October 19, 2018
information charging the defendant with the crimes of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell and
criminal possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the
defendant was presented to the court, Fasano,
J., on a plea of guilty; judgment of guilty in
accordance with the plea; thereafter, the court denied the
defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, and
the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Farrar, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Hanna, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the
brief, was Maureen Platt, state's attorney, for the
Lavine, Prescott and Elgo, Js.
self-represented defendant, Chad Lamar Farrar, appeals from
the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct
an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the
court improperly concluded that the sentence imposed on him
for a term of incarceration followed by a period of special
parole was authorized by statute and, therefore, was not
illegal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
following facts and procedural history underlie the
defendant's appeal. On October 9, 2014, the defendant
pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with
intent to sell in violation of General Statutes §
21a-277 (a) and criminal possession of a firearm in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-217. The trial court sentenced
the defendant to a total effective term of seven years of
incarceration followed by eight years of special parole.
February 27, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to correct an
illegal sentence, claiming that his sentence, which included
a term of imprisonment followed by a period of special
parole, was not authorized by statute and, thus, violated his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. The court held
a hearing on the defendant's motion on May 31, 2017. In a
memorandum of decision issued on June 7, 2017, the court
denied the defendant's motion, concluding that
‘‘there is no authority for the proposition that
special parole constitutes a separate sentence as opposed to
a parole status and, therefore, a double jeopardy violation .
. . .'' The defendant appealed.
appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied
his motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that his
sentence of seven years of incarceration followed by eight
years of special parole is prohibited by statute because
special parole is not a definite term of imprisonment and
that General Statutes § 53a-35a requires that a defendant be
sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment. He contends,
therefore, that the court illegally sentenced him to both a
definite term of imprisonment and a period of special parole
in violation of § 53a-35a.
issue raised by the defendant is the same one he raised in
his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We have examined
the record on appeal and the briefs and arguments of the
parties and conclude that special parole is a status duly
authorized by General Statutes § 53a-28
We decline to adopt the defendant's construction of
§ 53a-35a, as that construction would conflict with
§ 53a-28 (b) (9) and General Statutes § 54-128 (c).
Sections 53a-28 (b) (9) and 54-128 (c) explicitly authorize a
defendant to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed
by a period of special parole, provided that the combined
term of the period of imprisonment and special parole do not
exceed the statutory maximum for the crime for which the
defendant was convicted.
. . . is well established that, [i]n cases in which more than
one [statutory provision] is involved, we presume that the
legislature intended [those provisions] to be read together
to create a harmonious body of law . . . and we construe the
[provisions], if possible, to avoid conflict between
them.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Victor O., 320 Conn. 239, 248- 49, 128 A.3d 940
the defendant received a definite period of incarceration of
seven years followed by a period of eight years of special
parole, and the combined terms of imprisonment and special
parole did not exceed the maximum sentence of incarceration
for his conviction of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to sell pursuant to § 21a-277 (a), which is
punishable for up to fifteen years of incarceration for a
first offense. The defendant's sentence, therefore, was
explicitly authorized by statute and ...