United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending
before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's Ruling dated December
17, 2018 [Doc. 8], in which the Court denied Plaintiff's
motion for an “Emergency Stay/Protective
Order.”[1] The case arises out of Defendant
Whitehead's issuance of a summons to Plaintiff for
operating a motor vehicle without mandatory insurance and for
operating an unregistered motor vehicle in violation of
Connecticut statutes. Subsequently, Plaintiff alleges that
she received a notice from the Connecticut Department of
Motor Vehicles “that the license issue [sic] will be
suspended effective 17 December 2018 as a result of a
‘conviction of operating without required insurance,
'” and advising that Plaintiff “may request
an administrative hearing to contest” that action.
[Doc. 1 at 4.] Plaintiff alleges that she submitted that
request on November 29, and has not yet received an answer
from the State authorities. [Id.]
Plaintiff
filed a motion for an “Emergency Stay/Protective
Order” on December 13, 2018 (the “TRO
Motion”), in which she requested “a stay”
against the “proposed suspension” of her
driver's license. [Doc. 5 at 1.] She stated that the
“proposed suspension” of her driver's license
would “create an extreme hardship upon myself and my
family; make it impossible to retrieve mail relative to this
case as well as the freedom to move about when copies are
needed and documents must be either dropped off or mailed; as
well as the action is unconstitutional AND is in direct
opposition to the premise of impunity when one observes their
guaranteed constitutionally secured liberties . . . .”
[Doc. 5 at 1.] The Court denied her request for emergency
relief, finding that she had failed to allege facts
sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm. [Doc. 8 at 2.]
Specifically, the Court found that, by Plaintiff's own
account, her request for a State administrative hearing
remained pending, which may abrogate the threatened
suspension of her license. [Id. at 2-3.]
Plaintiff
now seeks reconsideration of this Ruling. The standard for
granting a motion for reconsideration is “strict,
” and reconsideration will “generally be denied
unless the moving party can identify controlling decisions or
data that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached
by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Schonberger v.
Serchuk, 742 F.Supp. 108, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)); D. Conn.
Civ. R. 7(c) (a motion for reconsideration “will
generally be denied unless the movant can point to
controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked in
the initial decision or order”). Importantly, a motion
for reconsideration is not a “second bite at the
apple” for a party dissatisfied with a court's
ruling, Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners,
L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sequa
Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.1998)),
nor may it be used “to advance new theories or adduce
new evidence in response to the court's rulings.”
Ambac Assur. Corp. v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 08 CIV.
9464 RMB THK, 2011 WL 308276, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, the
“sole function of a proper motion for reconsideration
is to call to the Court's attention dispositive facts or
controlling authority that were plainly presented in the
prior proceedings but were somehow overlooked in the
Court's decision; in other words, an obvious and glaring
mistake.” Id.
In her
Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff reiterates several
arguments set forth in her TRO Motion-that loss of a license
would create extreme hardship for her and her family, and
that the act of suspending her license was
unconstitutional-but does not address the Court's basis
for denying Plaintiff's motion, i.e., that
Plaintiff's pending request for a State administrative
hearing may abrogate the threatened suspension of her
license. Nor does she proffer facts that could reasonably
alter the Court's analysis-for example, that
Plaintiff's request for a hearing had been denied, or
that Plaintiff would suffer a particular irreparable harm
while waiting for a hearing. Plaintiff has therefore failed
to demonstrate that “the Court has overlooked
controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before
it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had they been
considered, might have reasonably altered the result before
the court.” Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. Music Sales
Corp., 90 F.Supp.2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Her motion for
reconsideration will therefore be DENIED.
It is
SO ORDERED.
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Notes:
[1] The Court construed this as a motion
for a Temporary Restraining ...