United States District Court, D. Connecticut
LUIS A. DELGADO, Plaintiff,
v.
DOUGHERTY, et al., Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Michael P. Shea United States District Judge
Plaintiff
Luis A. Delgado, currently incarcerated at the Garner
Correctional Institution in Newtown, Connecticut, filed this
case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He contends that the
defendants used excessive force against him in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiff seeks damages and asks
that the defendants be disciplined for their actions.
The
Court must review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any
portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This requirement
applies to all prisoner filings regardless whether the
prisoner pays the filing fee. Nicholson v.
Lenczewski, 356 F.Supp.2d 157, 159 (D. Conn. 2005)
(citing Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1999)
(per curiam)). Here, the plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.
Although
detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must
include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice
of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and
to demonstrate a plausible right to relief. Bell Atlantic
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory
allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678.
I.
Allegations
On May
25, 2017, the plaintiff was in the AP room waiting to be
transferred from Corrigan Correctional Institution to Garner
Correctional Institution (“Garner”), when he was
falsely accused of a minor aggression. ECF No. 1,
¶¶ 1-2. Correctional Officer Ocasio punched the
plaintiff in the face. Id., ¶ 3. The plaintiff
fell to the floor and covered himself for protection and as a
sign of submission. Id. Correctional Officers Colby,
St. John, and Thibodeau began kicking, punching, and spitting
on the plaintiff. Id. Captain Dougherty and
Lieutenant Holloran knew the incident was occurring but did
not intercede. Id.
After
the incident was over, a handheld video camera was produced
to document the plaintiff's placement in a holding cell
and photograph his injuries. Id., ¶ 4. The
plaintiff was then transferred to Garner. Id. Upon
his arrival at Garner, the plaintiff was placed in
segregation for fifteen days. Id., ¶ 5. Mental
health staff told the plaintiff that he suffered from PTSD
and anxiety, and prescribed medication. Id.
Upon
his release from segregation, the plaintiff filed a
grievance. Id., ¶ 6. The grievance was not
returned to him. Id. The plaintiff states that his
attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies were blocked
because his requests were unacknowledged. Id.,
¶ 7. To this day, the plaintiff suffers from anxiety,
depression, back pain, and a general fear of correctional
staff. Id., ¶ 10.
II.
Analysis
The
plaintiff alleges that defendants Ocasio, St. John, Colby,
and Thibodeau used excessive force against him and defendants
Dougherty and Holloran did not intercede to protect him from
harm. The Department of Correction website shows that the
plaintiff was sentenced on September 25, 2012.
www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?idinmtnum=239073
(last visited January 3, 2019). Thus, he was a sentenced
inmate at all times relevant to this action and his claims
are properly considered under the Eighth Amendment. See
Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017)
(rights of pretrial detainees are considered under the
Fourteenth Amendment while rights of sentenced prisoners are
considered under the Eighth Amendment).
The use
of excessive force against a prisoner can constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
regardless of the severity of injury suffered by the
prisoner. See Hudson v. MacMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4
(1992); accord Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 34, 36
(2010) (per curiam). The “core judicial inquiry”
is “not whether a certain quantum of injury was
sustained but rather whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (quoting Hudson,
502 U.S. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An
excessive force claim has objective and subjective
components. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Objectively,
the court considers the amount of force used and whether that
force is repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Id.
at 9-10. Subjectively, the court must determine whether the
correctional officer had a “wanton” state of mind
when applying the force. Id. At 8. In evaluating
these components, the court considers the extent of any
injuries suffered by the inmate, the need for application of
force, the relationship between that need and the amount of
force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the
correctional officers involved in the use of force, and any
efforts made to temper the amount of force used. See
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
The
plaintiff alleges that Correctional Officer Ocasio punched
him in the face after he was falsely accused of a minor
aggression. He further alleges that Correctional Officers
Colby, Thibodeau and St. John joined Correctional Officer
Ocasio in punching and kicking him after he was on the floor
in a submissive pose. The Court concludes that these
allegations are sufficient to support an inference that the
force used was excessive and done maliciously. The excessive
force claim will proceed against defendants Ocasio,
Thibodeau, Colby and St. John.
The
plaintiff also alleges that defendants Dougherty and Holloran
were aware of the assault but did not intercede. To state a
claim for failure to protect or deliberate indifference to
safety, the plaintiff must show that prison officials were
aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to the
plaintiff's safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Bridgewater v. Taylor, 698
F.Supp.2d 351, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that
defendants must be aware of facts supporting an inference
that harm would occur and must actually draw that inference).
When considering a failure to protect claim, the court
“looks at the facts and circumstances of which the
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