Argued
October 25, 2018
Procedural
History
Action
for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Tindill, J.,
approved the agreement of the parties to enter into binding
mediation/arbitration as to certain disputed matters;
thereafter, the arbitrator issued an award and entered
certain orders; subsequently, the arbitrator issued a
clarification of the award; thereafter, the court granted the
defendant's motion to confirm the arbitrator's award
and rendered judgment incorporating the arbitrator's
award and clarification, and dissolving the marriage and
granting certain other relief; subsequently, the court issued
certain orders; thereafter, the court, Heller, J.,
granted the plaintiffs motion for an order regarding certain
tuition payments; subsequently, the court, Heller,
J., denied the defendant's motion to reargue, and
the defendant appealed to this court; thereafter, the court,
Heller, J., issued an articulation of its decision;
subsequently, the court, Heller, J., granted the
plaintiffs motion for contempt, and the defendant filed an
amended appeal. Affirmed.
Laurence Kirwan, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Joseph
T. O'Connor, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Alvord, Prescott and Norcott, Js.
OPINION
ALVORD, J.
The
present appeal arises following the trial court's October
23, 2015 judgment dissolving the marriage of the plaintiff,
Chelsea Chapman Kirwan, and the self-represented defendant,
[1]
Laurence Kirwan. The judgment incorporated by reference a
pendente lite arbitration award that had resolved many of the
issues raised in the dissolution action, including alimony,
the distribution of marital assets, and the enforceability of
a premarital agreement. Both the parties' arbitration
agreement and the arbitrator's award, however, expressly
reserved for the Superior Court resolution of child related
financial issues.[2] Following an evidentiary hearing, the
court, on December 7, 2016, issued child support orders,
which, by agreement of the parties, were made retroactive to
the date of the dissolution judgment. On that same date, the
court also ordered the parties to make determinations
regarding their children's private middle school
education in accordance with their parenting plan. In this
appeal, the defendant challenges two subsequent judgments of
the trial court, ordering him to pay for a portion of his
children's private middle school tuition[3] and finding him
in contempt when he failed to do so.
On
appeal, the defendant raises various repetitive and
overlapping claims of error, which this court has distilled
into the three inclusive issues addressed in this opinion.
The core of the defendant's claims are that the court
erred in (1) ordering him to pay 75 percent of his
children's private middle school tuition for the
2015-2016, 2016-2017, and 2017-2018 academic years, because
their enrollment in the school was not decided pursuant to
the parties' parenting plan, (2) ordering him to pay for
a portion of the 2015-2016 school year tuition that was
incurred before October 23, 2015, the date of the
dissolution, and (3) finding him in contempt. We disagree
and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The
following facts and procedural history, relevant to our
resolution of the defendant's claims in the present
appeal, were recently set forth by this court in Kirwan
v. Kirwan, 185 Conn.App. 713, A.3d (2018).[4]"The parties
were married in 2001. The defendant is a plastic surgeon with
offices in New York, Norwalk, and London, as well as a
consultant and a professor of plastic surgery. The plaintiff
is college educated and worked in pharmaceutical sales until
shortly after she married the defendant, at which time she
worked for the defendant in his medical practice. The parties
have three minor children together, one of whom has special
needs. Prior to their marriage, the parties entered into a
premarital agreement that, in relevant part, limited the
plaintiffs alimony in the event of divorce to $50, 000 a year
for five years and allocated 45 percent of the value of the
marital home to the plaintiff as her share of marital
property. In September, 2012, the plaintiff initiated an
action to dissolve the parties' marriage.
