October 23, 2018
from the decisions by the defendant ordering the plaintiff to
cease and desist certain activities on certain of his real
property, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Litchfield, where the court, Pickard,
J., granted the motions filed by Jessica Genovese et al.
to intervene in both appeals; thereafter, the appeals were
consolidated, and the court, Danaher, J., approved
the parties' stipulations for judgments in both appeals
and rendered judgments thereon; subsequently, the court,
J. Moore, J., granted in part the motion for
contempt filed by the intervenors, and the plaintiff filed a
consolidated appeal with this court. Affirmed.
Truskauskas, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
W. Mott, for the appellees (intervenors).
Alvord, Elgo and Bright, Js.
plaintiff, Don Truskauskas, appeals from the judgments of the
trial court finding him in contempt for violating the terms of a
stipulated judgment involving himself, the defendant, the
Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Harwinton (board), and
the intervenors, Ronald Genovese and Jessica Genovese, who
own property abutting that of the plaintiff. On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the court improperly interpreted the
March 30, 2016 stipulated judgment and found that he wilfully
had violated the stipulated judgment. We affirm the judgments of
the trial court.
following facts and procedural history, which are ascertained
from the record and the trial court's memorandum of
decision, inform our review. The court found:
‘‘[These cases] arose as [appeals] from orders
issued against the plaintiff by the [board]. On appeal, the
[board] confirmed that [the] plaintiff was using his
residential property for commercial use in violation of the
Harwinton Zoning Regulations [regulations]. To resolve [these
cases after the plaintiff appealed from the board's
decisions to the Superior Court], the parties entered into a
joint stipulation. After [the court] conducted a canvass of,
inter alia, the plaintiff, the joint stipulation was entered
as a judgment of the court on March 30, 2016.
joint stipulation, now the judgment, provide[s], in
[relevant] part . . .
The plaintiff could not conduct any commercial activities at
his residential property, including activities related to his
contracting business, Autumn Contracting, LLC. This
provision, however, did not ‘apply to . . . other
activities as permitted by the [regulations]' [as set
forth in paragraph 2 of the judgment].
The plaintiff's 2000 Mack Dump Truck [(dump truck)] could
be parked overnight at his residence in accordance with a
previous [board] decision, and could be used for farm or
personal use, but this dump truck could not be used for the
plaintiff's contracting business or other commercial
purposes [as set forth in paragraph 5 of the stipulated
The plaintiff was required permanently to remove from his
residential property all ‘equipment, tools, and/ or
materials used for [the] plaintiff's contracting business
or any other commercial activity . . . within seven (7)
calendar days after [the] stipulated judgment is fully
executed, and shall be maintained by [the] plaintiff off the
subject premises.' This provision did not apply ‘to
tools kept in the plaintiff's pickup truck that are used
for his contracting business or other tools or equipment as
allowed by the [r]egulations' [as set forth in paragraph
3 of the stipulated judgment].
The plaintiff shall be able to use his residential property
as he wishes as long as he complies with the stipulated
judgment, ‘the [regulations], and other applicable
law' [as set forth in paragraph 8 of the stipulated
judgment also permitted the plaintiff to conduct farming
operations on, and to maintain the farm equipment specified
in exhibit A at, his residential property. This farm
equipment was further depicted in photographs appended to the
[intervenors] moved for an order of contempt, arguing that
the plaintiff has violated several aspects of the
[stipulated] judgment. Specifically, they claimed that the
plaintiff has violated (1) paragraph 2 by continuing to
conduct commercial activities at his residence, (2) paragraph
3 by failing to remove commercial, nonexempted equipment from
the residential property, and (3) paragraphs 2 and 5 by
regularly moving heavy equipment in and out of his
plaintiff denied that he had conducted, after the judgment,
commercial activities at his residence. Moreover, the
plaintiff claimed that he maintained certain heavy equipment
at his residence so that he could conduct permitted
activities, namely, building a large storage barn and a pool
there. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he, after the
date of judgment, used heavy equipment to bring fill to his
residential property and to smooth the fill to level the
ground so that he could construct the storage barn. Finally,
the plaintiff argued that some of the allegedly contemptuous
activity was otherwise allowed by the town [of Harwinton] (1)
by means of prior zoning rulings, or (2) because he undertook
such activity for his personal use.''
a hearing, the court found that the plaintiff wilfully had
violated the stipulated judgment ‘‘by continuing
to conduct his commercial enterprise out of his residential
property and by using his [dump truck] for commercial
purposes.'' Specifically, the court found that the
plaintiff was in ...