United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
KARI
A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Preliminary
Statement
Plaintiff,
Luther Atkinson (“Atkinson”), currently confined
at Bridgeport Correctional Center in Bridgeport, Connecticut,
filed this complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 asserting a claim for use of excessive force. The named
defendants are the Norwalk Police Department, Norwalk City
Hall, and three John Doe Norwalk Police Officers. Atkinson
seeks damages and an injunction preventing the Norwalk Police
Department from assaulting persons suspected of criminal
activity. The complaint was received on December 3, 2018, and
Atkinson's motion to proceed in forma pauperis
was granted on December 28, 2018.
Standard
of Review
Under
section 1915A of title 28 of the United States Code, the
Court must review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any
portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. Id. In reviewing a pro se
complaint, the Court must assume the truth of the
allegations, and interpret them liberally to “raise the
strongest arguments [they] suggest[].” Abbas v.
Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). Although
detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must
include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice
of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and
to demonstrate a right to relief. Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory
allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570.
Allegations
On
November 6, 2016, three Norwalk police officers assaulted
Atkinson. As a result of the assault, Atkinson suffered a
dislocated left shoulder and severed rotator cuff. The injury
caused Atkinson to suffer severe pain. Atkinson underwent
surgery to repair the injury with the insertion of a metal
plate. He continues to experience chronic pain. Atkinson
received correspondence from the Norwalk Police Chief
admitting that the officers used excessive force.
Discussion
Atkinson
names all defendants in their official and individual
capacities. As the Norwalk Police Department and Norwalk Town
Hall, presumably meaning the City of Norwalk, are not
individuals, they do not have an individual capacity.
Further,
a municipal police department is not an independent legal
entity and, therefore, is not subject to suit under section
1983. See Rose v. City of Waterbury, No.
3:12cv291(VLB), 2013 WL 1187049, at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 21,
2013) (Connecticut statutes “contain no provision
establishing municipal departments, including police
departments, as legal entities separate and apart from the
municipality they serve, or providing that they have the
capacity to sue or be sued … Rather, … it is
the municipality itself which possesses the capacity to sue
and be sued.”); see also Nicholson v.
Lenczewski, 356 F.Supp.2d 157, 164 (D. Conn. 2005)
(holding that municipal police department is not a
municipality or a person subject to suit under section 1983)
(citing cases). All claims against the Norwalk Police
Department are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1).
Claims
against municipalities are considered under the standard for
municipal liability established in Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A municipality
cannot be found liable merely because it employs a
tortfeasor. Id. at 691. To state a cognizable claim
for municipal liability, Atkinson must demonstrate the
existence of an officially adopted policy or custom that
caused his injury and a direct causal connection between that
policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional
right. Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195
(2d Cir. 2007); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. He
must show that his rights were violated as a result of a
municipal policy, a municipal custom or practice, or the
decision of a municipal policymaker with final policymaking
authority. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 123 (1988).
A
municipal policy exists when there is a decision by an
official with policymaking authority, or a formal enactment
by the municipality's governing body. Monell,
436 U.S. at 690. A municipal policy generally encompasses
more than one incident. See Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A]
single incident alleged in a complaint, especially if it
involved only actors below the policy-making level, does not
suffice to show a municipal policy[.]”). Atkinson
alleges that three police officer used excessive force
against him on one occasion. As he alleges no involvement by
an official with policymaking authority and describes only
one incident, Atkinson does not allege any facts suggesting
that the use of force was done pursuant to a municipal
policy.
A
municipal custom or practice is less formal and may be shown
by the existence of a practice “so widespread as to
have the force of law.” Board of Cty. Comm'rs
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). The practice must be
“permanent and well settled.”
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. A practice cannot be
inferred from a single incident. City of Oklahoma v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985); see also
Giaccio v. City of New York, 308 Fed.Appx. 470, 471-72
(2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing Monell claim where
plaintiff identified, at most, only four examples of injury
complained of); Bowles v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., Nos.
00 Civ. 4213 BSJ MHD, 03 Civ. 2073 BSJ MHD, 2006 WL 1418602,
at *16 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006) (finding that “the
combined evidence of only two incidents would still be
insufficient to show a ‘custom or usage' under the
Monell standard”). The single incident alleged
in the complaint is insufficient to establish a municipal
custom or practice. Thus, Atkinson fails to allege facts
stating a cognizable claim for municipal liability. The
claims against defendant Norwalk Town Hall are dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
A claim
against a municipal officer in his or her official capacity
is, in essence, a claim against the city for which he or she
works. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72
(1985) (noting that suit against municipal official in his
official capacity was a suit against the municipality because
liability for any judgment would rest with the municipality).
As the Court has concluded that Atkinson fails to allege
facts to state a claim for municipal liability, there is no
factual basis for a claim against the individual officers in
their official capacities. The claims against the police
officers in their official capacities are dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Accord Parker v. City of
Long Beach, 563 Fed.Appx. 39, 41-42 (2d Cir.
2014)(summary order), as amended (Apr. 21, 2014)
(affirming dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff
“fail[ed] to establish that the individual
...