"On
May 26, 2015, the court, Tindill, J., approved an
agreement by the parties to enter into binding
mediation/arbitration of the dissolution action. Pursuant to
the parties' arbitration agreement, which was made an
order of the court, '[t]he parties agree[d] that the
following issues in their action for dissolution of marriage
shall be the subject of mediation and, if the parties are
unable to resolve these issues via mediation, to binding
arbitration . . . .' The list of issues to be resolved in
arbitration included the validity and enforceability of the
premarital agreement; the validity of an alleged rescission
of that premarital agreement; a determination of alimony in
accordance with General Statutes § 46b-82; an equitable
division of marital property, assets, and liabilities
pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-81; division of
attorney's fees and guardian ad litem fees; and any other
relief deemed appropriate by the arbitrator 'except as it
pertains to child custody and issues of child support'
"On
August 4, 2015, the arbitrator, former Superior Court Judge
Elaine Gordon, issued her arbitration award. As a preliminary
matter, the arbitrator determined that the parties'
premarital agreement was unconscionable, and thus
unenforceable, due to 'the present, uncontemplated
circumstances' of the parties.[5]The arbitrator issued a
number of orders regarding alimony and the distribution of
marital assets, including an order directing the sale of the
marital home. In support of her orders, the arbitrator made
several factual findings, including that '[t]he
defendant's annual [gross] income is found to be
approximately $400, 000 per year based on his income tax
returns, business financial statements and the information he
has provided to lending institutions on his
applications.' As previously noted, the arbitration award
indicated that '[t]he issues of custody, access, child
support, maintenance and cost of medical insurance for minor
children and unreimbursed medical expenses are reserved to
the Connecticut Superior Court'
"On
September 1, 2015, the defendant filed a motion asking the
court to confirm the arbitration award and to render judgment
dissolving the parties' marriage in accordance with the
arbitration award. On that same date, the plaintiff filed a
motion asking the court to issue orders on the unresolved
matters of child support and postsecondary educational
expenses. Neither party filed an objection to the other
party's motion, and the matters were set down for a
hearing on October 23, 2015. At that time, the court rendered
a judgment of dissolution of marriage that incorporated by
reference the arbitration award and subsequent clarification.
The parties agreed that the court would determine the
defendant's child support obligations, including the
issue of unreimbursed medical expenses and child care, after
an evidentiary hearing, and that child support obligations
would be made retroactive to the date of dissolution."
(Footnotes altered.)
The
following additional facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
current appeal by the defendant. On December 7, 2016,
following a five day hearing on child related financial
orders as well as several postjudgment motions, the court
issued a memorandum of decision ordering, inter alia, that
the parties were to make determinations regarding their
children's private middle school education in accordance
with their parenting plan.[6] The court also ordered that the parties
would share the children's educational expenses, with the
plaintiff responsible for 25 percent and the defendant
responsible for 75 percent.
During
the course of the marriage and after the divorce proceeding
was filed, the parties' children had attended private
school at the French-American School of New York from
kindergarten through the fourth grade, as the parents agreed
that their children should have a more European focused
education. The French-American School of New York, upon the
plaintiff's inquiry, recommended Saints John and Paul
School for the children because it had a similar program but
cost less money. The children were accepted into middle
school at Saints John and Paul School beginning in the fall
of 2014 for their fifth grade year. The middle school at
Saints John and Paul School ran from fifth grade through
eighth grade.
In
January, 2015, the defendant visited Saints John and Paul
School, where his daughters were enrolled in fifth grade. The
defendant met with the school's assistant principal.
During the visit, he asked questions about the school and his
children's French language studies. At that time, he
expressed no objection to his children being educated at
Saints John and Paul School.
On
January 19, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for an order
regarding the defendant's payment of his share of the
private middle school tuition. In this motion, the plaintiff
requested that the court order the defendant to pay $36, 000,
representing his share of the tuition costs for the 2015-2016
and 2016-2017 academic years. The plaintiff later requested
that the defendant also pay his share of the 2017-2018
tuition costs. In objecting to the plaintiffs motion for an
order, the defendant argued that the children's
enrollment in private middle school had not been made in
compliance with the May, 2015 parenting plan and that he was
therefore not obligated to pay his share of the tuition
costs. On June 22, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking
an immediate hearing on her motion for order, wherein she
also replied to arguments raised in the defendant's
objection to her motion for an order.
On July
17, 2017, the trial court, Heller, J., on the
record, granted the plaintiffs January 19, 2017 motion for
order and overruled the defendant's objection thereto.
Specifically, the court found that "under the orders
that were entered by Judge Tindill in December, 2016
retroactive to October, [2015], the defendant is obligated to
pay 75 percent of the tuition that is past due from 2015 to
2016 and 2016 to 2017, and for the coming year of 2017 to
2018." On July 31, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to
reargue. On August 25, 2017, the court issued a written order
summarily denying that motion. The defendant then filed this
timely appeal.
On
September 11, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for
articulation of the trial court's July 17, 2017 decision.
The plaintiff filed an objection thereto. The trial court
summarily denied the motion for articulation and sustained
the objection thereto. The defendant then filed a motion for
review with this court.
On
January 18, 2018, this court ordered the trial court to
articulate the factual and legal basis of its July 17, 2017
decision to the extent that the defendant argued that he was
not required to pay tuition costs incurred prior to October
23, 2015. On January 26, 2018, the trial court articulated
its decision. It explained that the plaintiff incurred the
debt to Saints John and Paul School for the parties'
children during the 2015-2016 school year prior to the entry
of the October, 2015 ...