United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR REMAND
A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
August 29, 2018, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
(“Plaintiff” or “Deutsche Bank”)
moved the Court to remand this case to Connecticut Superior
Court. First Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 7.
reasons that follow, Deutsche Bank's motion to remand is
August 20, 2011, Deutsche Bank instituted a foreclosure
action against Michael Porzio and potential secured creditor
Wells Fargo in Connecticut state court. Conn. Super. Ct.
Compl., ECF No. 1, at 8-13; see also Deutsche Bank Trust
Company Americas v. Porzio, No. FST-CV11-6011134-S
(Conn. Super. Ct.).
April 29, 2014, Deutsche Bank prevailed in state court.
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, No.
FST-CV11-6011134-S, Dkt. 154, at 8 (“The Court having
found the plaintiff has standing, the court finds that the
plaintiff has proven the elements of foreclosure. The court
having rejected each of the twelve enumerated Special
Defenses, and the other outlined defenses, finds the issues
in this foreclosure lawsuit for the plaintiff.”).
Following the 2014 foreclosure decision, years of litigation
2014 to 2018, Mr. Porzio twice moved to vacate the judgment,
id., Dkt. 205, 243, moved to have the judgment
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
id., Dkt. 196, and twice appealed the decision to
the Connecticut Appellate Court, Id., Dkt. 162, 199.
26, 2018, the Connecticut Appellate Court removed the stay
that had prevented the foreclosure of Mr. Porzio's
property. Id., Dkt. 259. Mr. Porzio's property
was then appraised, as it had been several times before.
See Id., Dkt. 138, 180, 189, 228, 265. A few days
after the appraisal was submitted to the Connecticut Superior
Court, id., Dkt. 265, Mr. Porzio removed the case to
this Court. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
is permitted of civil actions “of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction . . .
.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Only state-court
actions that originally could have been filed in federal
court may be removed to federal court by the
defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482
U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
courts construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any
doubts against removability.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v.
Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2013). The party
opposing a motion to remand bears the burden of showing that
the requirements for removal are satisfied. See United
Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFLCIO v.
CenterMark Props. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301
(2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he party asserting jurisdiction
bears the burden of proving that the case is properly in
federal court”); see also Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys.
v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 100 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“‘[T]he defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating the propriety of removal'”)
(quoting Grimo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Vermont,
34 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1994)).
case must be remanded to Connecticut Superior Court for
removal is improper because Mr. Porzio cannot assert
diversity jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2),
removal is improper “if any of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the
State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C.
§1441(b)(2); see also, Lincoln Prop. Co. v.
Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005) (“Defendants may
remove an action on the basis of diversity of citizenship if
there is complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and
all named defendants, and no defendant is a citizen of the
forum State.”). Defendant is a citizen of the state in
which the action was brought-Connecticut. See ...