September 24, 2018
information charging the defendant with the crimes of felony
murder and attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and
with two counts of the crime of hindering prosecution in the
second degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Ansonia-Milford, where the defendant was
presented to the court, Iannotti, J., on a guilty
plea to two counts of hindering proseuction in the second
degree; judgment of guilty in accordance with the plea;
subsequently, the court denied the defendant's motions to
correct an illegal sentence and for procedural default, and
the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Anthony Adams, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state's attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Kevin D. Lawlor, state's
attorney, and Cornelius P. Kelly, supervisory assistant
state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Bright and Sullivan, Js.
self-represented defendant, Anthony Adams, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court denying his postsentencing
motions to correct an illegal sentence and for procedural
default. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly (1) rejected his double jeopardy challenge to his
sentence for two counts of hindering prosecution in the
second degree in violation of General Statutes §
53a-166, (2) concluded that his sentence did not exceed the
statutory maximum, (3) denied his motion for procedural
default, and (4) advocated on behalf of the state at the
hearing on his motions. We affirm the judgment of the trial
October 28, 2012, Daquane Adams and Eugene Walker were
involved in a drug deal that culminated with the fatal
shooting of the victim, Neville Malacai Registe. See
State v. Walker, 180 Conn.App. 291, 296-97,
183 A.3d 1, cert. granted, 328 Conn. 934, 183 A.3d 634
(2018). After fleeing the scene, Adams and Walker telephoned
the defendant. The defendant then placed a telephone call to
a friend and had her pick up Adams and Walker from their
location in New Haven.
August 18, 2016, the defendant was charged, by substitute
information, with one count of felony murder in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-54c, one count of attempt to
commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General
Statutes §§ 53a-8, 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-134 (a)
(2), and two counts of hindering prosecution in the second
degree in violation of § 53a-166. The defendant
thereafter entered a guilty plea to two counts of hindering
prosecution in the second degree. In accordance with the terms
of that plea, the court sentenced the defendant to
consecutive terms of seven and one-half years incarceration,
execution suspended after five years, with five years of
probation. His total effective sentence on the two hindering
prosecution counts was fifteen years incarceration, execution
suspended after ten years, with five years of probation.
later, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal
sentence, claiming that his sentence exceeded the statutory
maximum and violated the prohibition against double
jeopardy. The defendant later filed a motion for
procedural default predicated on the state's failure to
file a written response to his motion to correct. The court
held a hearing on the defendant's motions on July 26,
2017, at which it denied both motions. From that judgment,
the defendant now appeals.
defendant first claims that the court improperly rejected his
double jeopardy challenge to his sentence on the two
hindering prosecution counts. In response, the state argues
that the defendant waived that claim by pleading guilty to
those counts. We agree with the state.
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United
States constitution provides that no person shall
‘‘be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .'' That
constitutional provision is applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Ben-ton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89
S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). An alleged double jeopardy
violation is a proper basis for a motion to correct an
illegal sentence. See State v. Wade, 178
Conn.App. 459, 466, 175 A.3d 1284 (2017), cert. denied, 327
Conn. 1002, 176 A.3d 1194 (2018).
nevertheless remains that the defendant pleaded guilty to the
two counts in question and in this appeal does not dispute
that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. See
footnote 1 of this opinion. Our Supreme Court has observed
that ‘‘[a]s a general rule, an unconditional plea
of guilty . . . intelligently and voluntarily made, operates
as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and bars the
later assertion of constitutional challenges to pretrial
proceedings. . . . Therefore, only those issues fully
disclosed in the record which relate either to the exercise
of jurisdiction . . . by the court or to the voluntary and
intelligent nature of the plea are ordinarily appealable
after a plea of guilty . . . .'' (Citations omitted;
emphasis omitted; footnotes omitted.) State v.
Madera, 198 Conn. 92, 97- 98, 503 A.2d 136 (1985).
United States Supreme Court, in addressing the viability of a
double jeopardy challenge following a guilty plea, has
explained that ‘‘[j]ust as a defendant who pleads
guilty to a single count admits guilt to the specified
offense, so too does a defendant who pleads guilty to two
counts with facial allegations of distinct offenses concede
that he has committed two separate crimes.''
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570,
109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989). In that case, the
court emphasized that the defendants ‘‘had the
opportunity, instead of entering their guilty pleas, to
challenge the theory of the indictments . . . . They chose
not to, and hence relinquished that entitlement.''
Id., 571. Relinquishment of a double jeopardy claim,
the court continued, ‘‘derives not from any
inquiry into a defendant's subjective understanding of
the range of potential defenses, but from the admissions
necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of
guilty.'' Id., 573-74; accord United
States v. Burroughs, 691 Fed.Appx. 31, 33 (2d
Cir. 2017) (defendant's ‘‘valid guilty plea .
. . constitutes a waiver of his double jeopardy