United States District Court, D. Connecticut
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
STEFAN
R. UNDERHILL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jerome
Riddick (“Riddick”), currently confined at
Northern Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut,
filed this complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for violating his rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Before the court completed an initial screening
of the complaint, Riddick moved for leave to amend his
complaint. Because he may amend his complaint once as of
right before the defendants serve their response,
Riddick's motion for leave to amend [ECF No. 19] is
granted.
The
named defendants are Commissioner Scott Semple
(“Semple”), Correctional Officer Christine
Paquette (“Paquette”), Disciplinary Hearing
Officer Lieutenant Prior (“Prior”), Warden
William Mulligan (“Mulligan”), Counselor
Supervisor John Aldi (“Aldi”), Director of
Offender Classification and Population Management David Maiga
(“Maiga”), and District Administrator Angel
Quiros (“Quiros”).
Under
section 1915A of Title 28 of the United States Code, I must
review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any portion of
the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Although detailed allegations
are not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts
to afford the defendants fair notice of the claims and the
grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate a
plausible right to relief. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory allegations are not
sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Nevertheless, it is
well-established that “[p]ro se
complaints ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted
to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.'” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d
399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see
also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir.
2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude for pro
se litigants).
I.
Allegations
On
December 6, 2017, Paquette issued Riddick a disciplinary
report for Security Risk Group Affiliation
(“SRGA”). ECF No. 19 at 11, ¶¶ 1, 4.
That charge encompasses behaviors uniquely or clearly
associated with a security risk group. Id. ¶ 2.
The charge was based on a telephone conversation Riddick had
with a former inmate. Id. ¶ 4. The disciplinary
report indicated there was no physical evidence. Id.
at 12, ¶ 14 & at 30. The disciplinary report did set
forth the two statements that were the basis of the charge.
Id. at 30.
As part
of the investigation of the December 6, 2017 disciplinary
charge, Paquette searched Riddick's personal property.
Id. at 13, ¶ 17. On December 8, 2017, she
issued Riddick a second disciplinary report for SRGA based on
the contents of his notebook, “an alleged historical
account of the ‘Black P. Stones.'”
Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. As a result of the
disciplinary report, Riddick's notebook was confiscated.
Id. at 14, ¶ 25. The notebook contained,
inter alia, the addresses and phone numbers of
family members and other personal information. Id.
¶¶ 26-27. Mulligan, Paquette and Prior have not
returned the notebook and will not tell Riddick whether the
notebook ever will be returned. Id. at 15,
¶¶ 29-31.
On
December 28, 2017, Prior was the disciplinary hearing officer
at the hearing on both disciplinary charges. At the hearing,
documentary evidence was introduced. Riddick was not aware of
the evidence even though prison directives required that any
evidence be made available to the inmate at least 24 hours
before the hearing. The documentary evidence had been
provided to Prior by a prison official at the “central
office.” Id. at 12-13, ¶ 14.
At the
December 28, 2017 disciplinary hearing, Prior found Riddick
guilty of both disciplinary charges. Prior imposed sanctions
of 10 days' confinement in punitive segregation, 90
days' loss of phone privileges, 90 days' loss of
commissary privileges and 15 days' loss of Risk Reduction
Earned Credit (RREC) time for each disciplinary charge.
Id. at 12, ¶ 13 & 19, ¶ 64. Prior did
not make an affirmative determination that Riddick was an SRG
member and did not sanction him with placement in the SRG
Program. Id. at 16, ¶ 39. Riddick appealed the
disciplinary finding on the ground that the directive did not
prohibit him from making statements “of an SRG
nature.” Id. at 17, ¶ 54. On January 23,
2018, Quiros denied the appeal. Id., ¶ 55.
On
January 12, 2018, Semple, Maiga and Aldi removed Riddick from
Administrative Segregation Status and reclassified him as
Security Risk Group (“SRG”) Status. No. separate
classification hearing was conducted. Id. at 15,
¶ 33. Riddick obtained a copy of Administrative
Directive 6.14 and learned that the disciplinary hearing on
the SRGA charge served as the classification hearing.
Id. at 15-16, ¶¶ 34-35. Prior did not tell
Riddick that the disciplinary hearing also was an SRG
classification hearing and no person or document advised him
of that fact before the hearing. Id. at 16,
¶¶ 36-37.
II.
Analysis
Riddick
includes nine counts in the amended complaint: (1) Semple,
Quiros, Maiga, Mulligan, Aldi, Paquette and Prior violated
Riddick's right to due process by punishing him for
violating vague and overbroad prison rules and failing to
give him adequate notice of those rules; (2) Quiros, Prior
and Paquette violated Riddick's right to freedom of
speech by punishing him for the content of his phone
conversation and the written content of his notebook; (3)
Semple, Quiros, Maiga, Mulligan and Aldi violated
Riddick's rights to freedom of speech and due process by
creating and continuing a policy under which subordinates
could punish Riddick for engaging in protected expressive
activities; (4) Semple, Quiros, Prior, Maiga and Aldi
violated Riddick's right to due process by failing to
give him adequate notice that the disciplinary hearing was
also an SRG hearing and failing to provide a separate SRG
hearing; (5) Semple, Quiros, Prior, Maiga, Mulligan and Aldi
violated Riddick's right to due process by refusing to
aggregate his administrative segregation time with his SRG
time; (6) Semple, Quiros, Maiga, Aldi and Mulligan violated
Riddick's right to be free from double jeopardy by
subjecting him to multiple punishments where all of the
punishments were not imposed at the disciplinary hearing; (7)
Semple, Quiros, Maiga, Mulligan, Aldi and Prior violated
Riddick's right to be free from ex post facto punishment
by requiring him to complete the SRG Program for engaging in
speech that was not prohibited at the time the statements
were made; (8) Semple, Mulligan, Aldi, Paquette and Prior
violated Riddick's right to due process by confiscating
his notebook; (9) Semple, Mulligan, Aldi, Paquette and Prior
committed the torts of conversion, detinue and replevin by
confiscating the notebook.
As a
result of the disciplinary charges, Riddick received combined
sanctions of 20 days' confinement in punitive segregation
from December 6, 2017, through December 25, 2017; thirty
days' loss of RREC; 180 days' loss of commissary
privileges from May 16, 2023, until November 11, 2023; and
180 days' loss of phone privileges from August 16, 2020,
through September 29, 2020; November 14, 2020, through
December 28, 2020; January 28, 2021, through March 13, 2021;
and April 13, 2021, through May 27, 2021. ECF No. 19 at 31,
39.
Because
Riddick was subjected to “mixed sanctions, ”
i.e., sanctions affecting both the duration and the
conditions of his confinement, his due process claims
relating to the disciplinary hearing are barred by the
favorable termination rule set forth in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the
Supreme Court held that a claim for money damages is not
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a decision in favor
of the plaintiff would necessarily invalidate a criminal
conviction unless that “conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal ..., or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. at 486-87 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court later extended the ...