CHERYL A. JENKINS
v.
MICHAEL A. JENKINS
Argued
October 9, 2018
Procedural
History
Action
for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Stamford, where the court, Colin, J., approved the
agreement of the parties to enter into binding arbitration as
to certain disputed matters; thereafter, the arbitrator
issued an award and entered certain orders; subsequently, the
defendant filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award,
and the plaintiff filed motions to vacate the award;
thereafter, the matter was tried to the court, Colin,
J.; judgment granting the defendant's motion to
confirm, denying the plaintiff's motions to vacate, and
dissolving the parties' marriage and granting certain
other relief, from which the plaintiff appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Pamela
M. Magnano, with whom, on the brief, was Cheryl A. Jenkins,
for the appellant (plaintiff).
George
J. Markley, for the appellee (defendant).
Keller, Bright and Pellegrino, Js.
OPINION
PELLEGRINO, J.
The
plaintiff, Cheryl A. Jenkins, appeals from the trial
court's judgment denying her motion to vacate an
arbitration award in a dissolution of marriage matter which,
in addition to dissolving the marriage, included orders of
alimony and a division of the parties' assets and other
financial orders.[1] On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
trial court erred when it refused to vacate the
arbitrator's award because the arbitrator (1) precluded
the testimony of an expert witness in violation of General
Statutes § 52-418 (a) (3), and (2) treated one party
more favorably than the other in violation of General
Statutes § 52-418 (a) (2). We disagree and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The
following facts and procedural history are relevant to the
resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant,
Michael A. Jenkins, were married on August 31, 2008. In
December, 2013, the plaintiff commenced the present
dissolution action.
In
November, 2015, the parties entered into an arbitration
agreement (agreement) for the resolution of several issues
relating to the dissolution of their marriage. Arbitration
proceedings took place before Elaine Gordon (arbitrator) on
December 1, 2, and 21, 2015. The parties attended the
proceedings with counsel and agreed that they would not have
the proceedings recorded.[2]
On
February 3, 2016, the arbitrator issued an award and
rationale for the award. The plaintiff subsequently filed
motions in the Superior Court to vacate the
award.[3]After holding a full evidentiary hearing on
the plaintiff's two operative motions on March 28, 2016,
the trial court, Colin, J., denied the
plaintiff's motions to vacate the arbitration award. This
appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will
be set forth as necessary.
The
plaintiff's claims arise under ‘‘General
Statutes § 52-418 (a), which sets forth the standard of
review governing an application to vacate, correct or modify
an arbitration award, [and] provides in relevant part: Upon
the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior
court for the judicial district in which one of the parties
resides . . . shall make an order vacating the award if it
finds [that] . . . (2) . . . there has been evident
partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; [or]
(3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in
refusing to . . . hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced . . . .'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Transportation v.
White Oak Corp., 319 Conn. 582, 598 n.3, 125 A.3d 988
(2015).
We
begin by setting forth the relevant standard for reviewing a
trial court's judgment affirming an arbitration award.
‘‘This court has for many years wholeheartedly
endorsed arbitration as an effective alternative method of
settling disputes intended to avoid the formalities, delay,
expense and vexation of ordinary litigation. . . . When
arbitration is created by contract, we recognize that its
autonomy can only be preserved by minimal judicial
intervention. . . . Since the parties consent to arbitration,
and have full control over the issues to be arbitrated, a
court will make every reasonable presumption in favor of the
arbitration award and the arbitrator's acts and
proceedings. . . . The party challenging the award bears the
burden of producing evidence sufficient to invalidate or
avoid it . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Bridgeport v. Kasper Group, Inc., 278
Conn. 466, 473-74, 899 A.2d 523 (2006).
Although
a trial court's review of an arbitrator's decision is
limited, our review of a trial court's decision to
dismiss a motion to vacate an arbitration award under §
52-418 (a) (3) involves a question of law and, thus, is
plenary. See id., 476. We review a trial court's
decision to dismiss a motion to vacate an arbitration
pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (2), which involves factual
findings by the trial court, under the clearly erroneous
standard. See Haynes Construction Co. v. Cascella &
Son Construction, Inc., 36 Conn.App. 29, 32-33, 647 A.2d
1015, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 916, 648 A.2d 152 (1994)
(applying clearly erroneous standard when reviewing trial
court's decision vacating arbitration decision on basis
of arbitrator's evident partiality).
‘‘Determining whether a trial court's
decision is clearly erroneous involves a two part function:
where the legal conclusions of the court are challenged we
must determine whether they are legally and logically correct
and whether they find support in the facts set out in the
memorandum of decision; where the factual basis of the
...