and the
CCHRO on September 19, 2016, while still on administrative
leave. (Id. at 7 ¶ 14.) The DMV sent her a
letter on April 7, 2017, terminating her employment effective
April 20, 2017. (Id. at 7 ¶ 15.) The letter
stated that her termination was “related to the
incidents described above.” (Id. at 8 ¶
20.) Morgan asserts that she was the “only DMV
[I]nspector subjected to a disciplinary termination for any
reason whatsoever” between 2012 and April 20, 2017
(Id. at 9 ¶ 23.) The DMV opposed her
application for unemployment compensation benefits, requiring
Morgan to participate in an evidentiary hearing at the
Connecticut Department of Labor, at which she prevailed over
the DMV's opposition. (Id. at 9 ¶¶
21-22.)
Morgan
received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC and CCHRO on
September 20, 2017. (Id. at 2 ¶ 5.) She filed
this action on December 18, 2017. (ECF No. 1.)
II.
Legal Standard
Under
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the plaintiff
has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court accepts all of the complaint's factual allegations
as true when evaluating a motion to dismiss. Id. at
572. The Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.” Vietnam Ass'n
for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d
104, 115 (2d Cir. 2008). “However, the tenet that a
court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is
inapplicable to ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.'” Gonzales v. Eagle Leasing
Co., No. 3:13-CV-1565 JCH, 2014 WL 4794536, at *2 (D.
Conn. Sept. 25, 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678). Thus, “[w]hen a complaint is based solely on
wholly conclusory allegations and provides no factual support
for such claims, it is appropriate to grant [a]
defendant[']s motion to dismiss.” Scott v. Town
of Monroe, 306 F.Supp.2d 191, 198 (D. Conn. 2004).
“[T]o
survive a motion to dismiss, a Title VII plaintiff's
complaint must be facially plausible and allege sufficient
facts to give the defendant fair notice of the basis for the
claim; it need not, however, make out a prima facie
case.” Brown v. Daikin America, Inc., 756 F.3d
219, 228-29 & n. 10 (2d Cir.2014); see also E.E.O.C.
v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 254 (2d
Cir. 2014) (reconciling Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680)
(“[W]hile a discrimination complaint need not allege
facts establishing each element of a prima facie case of
discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss, it must at a
minimum assert nonconclusory factual matter sufficient to
nudge its claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible to proceed.”)
III.
Discussion
A.
Hostile ...