United States District Court, D. Connecticut
JOSE E. RAMOS, Plaintiff,
v.
DANNEL P. MALLOY, et al Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Kari
A. Dooley United States District Judge
On
October 9, 2018, the plaintiff, Jose E. Ramos, an inmate
currently confined at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional
Institution in Suffield, Connecticut, brought a civil action
pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Connecticut Governor Dannel P. Malloy, the state of
Connecticut, Attorney General George Jepsen, State's
Attorney Lawrence Tytla, Commissioner of Correction Scott
Semple, and Warden William Mulligan. Compl. (Doc. No. 1). The
plaintiff is suing the defendants for false arrest, malicious
prosecution, and discovery violations stemming from his state
criminal proceedings in September of 2012. See Id.
at ¶¶ 9-16, 19-25. He requests damages, declaratory
relief, and immediate release from the custody of the state
Department of Correction (“DOC”). Id. at
¶¶ 26-32. On October 26, 2018, Magistrate Judge
William I. Garfinkel granted the plaintiff's motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. See Order No. 8.
For the following reasons, the complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.
Standard
of Review
Under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review prisoner civil
complaints and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is
frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Although
detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must
include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice
of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and
to demonstrate a right to relief. Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory
allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic, 550
U.S. at 570. Nevertheless, it is well-established that
“[p]ro se complaints ‘must be
construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.'” Sykes v. Bank of
America, 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,
474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater,
623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules
of solicitude for pro se litigants).
Discussion
The
plaintiff claims that he is “illegally detained”
in DOC custody based on false criminal charges that were
brought against him in September of 2012. Compl. ¶ 12.
During his state criminal proceedings, he claims the
defendants refused to provide him with discovery,
particularly any proof that he committed the crimes charged.
See Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. State judicial
records show that the plaintiff was convicted of murder on
April 29, 2016 and sentenced to sixty years of imprisonment.
State v. Ramos, No. KNL-CR12-0119499-T, Connecticut
Superior Court, judicial district of New London,
https://www.jud2.ct.gov/crdockets/CaseDetailDisp.aspx?source=Pending&Key-=e7f4ee8e-bb53-4e3d-9f1d-5cec400d44a8.
“[I]n
order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called
into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. §2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that
has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under
§1983.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
487 (1994); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.
74, 81-82 (2005) (state prisoner's § 1983 action is
barred no matter the relief sought, no matter the target of
prisoner's suit, if success in action would necessarily
demonstrate invalidity of conviction or duration of
sentence). Moreover, when a state prisoner challenges
“the very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that
he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release
from that imprisonment, ” his “sole federal
remedy” is a petition for writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 500 (1973).[1] Such relief cannot be sought through an
action pursuant to §1983. Id.
Here
the plaintiff seeks both damages as well as a
“determination that he is entitled to immediate release
or a speedier release from” his imprisonment. Insofar
as it is manifest that the state conviction has not been
invalidated his claims are therefore subject to dismissal
pursuant to the principles set forth in both Heck
and Preiser. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed
without prejudice to refile, if, in the future, the plaintiff
succeeds in his efforts to have the state court conviction
reversed, expunged, invalidated or otherwise “called
into question by the issuance of a federal writ of habeas
corpus.” The clerk is directed to enter judgment in
favor of the defendants and close this case.
It is
so ordered.
---------
Notes:
[1] The court notes that the plaintiff
recently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under
§ 2254 in this Court. Ramos v. Semple, No.
3:18-CV-1259. Therein, he challenges his 2016 murder
conviction, the same state conviction underlying the ยง
1983 ...