Argued
September 6, 2018
Procedural
History
Substitute
information charging the defendant with the crimes of risk of
injury to a child and breach of the peace in the second
degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New London, geographical area number ten, where
the court, Jongbloed, J., granted in part the state's
motion to preclude certain evidence and denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss; thereafter, the matter was
tried to the jury; verdict of guilty of risk of injury to a
child; subsequently, the court rendered judgment in
accordance with the verdict, from which the defendant
appealed to this court.
Robert
L. O'Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief,
was William A. Adsit, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Rita
M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom
were Michael L. Regan, state's attorney, and, on the
brief, Sarah E. Steere, senior assistant state's
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Keller, Bright and Pellegrino, Js.
OPINION
PELLEGRINO, J.
The
defendant, Mark T., appeals from the judgment of conviction,
rendered after a jury trial, of one count of risk of injury
to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a)
(1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court
abused its discretion by excluding relevant evidence, and
thereby violated his constitutional right (1) to present a
defense and (2) to testify in his own defense. We disagree
and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The
jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The
defendant, who was thirty-five years of age, had maintained
custody of his biological daughter, the victim, for hardly
three weeks at the time of the incident. The victim was
thirteen, in the eighth grade, and enrolled in an intensive
behavioral support class for children who were prone to
disruptive behavior. At home, the defendant had significant
difficulty maintaining control of the victim. He therefore
arranged for the victim to participate in independent
after-school counseling at a local mental health facility.
On the
morning of September 9, 2015, the defendant arrived at the
victim's school to take her to her scheduled appointment
at the mental health facility. The front office secretary
contacted the victim's classroom to inform Monika Wilkos,
the victim's special education teacher, that the
defendant had arrived in the main office to pick up the
victim. As the victim was gathering her belongings in the
classroom, she protested in front of Wilkos, stating that she
did not want to go with the defendant. Wilkos asked the
victim to accompany her to the front office, and while en
route, the defendant approached the victim and Wilkos in the
hallway.
After a
number of unsuccessful attempts to persuade the victim to
come with him, the defendant attempted to pick her up and
carry her. When the victim resisted, a tussle ensued, and the
defendant dragged the victim by one leg through the school
corridors toward the exit. School personnel called the
police. By the time police arrived, the defendant had dragged
the victim through the front office and into the foyer. When
he saw the police, the defendant released the victim. The
police interviewed the defendant and school staff, but took
no further actions.
The
following day, both the school psychologist and the school
nurse spoke to the victim regarding the incident. During the
interviews, they both noticed bruising on the victim's
body and subsequently reported the incident to the Department
of Children and Families (department). A police officer
assigned to the school district investigated the incident
and, thereafter, an arrest warrant was issued for the
defendant. After learning of the arrest warrant, the
defendant turned himself in to the police without incident.
The
operative information charged the defendant with one count of
risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a)
(1) and one count of breach of the peace in the second degree
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (1).
During multiple pretrial hearings, the defendant insisted on
representing himself despite the court's many warnings
about the dangers of self-representation.[1] The defendant
refused court-appointed counsel, but the court ultimately
assigned the defendant standby counsel in accordance with
Practice Book § 44-4.
Before
trial, the state filed, among other things, a motion in
limine requesting that the name, address, and any other
identifying information pertaining to the victim be kept
confidential pursuant to General Statutes § 54-86e. The
victim's guardian ad litem also argued in favor of the
motion, underscoring the harmful impact that disclosure of
sensitive facts could have on the victim. The defendant
objected, claiming that details of his relationship with the
victim were necessary to demonstrate his urgent need to get
help for the victim. The court granted the motion in part and
ordered that only the victim's first initial be used in
the record and at trial. The court also ordered that the
defendant's pretrial motions containing the name of the
victim and the name of the program that the defendant was
planning to take her to be placed under seal for the purposes
of the record. The court further ordered that it would rule
on the admissibility of other facts as they arose at trial.
On
September 19, 2016, following a three day jury trial, the
jury found the defendant guilty of risk of injury to a child,
but not guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree.
On April 4, 2017, the court imposed a total effective
sentence of four years imprisonment, execution suspended,
with three years of probation. This appeal followed.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The
defendant's appeal is predicated on his contention that
the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right (1)
to present a defense and (2) to testify in his own defense in
violation of the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to
the federal constitution.[2]Specifically, the defendant argues that
the court erred when it excluded evidence relevant to his
theory of defense of parental justification by limiting his
inquiry with respect to the victim's violent behavior
toward others at school. He further claims that when he
testified in his own defense, the trial court
unconstitutionally limited his testimony with respect to his
struggles with the victim's behavior, and her history of
extreme and physical opposition. He argues that because the
jury did not hear this evidence, it was unable to fully
understand the urgent need to get the victim mental health
treatment. The state argues that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it limited certain aspects of the
defendant's testimony. Specifically, the state argues
that the trial court gave the defendant wide latitude with
respect to his presentation of evidence and did not abuse its
discretion when it excluded evidence that was beyond the
scope of ...