United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO.
21)
Janet
C. Hall United States District Judge.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The
plaintiff, Lawrence Jaggon (“Jaggon”), filed a
Complaint against defendant, Community Health Services
(“CHS”), seeking damages and equitable relief
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
section 2000e-2 of title 42 of the United States Code, and
the common law of Connecticut. See Am. Compl. (Doc.
No. 18) ¶ 1. CHS filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.
to Dismiss”) (Doc. No. 21). CHS seeks dismissal of
Counts Three, Four, and Five of the Complaint. For the
reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in
part.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To
withstand a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The
plausibility standard is not a probability requirement; the
pleading must show, not merely allege, that the pleader is
entitled to relief. Id. Legal conclusions and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” are
not entitled to a presumption of truth. Id. However,
when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the
factual allegations in the operative complaint as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor.
See Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.
2012).
If, on
a motion to dismiss, “matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must
be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). However, extrinsic evidence that is
attached to the pleadings or incorporated by reference may be
considered on a motion to dismiss, as well as matters of
which judicial notice may be taken. See New York Pet
Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 850 F.3d
79, 86 (2d Cir. 2017).
III.
FACTS[1]
Jaggon
is a Registered Nurse (“RN”), with 18 years of
experience. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. At the time the Complaint
was filed, Jaggon, a Jamaican national, was 53. Id.
Defendant CHS is a corporation incorporated pursuant to the
laws of the State of Connecticut. Id. ¶ 7.
Jaggon worked at CHS before being terminated on October 21,
2016. Id. ¶ 6. He does not allege how long he
was employed by CHS.
Jaggon
alleges that CHS and its agents created a hostile work
environment, punished him for reporting violations of policy
and law, subjected him to disparate treatment based on his
race, and wrongfully terminated his employment. See
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-17, 25-35; 50-57, 72-75; 79-84,
86-88, 90-93, 104-06, 113-20. Jaggon further alleges that
agents of CHS “published slanderous information”
about Jaggon, specifically by stating that Jaggon was
“a problem employee and that his coworkers should not
associate with him.” Id. ¶ 138. Jaggon
alleges that the CEO of CHS, Greg Stanton
(“Stanton”) published slanderous information by
stating that Jaggon's coworkers should “stay away
from him.” Id. ¶ 139. Jaggon also alleges
that CHS engaged in “ongoing and outrageous conduct,
” causing Jaggon to suffer sleeplessness and anxiety.
Id. ¶¶ 148-50.
IV.
DISCUSSION
CHS
seeks dismissal of Counts Three, Four, and Five. See
Mot. to Dismiss at 1. CHS argues that Count Three must be
dismissed because Jaggon failed to allege facts sufficient to
support a claim for defamation. Id. CHS argues Count
Four must be dismissed because it fails to allege
unreasonable conduct in the termination process. Id.
CHS argues that Count Five should be dismissed because it
does not state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress against CHS. Id. The court addresses each
argument in turn.
A.
Count Three: Defamation
In
Count Three, Jaggon alleges that CHS is liable for
defamation, because its agents published “slanderous
information” about Jaggon, specifically that he was
“a problem employee and that his coworkers should not
associate with him.” Am. Compl. ¶ 138. Jaggon also
alleges that, in one instance, Stanton stated that
“coworker[s] of the Plaintiff should stay away from
him.” Id. ¶ 139. CHS argues that Count
Three should be dismissed because the alleged defamatory
statements are expressions of opinion, not statements of
fact. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss (“Def.'s Mem. in Supp”) (Doc. No.
21-1) at 3. Jaggon responds that the Complaint alleges
sufficient facts to plausibly support a claim of defamation.
See Jaggon Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
(“Jaggon Opp.”) (Doc. No. 34) at 4.
To
establish a prima facie case of defamation in Connecticut,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) the defendant
published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory
statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the
defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4)
the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury ...