United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Charles S. Haight, Jr., Senior United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Ali Richard, currently incarcerated at MacDougall-Walker
Correctional Institution (“MacDougall-Walker”) in
Suffield, Connecticut, has commenced this action pro
se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff names
thirteen officials at MacDougall-Walker as Defendants in
their individual and official capacities: Steven R. Strom,
Nancy O'Braskey, Reverend Williams, Karl Lewis, John
Aldi, Scott Erfe, Michael Bibens, William Mulligan, Deputy
Warden Mudano, Commissary Service Manager Failla, Counselor
Supervisor Blanchard, Correctional Officer White, and
Mailroom Personnel Norton. Plaintiff contends that Defendants
violated his right to freely exercise his religion,
discriminated against him on the basis of his religion,
denied him equal protection of the laws, deprived him of
property in violation of due process, and retaliated against
him. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from the
Defendants in their official capacities and monetary relief
from the Defendants in their individual capacities.
[See Doc. 6 at ¶ 1.]
Richard's
motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted on
August 31, 2018. [See Doc. 5.] Richard filed an
Amended Complaint as a matter of course on September 18, 2018
(the “Amended Complaint”). [See Doc. 6.]
The Court now reviews Richard's Amended Complaint to
determine whether his claims may proceed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
dismisses Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in part.
I.
Standard of Review
Under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a
prisoner's civil complaint against governmental actors
and “dismiss . . . any portion of the complaint [that]
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, ” or that “seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible
on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 570 (2007)); see also Allco
Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2017).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
However, the Court is not “bound to accept conclusory
allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions.” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Accordingly, a Complaint “that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
With
respect to pro se litigants, it is well-established
that pro se pleadings “must be construed
liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments
that they suggest.” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank
Nat'l Tr. Co., 706 Fed.Appx. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017)
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
see also Boykin v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d
Cir. 2008) (“‘A document filed pro se is
to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.'” (quoting Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007))); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d
636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In reviewing a pro
se complaint, the court must assume the truth of the
allegations, and interpret them liberally to “raise the
strongest arguments [they] suggest[].”). Even in a
pro se filing, however, “threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice, ” nor may the
Court “invent factual allegations” that the
plaintiff has not pleaded. Chavis v. Chappius, 618
F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
II.
Plaintiff's Allegations
The
factual allegations contained in Plaintiff's complaint
are recounted below, recited in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff
is a Moorish-American and diligently practices his Moorish
religion. [Doc. 6 ¶ 20.] The staff at MacDougall-Walker
permit inmates of the Moorish Science religion to practice
their faith individually using books, religious newspapers,
audio recordings, and other items. [Id. ¶ 21.]
On or
about December 14, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a written
request to Defendant Williams, the Director of Religious
Services for the Department of Correction, seeking to
purchase a fez to be used during religious practice.
[Id. ¶ 22.] In the Moorish religion, a fez is
believed to symbolize spiritual and physical aspects of life
and to provide spiritual protection. [Id. ¶
23.] It is an “essential component of the Moorish
religion and a requirement for all Moorish
practitioners.” [Id.]
On
February 5, 2018, Plaintiff received written notification
from Defendant Lewis that all ten members of the Religious
Review Committee (the “Committee”)-Defendants
Strom, O'Braskey, Williams, Lewis, Aldi, Erfe, Bibens,
Mulligan, Mudano, and Failla (the “Committee
Defendants”)-had denied his request to purchase the fez
due to safety and security concerns. [Id. ¶
24.] Plaintiff appealed the decision, arguing that the fez is
an essential component of his religion and that the security
concerns were unfounded. [Id. ¶ 25.] Plaintiff
also noted that the Committee had previously approved
requests from Nation of Islam and Five Percenter inmates to
purchase crowns, which were similar to the fez in design.
[Id.] The appeal was denied. [Doc. 6 ¶ 26.] As
a result, Plaintiff has been unable to freely and fully
practice his religion. [Id. ¶ 27.]
During
this time, Plaintiff had been communicating with K. Bin Bey,
the Grand Mufti of the Moorish Science Temple of America.
[Id. ¶ 28.] On February 16, 2018, Plaintiff
received a letter from the Grand Mufti. [Id. ¶
29.] Mailroom personnel White and Norton had torn the return
address from the envelope. [Id. ¶¶ 29,
32.] Plaintiff immediately reported the issue to the unit
officer delivering the mail and submitted a written informal
complaint to the deputy warden. [Id. ¶ 30.]
Defendant Blanchard, the mailroom supervisor, responded to
Plaintiffs complaint and assured him that it would not happen
again. [Id. ¶ 31.] On March 23, 2018, Plaintiff
received another letter from the Grand Mufti. [Id.
¶ 33.] Again, the return address had been torn off the
envelope. [Id.] Plaintiff filed a grievance which
was denied initially and on appeal. [Id.
¶¶ 34-35.]
Plaintiff
also alleges that he ordered a book entitled
“Nationality, Birthrights, and Jurisprudence” in
January 2018. [Doc. 6 ¶ 39.] The book “explains
the legal process for becoming a Moorish-american, which the
plaintiff must claim as his nationality in order to be
recognized as a member of the Moorish Science Temple of
America.” [Id. ¶ 40.] Staff at
MacDougall-Walker did not permit the book to enter the
facility, telling the Plaintiff that the Media Review
Committee had placed the book on the rejection list on July
21, 2015 based on safety and security concerns. [Id.
