United States District Court, D. Connecticut
RULING RE: MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION [DOC.
#136]
HON.
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
On
December 5, 2018, the Court issued a ruling (the
“December Ruling”) granting, in part, and
denying, in part, a motion filed by plaintiff Vineyard Vines,
LLC (“plaintiff”) seeking additional relief,
including enforcement of the judgment previously entered in
this case. See Doc. #134. Defendants MacBeth Collection,
L.L.C., MacBeth Collection By Margaret Josephs, LLC, MacBeth
Designs LLC, and Margaret Josephs (collectively,
“defendants”), now move for “partial
reconsideration” of the Court's December Ruling.
See Doc. #136. For the reasons set forth herein, the
defendants' Motion for Partial Reconsideration
[Doc. #136] is DENIED.
I.
STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION
The
Local Rules of Civil Procedure provide the standard for
motions for reconsideration. “Motions for
reconsideration shall not be routinely filed and shall
satisfy the strict standard applicable to such motions. Such
motions will generally be denied unless the movant can point
to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked in
the initial decision or order.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R.
7(c)(1).
Motions for reconsideration
must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to
discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on
issues that have been thoroughly considered by the court. A
motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for relitigating
old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing
a rehearing on the merits or otherwise taking a second bite
at the apple.
Steiner v. Lewmar, Inc., No. 3:09CV1976(DJS), 2016
WL 9113438, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 12, 2016) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). For reconsideration to be
appropriate,
the motion must demonstrate that newly discovered facts exist
that require consideration, that there has been an
intervening change in the law, or that the court has
overlooked and thus failed to consider an aspect of the law
presented by the moving party which, if left unredressed,
would result in a clear error or cause manifest injustice.
Morien v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., 270 F.R.D.
65, 69 (D. Conn. 2010) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendants
appear to proceed under both prongs of the Local Rule's
standard, asserting that (1) the Court applied the wrong
standard to its review of the plaintiff's motion and (2)
the evidence previously submitted does not support the
Court's finding or, in the alternative, new evidence is
available that would affect the Court's decision.
A.
The Motion does not cite any intervening change in the law or
point to any controlling decision or aspect of the law that
the Court overlooked.
As the
Court noted in the December Ruling, neither party made any
argument in the extensive briefing provided regarding the
burden of proof applicable to a claim that the terms of a
permanent injunction and/or consent judgment had been
violated. See Doc. #134 at 15 (“Neither party
articulates the standard of proof that must be met by
plaintiff in establishing that the Permanent Injunction has
been violated for purposes of awarding liquidated
damages.”). The Court therefore made its own
determination as to the appropriate burden of proof, finding
that plaintiff would need to establish a violation of the
Permanent Injunction, for purposes of the award of liquidated
damages -- a remedy available here only by virtue of the
parties' agreement to it in their settlement agreement --
by the preponderance of the evidence. See
Id. at 15-17.
Defendants
do not contend that there has been any change in the law on
this point. Rather, defendants argue, in effect, that the
only mechanism for enforcement of the settlement agreement
and consent judgment in this case is a finding of civil
contempt. See Doc. #136-1 at 3-4. Defendants are
incorrect. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., No. 98CV7076(BSJ), 2007 WL 1741885, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2007) (“Visa argues: (1) that as a
procedural matter, a party may enforce a court order only
through a contempt proceeding; and (2) that contempt
standards should nevertheless apply here in light of the
nature of MasterCard's proposed remedy. Visa is mistaken
on both accounts.”); Canada Dry Delaware Valley
Bottling Co. v. Hornell Brewing Co., No. 11CV4308(PGG),
2013 WL 5434623, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013)
(“Canada Dry bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence that Hornell violated the
Judgment.”); ...