Argued
September 25, 2018
Procedural
History
Substitute
information charging the defendant with the crimes of
manslaughter in the first degree and tampering with evidence,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Hartford and tried to the jury before Kwak, J.;
verdict and judgment of guilty of manslaughter in the first
degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Lisa
J. Steele, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was
Stephen A. Lebedevitch, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Denise
B. Smoker, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and
Anthony Bochicchio, senior assistant state's attorney,
for the appellee (state).
Lavine, Sheldon and Bishop, Js.
OPINION
LAVINE, J.
The
defendant, Jayson Mota-Royaceli, appeals from the judgment of
conviction rendered after a trial to the jury, on the charge
of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1). The defendant claims that the
trial court improperly (1) limited his voir dire of the
venire panel and (2) gave the jury a Chip Smith instruction
at an impermissibly coercive time. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The
jury was presented with evidence of the following facts. The
defendant and the victim worked together and attended the
wedding reception of one of their coworkers. During the
course of the night, the victim touched the defendant's
buttocks, causing the defendant to get angry. The victim
tried to fight the defendant, but the defendant did not want
to fight. After they separately left the reception, there was
phone communication between the two, and they ultimately
drove to and met in a parking lot. After a discussion, the
defendant returned to his car, and after getting in, he
thought that he saw the victim with a firearm, and drove the
car into the victim, killing him. No gun was found on the
scene. Following the trial, the defendant was convicted of
one count of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of
§ 53a-55 (a) (1) and acquitted of two counts of
tampering with evidence in violation of § 53a-155 (a)
(1).[1]
This appeal followed.
I
The
defendant claims that the court erred in limiting defense
counsel's line of questioning of prospective jurors
regarding the finality of their verdict. Specifically, the
defendant argues that without being allowed to pursue this
line of questioning, ‘‘there [was] an
impermissible risk that one or more jurors entertaineda
belief that the ultimate task of determining whether the
defendant is guilty or not could be corrected in a higher
court.'' We are unpersuaded.
Jury
selection for the defendant's trial began on October 22,
2015. During voir dire, defense counsel's line of
questioning included inquiries regarding the finality of a
jury's verdict.[2] After the state objected, the court
allowed the line of questioning but ordered defense counsel
to reword the questions. The next day, however, upon
reconsidering the state's objection, the court precluded
defense counsel from asking venirepersons whether they
believed that their verdict as jurors would be final. The
defendant argues that the court erred in precluding this line
of questioning, and that in doing so, the court deprived the
defendant of his right to inquire into potential bias. We
disagree.
‘‘Voir
dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal
defendant that his [or her] [s]ixth [a]mendment right to an
impartial jury will be honored. . . . Part of the guarantee
of a defendant's right to an impartial jury is an
adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. . . . Our
constitutional and statutory law permit each party, typically
through his or her attorney, to question each prospective
juror individually, outside the presence of other prospective
jurors, to determine [his or her] fitness to serve on the
jury. . . . Because the purpose of voir dire is to discover
if there is any likelihood that some prejudice is in the
[prospective] juror's mind [that] will even
subconsciously affect his [or her] decision of the case, the
party who may be adversely affected should be permitted [to
ask] questions designed to uncover that prejudice. This is
particularly true with reference to the defendant in a
criminal case. . . . The purpose of voir dire is to
facilitate [the] intelligent exercise of peremptory
challenges and to help uncover factors that would dictate
disqualification for cause.'' (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State Edwards,
314 Conn. 465, 483, 102 A.3d 52 (2014).
It is
well settled that ‘‘[t]he court has wide
discretion in conducting the voir dire . . . and the exercise
of that discretion will not constitute reversible error
unless it has clearly been abused or harmful prejudice
appears to have resulted.'' (Citations omitted.)
State Dahl-gren, 200 Conn. 586, 601, 512 A.2d 906
(2009).
‘‘A
defendant will not prevail on appeal just because he might be
correct in asserting that a prohibited line of questioning
would have exposed potential bias.'' State
Thornton, 112 Conn.App. 694, 705, 963 A.2d 1099, cert.
denied, 291 Conn. 914, 970 A.2d 727 (2009). ‘‘We
have repeatedly stated that a juror's knowledge or
ignorance concerning questions of law is not a proper subject
of inquiry on voir dire.'' State Dahlgren,
supra, 200 Conn. 601.
As an
initial matter, we reject the defendant's
characterization of the prohibited inquiry as relating to
‘‘bias.'' The term ‘‘bias,
'' as commonly used, refers to a predisposition or
tendency to view a person or circumstance in an unfair way.
The trial court determined that the questioning regarding
finality was improper, as it concerned the understanding of
legal concepts. We agree with this determination, as the line
of questioning by defense counsel improperly inquired into
legal knowledge. Although the defendant argues that the
questions were not improper questions of law, he emphasizes
the importance of gauging a venireperson's
‘‘aware[ness] of the possibility of
post-conviction proceedings.'' We fail to see the
distinction between improper questions regarding a
venireperson's knowledge of law, and the questions that
the defendant sought to ask. These questions did not probe
potential bias but, rather, inquired into a
venireperson's awareness of legal proceedings.
Additionally,
the defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by the court's ruling. The defendant argues
that prejudice arose from the risk that a juror might have
believed that a higher court could correct an improper
verdict. This argument is speculative as there is no ...