¶ 41; id. at 28.] Plaintiff appealed the
decision and, on July 9, 2018, the Director of Security at
MacDougall-Walker informed him that the book had been
reevaluated and the Media Review Committee's prior
rejection overturned. [Id. ¶¶ 42-43.]
However, Defendants Blanchard, White and Norton (the
“Mailroom Defendants”) returned the book to the
vendor in retaliation for the plaintiff previous complaints
regarding mail issues, falsely claiming that they did not
receive the plaintiffs appeal within the time permitted for
filing. [Id. ¶¶ 44-45.]
III.
Discussion
Plaintiff
includes three counts in his Amended Complaint. In the first
count, Plaintiff includes all federal constitutional claims.
He contends that all Defendants violated his right to freely
practice his religion under the Free Exercise Clause and
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and discriminated
against him because of his religion in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. He also alleges
that the Mailroom Defendants deprived him of his religious
book without affording him due process in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, and retaliated against him for filing a
grievance in violation of his rights under the First
Amendment. In the second count, Plaintiff contends that all
Defendants violated his rights under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2 by
interfering with his purchase of the book and fez and by
removing the return address from his correspondence with the
Grand Mufti. In the third count the plaintiff asserts state
law claims against all Defendants for religious
discrimination and equal protection violations under Article
First §§ 3 and 20 of the Connecticut Constitution,
and against the Mailroom Defendants for due process and free
speech violations under Article First §§ 8 and 14
of the Connecticut Constitution.
For the
reasons discussed below, the Court will allow Plaintiffs Free
Exercise and RLUIPA claims to proceed against all Defendants
with respect to Plaintiffs attempts to procure a fez and
religious book. It will also permit Plaintiffs Establishment
Clause and Equal Protection claims to proceed against the
Committee Defendants, and his retaliation claims under the
U.S. and Connecticut Constitutions to proceed against the
Mailroom Defendants. However, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims under
Article First §§ 3, 8, and 20 of the Connecticut
Constitution. Additionally, Plaintiffs Equal Protection,
Establishment Clause, and due process claims against the
Mailroom Defendants, as well as all claims arising out of the
Mailroom Defendants' purported removal of a return
mailing address, will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
A.
First Amendment Free Exercise Claims Against All
Defendants
Plaintiff
argues that Defendants' denial of permission to purchase
a fez, interference with his purchase of a religious book,
and removal of the return address from a letter from the
Grand Mufti each violates his right to free exercise of his
religion under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. “Inmates clearly retain protections
afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that
no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.”
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 283 U.S. 342, 348
(1987); see also Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588
(2d Cir. 2003) (“Prisoners have long been understood to
retain some measure of the constitutional protection afforded
by the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.”).
But a prisoner's right to exercise his religion is not
absolute, and must be balanced against “the interests
of prison officials charged with complex duties arising from
administration of the penal system.” Id.
(quoting Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d
Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, a prisoner's free exercise
claim must be judged “under a
‘reasonableness' test less restrictive than that
ordinarily applied: a regulation that burdens a protected
right passes constitutional muster if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.”
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274 (2d Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To
state a First Amendment free exercise claim, Plaintiff
“must make a threshold showing that ‘the disputed
conduct substantially burden[ed] his sincerely held religious
beliefs.'” Washington v. Gonyea, 538
Fed.Appx. 23, 26 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Salahuddin,
467 F.3d at 274-75).[1] Specifically, he must allege facts showing
that he sincerely holds a particular belief, that the belief
is religious in nature, and that the challenged action
substantially burdened his exercise of that belief. See
Ford, 352 F.3d at 588-91. A belief is substantially
burdened where the state has “put[] substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate
his beliefs.” Forde v. Zickefoose, 612
F.Supp.2d 171, 177 (D. Conn. 2009) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In considering whether a prisoner has
made the required showing, the court does not “evaluate
the objective reasonableness of the prisoner's belief but
considers only whether the prisoner “sincerely holds a
particular belief and whether the belief is religious in
nature.” Ford, 352 F.3d at 590.
Plaintiff
alleges that he is a “devout Moorish-american”
[sic] and “diligently practices his Moorish religion,
” including through correspondence with a Moorish
religious leader. [Doc. 6 ¶ 20.] Plaintiff further
alleges that a fez is believed to provide spiritual
protection, is an essential component of the Moorish
religion, and is a requirement for all Moorish practitioners.
[Id. ¶ 23.] He also alleges that
Nationality, Birthrights, and Jurisprudence-the book
that mail personnel returned to the vendor-“explained]
the legal process for becoming a Moorish-american, ”
which the Plaintiff was required to claim as his nationality
in order to be recognized as a member of the Moorish Science
Temple of America. [Id. ¶ 40.] These
allegations, taken together and construed liberally, state a
plausible claim that Plaintiff sincerely held a religious
belief that was substantially burdened by the Committee's
denial of his request to purchase a fez and, subsequently, by
the Mailroom Defendants' interference with his purchase
of an important religious book.
There
is no basis, however, for Plaintiff's Free Exercise claim
against the Mailroom Defendants for removal of the return
address on two letters from the Grand Mufti. Plaintiff
acknowledges that he contacted the Grand Mufti both prior and
subsequent to removal of the return addresses. It therefore
cannot be reasonably inferred-nor does Plaintiff allege-that
the lack of a return address on the envelope interfered with
or otherwise burdened his religious practice. Plaintiff's
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