Argued
October 25, 2018
Procedural
History
Action
to recover damages for the defendants' alleged violation
of the patients' bill of rights, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Middlesex, where the court, Domnarski, J., granted
in part the defendants' motion to dismiss; thereafter,
the court denied the plaintiffs motions for a jury trial and
for the appointment of counsel; subsequently, the court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Francis Anderson, self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).
Darren
P. Cunningham, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the
brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Jacqueline
S. Hoell, assistant attorney general, for the appellees
(defendants).
Alvord, Prescott and Norcott, Js.
OPINION
NORCOTT, J.
The
plaintiff, Francis Anderson, appeals from the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the
defendants, Charles Dike, Thomas Ward-McKinley, Steve Lazrove
and Heather Madison. The plaintiff claims that the court
improperly (1) granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, (2) denied his motion for a jury trial and (3)
denied his motions for the appointment of counsel. We affirm
the judgment of the court.
The
record reveals the following facts and procedural history.
The plaintiff commenced this action in September, 2014,
pursuant to the patients' bill of rights, General
Statutes § 17a-540 et seq. The plaintiff alleged the
following facts in his complaint. On May 4, 2014, while the
plaintiff was a patient in the Whiting Forensic Division of
Connecticut Valley Hospital, Madison closed the door to the
video room, located on unit 2, on his hand and then
intentionally and forcibly kicked his hand into the door. The
plaintiff went to the nursing station to request medical
treatment for his hand, as it was swollen. The plaintiff
initially was refused treatment by the nurse. Madison was
threatening as well as verbally abusive to the point that
Police Lieutenant Margaret G. Miner became involved. As a
result of this incident, the plaintiff alleged that Madison
was temporarily ordered off the unit. Finally, Lazrove
witnessed and was complicit in covering up the incident, and
Dike, Ward-McKinley, and Lazrove allowed Madison to pose a
threat to the plaintiffs well-being.
In
January, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that a claim
under General Statutes § 17a-550 for violation of the
patients' bill of rights can be brought only against the
state and not against individual state employees; therefore,
the defendants in their individual capacities cannot be held
liable for violations of General Statutes § 17a-542. The
court granted the defendants' motion as to Dike,
Ward-McKinley, and Lazrove. That court, however, denied the
motion as to Madison. The court noted that "[General
Statutes] §§ 17a-550 and 4-165 mean that a person
can sue a state employee in his individual capacity for
violations of the patients' bill of rights, but only for
actions that are wanton, reckless or
malicious."[1] (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The
court went on to note that as to Dike, Ward-McKinley and
Lazrove, the plaintiff had alleged only that those defendants
witnessed the incident, were complicit in allowing the
incident to happen, and allowed Madison to again pose a
threat to the plaintiff's well-being and safety, and that
these allegations were not "sufficient to support a
cause of action sounding in recklessness." The court
denied the motion as to Madison, because when read in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff in his
complaint had alleged reckless, wanton or malicious conduct
on the part of Madison.[2] As a result of this order, Madison is
the only defendant who this action continues against in an
individual capacity.
Throughout
the pendency of the action, the plaintiff made a request for
a jury trial as well as several requests to have counsel
appointed for him. The court denied these requests. The
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that
they had sustained their burden of establishing that there is
no genuine issue of material fact pertaining to the
plaintiffs claim that Madison intentionally or recklessly
caused injury to the plaintiff. The court granted the
defendants' summary judgment motion, concluding that the
plaintiff did not provide evidence to raise a genuine issue
of material fact.[3] This appeal followed.
On
appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred by (1)
concluding that the defendants sustained their burden of
establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact
pertaining to his claim, (2) denying his claim for a jury
trial and (3) denying his motions for the appointment of
counsel.
First,
we address the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
because there existed a ...