United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REVERSE THE
DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER AND ON THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR AN ORDER AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
COMMISSIONER
ROBERT
M. SPECTOR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
action, filed under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeks review of a final decision by
the Commissioner of Social Security [“SSA”]
denying the plaintiff disability insurance benefits
[“DIB”].
I.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
On or
about October 7, 2013, the plaintiff filed an application for
DIB benefits claiming she has been disabled since December 1,
2008, due to degenerative disc disease, chronic pain and
plantar fasciitis in both feet, back injury, and depression.
(Certified Transcript of Administrative Proceedings, dated
December 2, 2017 [“Tr.”] 76, 175-81; see
also Tr. 192).[2] The plaintiff's application was denied
initially (Tr. 102-05), and upon reconsideration. (Tr.
111-13). On June 30, 2014, the plaintiff requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge [“ALJ”] (Tr.
114-15), and on November 23, 2015, a hearing was held in
Massachusetts, before ALJ Addison C.S. Masengill, at which
the plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. (Tr. 48-75).
On February 3, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision
denying the plaintiff's claims for benefits. (Tr. 17-40).
On February 3, 2016, the plaintiff submitted a request for
review of the hearing decision (see Tr. 12-13), and
on May 25, 2017, the Appeals Council denied the
plaintiff's request for review, thereby rendering the
ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
(Tr. 6-8).
On
October 11, 2017, the plaintiff filed her complaint in this
pending action (Doc. No. 1; see Tr. 1-4 (request for
more time to file civil action)), [3] and on December 15, 2017,
the defendant filed her answer and administrative transcript,
dated December 2, 2017. (Doc. No. 15). On April 14, 2018, the
plaintiff filed her Motion to Reverse the Decision of the
Commissioner (Doc. No. 17), and brief in support (Doc. No.
17-1 [“Pl.'s Mem.”]), [4] and on June 12,
2018, the defendant filed her Motion to Affirm (Doc. No. 19),
and brief in support (Doc. No. 19-1 [“Def.'s
Mem.”]). On September 5, 2018, the parties consented to
the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge and the
case was transferred to this Magistrate Judge. (Doc. No. 20).
For the
reasons stated below, the plaintiff's Motion to Reverse
the Decision of the Commissioner (Doc. No. 17) is granted
in part such that this case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this Ruling, and the
defendant's Motion to Affirm (Doc. No. 19) is granted
in part and denied in part.
II.
THE ALJ'S DECISION
Following
the five-step evaluation process, [5] the ALJ found that the
plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity
during the period from her alleged onset date of December 1,
2008 through her date last insured of June 30, 2011. (Tr. 22,
citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 et seq.). The ALJ
concluded that the plaintiff had the following severe
combination of impairments: back pain due to degenerative
disc disease, plantar fasciitis, a history of tarsal tunnel
surgery, left knee pain status post-surgical intervention,
insomnia, anxiety disorder, and depressive disorder. (Tr. 23,
citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)). He next found that the
plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a
listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. (Tr. 23-25, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
404.1525 and 404.1526). The ALJ concluded that,
“[a]fter careful consideration of the entire record,
” the plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work
as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) through her date
last insured, except that the plaintiff was limited to work
that involved unskilled tasks, with no foot and leg controls;
limited to work “not performed at heights or using
ladders, ropes, and scaffolding[]”; limited “to
no more than occasional coworker contact and public
contact[];” limited to “standing and walking four
hours in an eight-hour workday[]”; and limited to no
overhead lifting and reaching. (Tr. 25-39). The ALJ then
concluded that, through her date last insured, there were
“jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant could have performed,
” (Tr. 39-40, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569,
404.1569(a)), [6] and thus, the claimant was not under a
disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any
time from December 1, 2008, through her date last insured,
June 30, 2011. (Tr. 40, citing 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(g)).
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
scope of review of a Social Security disability determination
involves two levels of inquiry. First, the court must decide
whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles
in making the determination. Second, the court must decide
whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d
Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The court may “set aside
the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not
disabled only if the factual findings are not supported by
substantial evidence or if the decision is based on legal
error.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127
(2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks & citation
omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial
evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion; it is more than a
“mere scintilla.” Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted); see Yancey
v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted). The substantial evidence rule also applies to
inferences and conclusions that are drawn from findings of
fact. See Gonzalez v. Apfel, 23 F.Supp.2d 179, 189
(D. Conn. 1998) (citation omitted); Rodriguez v.
Califano, 431 F.Supp. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(citations omitted). However, the court may not decide facts,
reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. See Dotson v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 571, 577
(7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Instead, the court must
scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness
of the ALJ's factual findings. See Id.
Furthermore, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive
if supported by substantial evidence and should be upheld
even in those cases where the reviewing court might have
found otherwise. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
see also Beauvoir v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1432, 1433 (2d
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); Eastman v. Barnhart,
241 F.Supp.2d 160, 168 (D. Conn. 2003).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
The
plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to evaluate thoroughly
the opinion of Dr. Stephan Lange when determining the
plaintiff's RFC. In addition, the plaintiff argues that
the ALJ's credibility analysis misapplied the law and
failed to assess properly the plaintiff's reports of
pain. (Pl.'s Mem. at 1, 3-9). In response, the defendant
contends that the ALJ correctly weighed the opinion evidence
in the record, and substantial evidence supports the
ALJ's RFC finding. (Def.'s Mem. at 5-10).
Additionally, the defendant argues that the ALJ properly
analyzed and weighed the plaintiff's subjective
complaints of pain. (Def.'s Mem. at 10-13).
B.
RFC ASSESSMENT AND CONSIDERATION OF TREATING
...