United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RICHARD M. COAN, TRUSTEE, et al.
SEAN DUNNE, et al.
RULING ON EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (DOC.
M. SPECTOR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
December 18, 2018, this Magistrate Judge issued a Ruling on
[the Trustee's] Motion to Compel, granting in part and
denying in part the Trustee's Motion, and, in light of
the Scheduling Order in the case, ordering compliance by
December 21, 2018. (See Doc. No. 129
Ruling”]). On December 21, 2018, the defendants filed
this pending Emergency Motion for Reconsideration of the
December 18th Ruling (Doc. No. 137), and the
Trustee filed an objection on December 27, 2018. (Doc. No.
141; see also Doc. Nos. 146-47). On January 4, 2019,
the defendants filed their reply brief. (Doc. No. 152;
see also Doc. No. 146).
reasons detailed below, the defendants' Emergency Motion
for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 137) is granted in limited
part as to John Dunne's post-March 2016 records,
denied as moot as to the request for additional time
for compliance, and denied as to all of the
standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict,
” and such motions “will generally be denied
unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or
data that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached
by the [C]ourt.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). “The major grounds
justifying reconsideration are an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l
Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “A motion for
reconsideration may not be used to plug gaps in an original
argument or to argue in the alternative once a decision has
been made, ” nor is it appropriate “to use a
motion to reconsider solely to relitigate an issue already
decided.” Lopez v. Smiley, 375 F.Supp.2d 19,
21-22 (D. Conn. 2005). See also Mody v. Gen'l Elec.
Co., No. 3:04-CV-358 (JCH), 2006 WL 1168051, at *1 (D.
Conn. Apr. 26, 2006).
their motion, the defendants request that the Court
reconsider its December 18th Ruling to
“allow for additional time for [the] [d]efendants to
gather, process, review and produce the responsive documents
called for in the order” as the compliance deadline
“will substantially prejudice [the defendants].”
(Doc. No. 137 at 2). Additionally, the defendants seek
reconsideration of the breadth of the Ruling's order of
disclosure related to Gayle Killilea and John Dunne. (Doc.
No. 137 at 2, 6-9).
DEADLINE FOR COMPLIANCE
bulk of the defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
focuses on the deadline that this Court set for compliance.
On the same day that the defendants filed the pending
Emergency Motion for Reconsideration, the defendants filed an
Emergency Motion for Extension of Time in which they sought
until January 4, 2019 to comply with the December
18th Ruling. (Doc. No. 134). The next day, on
December 22, 2018, this Court granted in large part that
Motion for Extension of time “until January 2,
2019” noting that “[t]he Trustee appears to
have made his expert disclosure by December 21, 2018, which
was the original reason the Court established the December
21, 2018 deadline.” (Doc. No. 138). Accordingly, the
Court finds moot all of the defendants' arguments
relating to the timeframe for production.
FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION
defendants move for reconsideration of this Court's order
as it relates to the production of banking records in light
of their argument that this is not a “financial fraud
case.” (Doc. No. 137 at 6-7; see also Doc. No.
142 at 1-4). Specifically, the defendants “urge the
Court to consider a more targeted disclosure order for
transactions occurring after the time period at issue in the
complaints[, ]” and request that the “Court . . .
limit disclosure after 2014 to transfers to or from [Sean
Dunne] or transfers between the Killilea Defendants or the
particular entities which [the Trustee] has
identified.” (Doc. No. 137 at 6-7). Additionally, the
defendants argue that “[t]here has been no showing why
or how . . . personal transactions under $5000 can in anyway
relate to the claims in the complaints.” (Doc. No. 137
at 9). These arguments were made by the defendants in the
underlying briefing, and again in connection with the
submission of bank statements for this Court's in
camera review. The Court has thoroughly considered these
arguments and rejected them in the December 18th
Ruling, and again in the December 21, 2018 Order following
the in camera review. (See Doc. No. 78 at
18-21, Doc. No. 120 at 9-10). As this Court has already
pointed out, the Confidentiality Agreement and the Protective
Orders in this case address the defendants' privacy
concerns. (See December 18th Ruling at 29
(addressing banking records that include “personal
transactions”) & 30 (addressing confidentiality
designations)). Accordingly, the undersigned rejects these
arguments as an improper attempt to relitigate them in the
Motion for Reconsideration.
JOHN DUNNE'S DISCLOSURE
the defendants argue that compliance with the December
18th Ruling would unduly prejudice John
Dunne's career as he avers that “[s]ince [March 3,
2016, he has] not transferred any property, money, assets or
anything of financial value to Sean Dunne, Gayle Killilea, or
any of the Defendants in these proceedings.” (Doc. No.
139 at 2). John Dunne further avers that the only
transactions he has had with these defendants is his
compensation from Mountbrook, “all records of which are
being disclosed.” (Doc. No. 139 at 2). His request for
reconsideration “is focused on unrelated party
transactions from his personal accounts after March
2016.” (Doc. No. 152 at 7 (footnote omitted)).
defendants argue that, because John Dunne is a real estate
developer in New York City and has signed many non-disclosure
agreements, compliance with the December 18th
Ruling “may compromise the interests of third parties
with whom [John Dunne] has business interests and that are
completely unrelated to any defendant, Sean Dunne, or Gayle
Killilea.” (Doc. No. 137 at 7). Although the Trustee
points to the existence of the Protective Orders and
Confidentiality Agreement in this case (see Doc. No.
3; see also Doc. No. 78 at 27 (citing Bankr. D.
Conn. Doc. No. 309)), John Dunne avers that he is
“routinely required to sign nondisclosure agreements in
connection with [his] real estate work, ” and thus,
production of documents postdating March 2016 would
“catastrophically affect [his] business, from both a
financial and reputational standpoint, thereby ruining [his]
real estate career.” (Doc. No. 139 at 2; see
also Doc. No. 142 at 7).
Trustee argues that “John Dunne's assertions are
incomplete and seriously misleading as he has been
inextricably intertwined with the Debtor and Killilea's
financial and business affairs.” (Doc. No. 141 at 5).
Yet, it is concerning to the Court that, in support of this
argument, the Trustee cites to the same transactions that
John Dunne has already disclosed. (Doc. No. 141 at 5-8;
see Doc. No. 147). The Trustee has not linked John
Dunne to any transactions or documents after March 3, 2016,
with the exception of the pay records from Mountbrook that
have already been produced. Moreover, the Trustee's
argument in his brief in opposition suggests that the Trustee
agrees with John Dunne that unrelated party transactions
“are not relevant to the Trustee's claims.”
(Doc. No. 141 at 9 (the Trustee argues in his brief in
opposition that John Dunne's “argument . . . does
not withstand scrutiny because the only specific harm he
references involves transactions with non-party