United States District Court, D. Connecticut
PETER T. SZYMONIK and MONICA L. SZYMONIK, Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, JORGE SIMON, LESLIE OLEAR, GEORGE JEPSEN, KEITH YAGALOFF, and GRANT MILLER Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
MICHAEL P. SHEA, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiffs
Peter T. Szymonik and Monica L. Symonik (“the
Szymoniks”) bring this action against the State of
Connecticut, three Connecticut state court judges, the
Attorney General of Connecticut (collectively “the
State Defendants”), and Attorney Keith Yagaloff, who
represented Mr. Szymonik's ex-wife in their marriage
dissolution proceeding. The Szymoniks allege that the state
court judges violated their constitutional rights by
requiring Peter Szymonik to obtain leave of the presiding
judge before filing motions in family court, denying Peter
Szymonik's request for leave to file a motion for
assignment of counsel, and denying Monica Szymonik's
motion to intervene in the marriage dissolution proceeding.
They assert that the Attorney General violated their rights
by declining to intervene in the family court case on behalf
of Peter Szymonik. Finally, they allege that Attorney
Yagaloff is liable because the leave-to-file procedures have
not applied to him. The State Defendants move to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for insufficient
service of process. (ECF No. 34.) Attorney Yagaloff moves to
dismiss only for insufficient service of process. (ECF No.
33.) I find that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to review these claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Further, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the State
of Connecticut and the Attorney General in his official
capacity, the state court judges are entitled to absolute
judicial immunity, the Attorney General is entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity, and the complaint fails to state a
claim against Attorney Keith Yagaloff. Accordingly, the
motions to dismiss are GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED.
I.
Background
This
case arises out of a marriage dissolution proceeding between
Peter Szymonik and Stephanie Szymonik. Although the
dissolution action was filed in 2006 and the marriage was
dissolved in 2008, litigation between the former spouses has
continued for the past ten years. (See State Court Docket,
ECF No. 34-3.) On August 30, 2012, Judge John Carbonneau
entered an order prohibiting either party in the
post-dissolution proceedings from filing “any motions
with the Court without the prior express written approval of
the Presiding Judge.” (the “Pre-Filing
Injunction”) (Filing Order, ECF No. 34-2 at 2.) The
Szymoniks allege that no judge enforced the Pre-Filing
Injunction until March of 2015. (Amended Compl., ECF No. 30
at 11; Plaintiffs' Response Brief, ECF No. 55 at 14.)
The
Szymoniks assert that their requests for leave to file
motions since March 2015 have been denied, including by
judges other than the presiding judge. (Amended Compl., ECF
No. 30 at 8.) In contrast, Attorney Yagaloff has been
permitted to file motions without first requesting leave.
(Id. at 9.) The Szymoniks allegedly contacted the
Attorney General to request that his office intervene on
their behalf in the family court proceeding. (Id. at
14-15.) The office refused their request. (Id.)
Finally, the Szymoniks assert that the state court
erroneously denied Monica Szymonik's motion to intervene
in the marriage dissolution action. (Id. at 24.)
The
Szymoniks allege that the Pre-Filing Injunction violates
their right to petition the government under the First
Amendment. They also allege that the Defendants' violated
their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment by treating them differently than similarly
situated litigants in family court. They filed this action in
federal court seeking the following relief: (1) a declaratory
judgment that the Pre-Filing Injunction violated Mr.
Szymonik's right to due process; (2) a declaratory
judgment that the state court erred in refusing to allow
Monica Szymonik to intervene in the proceeding; (3)
“[a]n immediate prejudgment injunction”
prohibiting the state court from enforcing the Pre-Filing
Injunction; (4) “[a]n immediate prejudgment injunction
ordering that Peter Szymonik be allowed to engage counsel of
his choosing to represent him in matters before the state
court”; and (5) attorney's fees. (Id.)
II.
Legal Standard
A
“case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court
lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate
it.” Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89,
94 (2d Cir. 2011). The “plaintiff asserting subject
matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that it exists.”
Luckkett v. Bure, 290 F.3d 493, 497 (2d. Cir. 2002).
“In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a district court . .
. may refer to evidence outside the pleadings.”
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d
Cir. 2000). The court must construe the complaint liberally
and accept all factual allegations as true. Ford v.
D.C. 37 Union Local 1549, 579 F.3d 187, 188 (2d Cir.
2009).
When
the defendants raise a challenge to the sufficiency of
process, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving its
adequacy. See Mende v. Milestone Technology, 269
F.Supp.2d 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). A Rule 12(b)(5) motion to
dismiss will be granted if the plaintiffs fail to serve a
copy of the summons and complaint on a defendant pursuant to
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rzayeva
v. United States, 492 F.Supp.2d 60, 74 (D.Conn.2007).
Rule 4(m) provides that, if service is not made upon a
defendant within 90 days after the filing of the complaint,
the court “shall dismiss the action without prejudice
as to that defendant or direct that service be effected
within a specified time.”
The
Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v.
Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret
them to raise the “strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
470 F.3d 471, 472 (2d Cir. 2006). To plead a cognizable legal
claim, however, a pro se plaintiff must meet the standard of
facial plausibility. See Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d
509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] pro se complaint must
state a plausible claim for relief.”) (citing
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2009)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[T]he tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
Id.at 678.
III.
Discussion
A.
Insufficient Service of Process
The
State Defendants and Attorney Yagaloff assert that the
Szymoniks failed to effectuate service in accordance with
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. That rule provides
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the
complaint is filed, the court-on motion or on its own after
notice to the plaintiff-must dismiss the action without
prejudice against that defendant or order that service be
made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good
cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for
service for an appropriate period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). State officials may be served by (1)
“delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to [the state's] chief executive officer; or (2)
“serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by
that state's law for serving a summons or like process on
such a defendant.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j). Connecticut law
provides that a state official may be served by delivering
the summons and complaint in person to the Attorney General
or sending those documents to the Attorney General by
certified mail. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-64.
An
individual defendant may be served (1) in accordance with the
law of the state where the district court is located or where
service is made; (2) by delivering the summons and complaint
personally; (3) by leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint at the individual's usual place of abode with
someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or
(4) by ...