United States District Court, D. Connecticut
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Jeffrey Alker Meyer United States District Judge
Plaintiff
Joyce Decormier has filed this pro se lawsuit that
seems to allege misconduct in connection with a mortgage loan
for her home. Because the complaint does not allege facts
that give rise to plausible grounds for federal jurisdiction
or that state plausible grounds for relief and give fair
notice to defendants, I will dismiss the complaint without
prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Background
Decormier has filed a boilerplate form “Complaint for
Interpleader and Declaratory Relief.” She lists herself
as plaintiff with an address in Connecticut. The caption of
the complaint names the following four entity defendants:
Aurora Loan Services LLC, Nationstar, McCalla Raymer Leibert
Pierce LLC, and Sandelands Eyet LLC. Doc. #1 at 1. The body
of the complaint names four individual defendants: Theodore
Janulis, CEO of Aurora Loan Service LLC in Colorado; Jay
Bray, CEO of Nationstar Services in Texas; Benjamin
Staskiewicz, attorney from the law firm of McCalla Raymer
Leibert Pierce LLC in Connecticut; and Crystal Cooke,
attorney from the law firm of Sandelands Eyet LLP in New
Jersey. Id. at 2.
The
complaint alleges an amount in controversy of “[w]ell
over $360, 000.00 over a 30 yr span, plus the couple of yrs.
on the remortage loan.” Id. at 5. It otherwise
alleges: “Elderly ABUSE, FRAUD, Failure to Disclose,
Assertion made with Knowlege of falsity and intent to
deceive, illegal conversion of the property, Hyjacked Tiltle,
Concealment, Misrepresentation, Property at 640 Old Hartford
Rd. Colechester Ct. 06415.” Id. at 7. It
further alleges that “My signature has monitized the
Promissory note 100%, The Creditors intern, took the bank
check they had, sold it back to me as a debt plus interest. I
am the Creditor, NOT the debtor.” Ibid. The
complaint contains no further factual allegations.
Discussion
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A federal
court complaint must allege facts that give rise to plausible
grounds for a court to conclude that it has federal
jurisdiction. See Lapaglia v. Transamerica Cas. Ins.
Co., 155 F.Supp.3d 153, 155 (D. Conn. 2016). “If
the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Decormier's
complaint alleges that the Court has diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Doc. #1 at 3. But
diversity jurisdiction exists only if there is
“complete” diversity among the opposing parties
(i.e., plaintiff is a citizen of a different State
than all of the defendants). See Strawbridge v.
Curtis, 3 Cranch 267 (1806) (Marshall, C.J.);
Imbruce v. Buhl, 2016 WL 2733097, at *2 (D. Conn.
2016). Decormier alleges that she is from Connecticut and
that at least two of the defendants (the law firm of McCalla
Raymer Leibert Pierce LLC and Benjamin Staskiewicz) are also
from Connecticut. There is no proper basis for diversity
jurisdiction.
Nor is
there any other apparent basis for federal jurisdiction. The
complaint, for example, does not appear to allege any
violation of federal law that would give rise to jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although the title of the
complaint alleges that there is interpleader jurisdiction,
the complaint lacks any allegation that Decormier has
deposited money or property to the registry of the Court to
give rise to interpleader jurisdiction. See Sechler-Hoar
v. Tr. U/W of Gladys G. Hoart, 2018 WL 3715277, at *3
(D. Conn. 2018). Accordingly, the complaint fails to allege
plausible grounds to support federal jurisdiction.
In
addition, even assuming there were federal jurisdiction, the
sparse and conclusory allegations of the complaint manifestly
fail to state plausible grounds for relief against any
particular defendant. It is well established that
“pro se complaints must be construed liberally
and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399,
403 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Tracy v.
Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010)
(discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se
litigants). Although the Court must accept as true all
factual matters alleged in a complaint, a complaint may not
survive unless its factual recitations state a claim to
relief that is at least plausible on its face. See,
e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 177
(2d Cir. 2014) (same). A complaint that fails to allege
plausible grounds for relief may be subject to dismissal by
the Court on its own initiative pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
pleadings contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “When a complaint fails to
comply with [the Rule 8] requirements, the district court has
the power, on motion or sua sponte, to dismiss the
complaint.” Celli v. Cole, 699 Fed.Appx. 88,
89 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49
F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)). Dismissal of a complaint is
generally reserved for those cases in which the complaint is
“so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise
unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well
disguised.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40,
42 (2d Cir. 1988)).
The
complaint does not state a plausible claim for relief.
Although Decormier is clearly upset with defendants as a
result of their apparent involvement with her mortgage loan,
she has not alleged any dates or details of any wrongful
conduct by any particular defendant. The complaint does not
give fair notice to any of the defendants of what they did
wrong. Accordingly, the complaint is subject to dismissal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to
state facts that give rise to any plausible grounds for
relief.
Conclusion
The
complaint (Doc. #1) is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The motion for leave to ...