United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RAMON A. GARCIA, Plaintiff,
JOHN DOE, et al. Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Dooley United States District Judge
November 27, 2017, the plaintiff, Ramon A. Garcia
(“Garcia”), a former inmate with the Connecticut
Department of Corrections (“DOC”), filed a
complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
six DOC and Correctional Managed Health Care employees for
acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs, in violation of his Eighth Amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment, and for retaliating
against him for filing a grievance, in violation of his First
Amendment rights. After reviewing the complaint, the court
permitted the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim to
proceed against Nurse Joy Burns and Nurse Hollie Good and the
First Amendment claim to proceed against Counselor Supervisor
September 25, 2018, the defendants each moved for summary
judgment averring that there is no genuine issue of material
fact with respect to any of the claims brought by the
plaintiff and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The plaintiff's opposition to the defendants'
motion was due by October 16, 2018. He has not filed any
opposition or response to the defendants'
motion. For the following reasons, the
defendants' motion is GRANTED in its entirety.
seeking summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden
to establish that there are no genuine issues of material
fact in dispute and that it is “entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is
“material” if it “might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law” and is
“genuine” if “a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party” based upon
it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). The moving party may satisfy this burden
“by showing - that is pointing out to the district
court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case.” PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per
curium) (internal quotations omitted; citations
motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary
evidence and sworn affidavits and “demonstrates the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, ” the
nonmoving party must do more than vaguely assert the
existence of some unspecified disputed material facts or
“rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated
speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs.,
Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
The nonmoving party “must come forward with specific
evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact.” Id.
reviewing the parties' submissions, the Court must
“construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and to draw all reasonable inferences in
its favor.” Gary Friedrich Enters., L.L.C. v.
Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 312 (2d Cir.
2013) (citation omitted). If there is any evidence from which
a reasonable factual inference could be drawn in favor of the
non-moving party for the issue on which summary judgment is
sought, then summary judgment is improper. See, Security
Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc.,
391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004).
one party is proceeding pro se, the Court must read
his papers liberally and interpret them “to raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest.” Willey v.
Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Despite this liberal
interpretation, however, “[u]nsupported allegations do
not create a material issue of fact” and cannot
overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment.
See, Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811 (2003).
Material Facts 
December 2015, the plaintiff was confined at the
MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution
(“MWCI”) in Suffield, Connecticut. On December
21, 2015, he was transported from MWCI to the UConn Medical
Center for oral surgery. Following surgery, the dentist, Dr.
A Stiles, prescribed for the plaintiff five milligrams of
Percocet to be taken every six hours to alleviate his pain.
Later that day, at 5:50 p.m., the plaintiff received a five
milligram dose of oxycodone and a 325 milligram dose of
acetaminophen. Shortly thereafter, at 6:00 p.m., he was
transported back to MWCI. Per Dr. Stiles' order, the
plaintiff was not due another dose of pain medication until
11:50 p.m., six hours after his 5:50 p.m. dosage. At
approximately 12:05 p.m. on December 22, the plaintiff
received another dose of oxycodone from MWCI medical staff.
Records at MWCI show that medication was also withdrawn for
the plaintiff at 11:35 p.m. on December 22 and at 5:37 p.m.
on December 23.
December 2015, there were several nurses employed at MWCI
each having different assignments and responsibilities. One
nurse, the designated medication nurse, was assigned the
responsibility of processing prescriptions and dispensing
medications for inmates. Defendant Nurse Good, who is alleged
to have withheld medication from the plaintiff, was never
assigned as the medication nurse at MWCI. Generally, her
responsibilities entailed examining inmates and handling
paperwork for out-of-facility medical treatment. Defendant
Good does not recall speaking with the plaintiff on December
December 28, 2015, at 6:50 p.m., the plaintiff's cell
mate was complaining of flu-like symptoms. As a result, the
plaintiff and his cellmate were placed in a medical
quarantine by MWCI medical staff. Pursuant to the order,
neither the plaintiff nor his cellmate were permitted to exit
their cell except for showers and telephone calls. Of import,
defendant Blanchard had no role in the decision to place the
plaintiff and his cellmate on quarantine status. Further, she
does not recall any interaction with the plaintiff in the
days that followed. On December 29, 2015, Blanchard ...