United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
W. EGINTON SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jessica Jimenez alleges pregnancy discrimination and
retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Connecticut
Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), and
interference and retaliation under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”). Defendant Chubb & Son has
moved for summary judgment on all counts against it. For the
following reasons, defendant's motion will be granted in
part and denied in part.
is a property and casualty insurance company with an office
in Simsbury, Connecticut. Chubb contracted with the Kelly
Services staffing company to fill Deductible Tracking Unit
(“DTU”) Analyst positions at Chubb's Simsbury
office. Kelly Services assigned Kerry Bailey, a Vendor
Management Specialist, to manage its staffing business with
Services assigned plaintiff to be a DTU Analyst at Chubb in
April 2012. As a DTU Analyst, plaintiff received and reviewed
invoices from law firms and processed documentation relating
to insurance policies. Accuracy was a key function of the
work at Chubb was managed by Helen Yang, a Deductible
Tracking Supervisor. Yang was in turn supervised by Senior
Deductible Tracking Supervisor, Nicole Rankin.
was counseled in January 2014 and January 2015 about
tardiness, attendance, and work-accuracy. In one instance,
plaintiff processed the same invoice twice, resulting in a
$9, 000 overpayment, but failed to correct the error without
having to be reminded by Yang. In another, plaintiff failed
to properly bill an insured, which required a request for
reimbursement to correct the error.
March 2015, plaintiff submitted a request for pregnancy leave
pursuant to the FMLA. The request was approved. In May 2015,
Chubb decided to deny plaintiff a raise in pay.
leave began on June 15, 2015, with an expected end date of
September 21, 2015.
communicated a list of performance concerns to Bailey by
email dated September 9, 2015. Plaintiff contends that, by
that time, the vacancy created by her pregnancy leave had
been filled, so plaintiff had already been replaced. It was
not until September 2015 that plaintiff contacted Kelly
Services about returning to work at Chubb in her role as a
maintains that she never received advanced warning of her
termination and that she was never threatened with
termination during various counseling sessions. Plaintiff
asserts that her work mistakes never led to additional or
special training. Moreover, she defends many of the absences
on her record as being due to her pregnancy. Finally,
although Chubb directly supervised and controlled
plaintiff's day-to-day work assignments, plaintiff
contends that no Chubb employee ever informed
plaintiff that Chubb decided to end plaintiff's
employment because of performance deficiencies. Instead,
plaintiff was informed by email that Chubb had discontinued
her position, when in fact, Chubb was looking to fill DTU
Analyst positions during the time that plaintiff was
returning from maternity leave.
motion for summary judgment will be granted where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
"Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the
import of the evidence is summary judgment proper."
Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 (1991).
burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of
any material factual issue genuinely in dispute. American
International Group, Inc. v. London American International
Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981). In determining
whether a genuine factual issue exists, the court must
resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable ...