United States District Court, D. Connecticut
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
REVERSE OR REMAND [ECF NO. 17] AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
AFFIRM [ECF NO. 18]
KARI
A. DOOLEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Preliminary
Statement
The
Plaintiff, Ramon Almonte, brings this appeal pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §405(g). He appeals the Defendant
Commissioner's decision denying his disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act
(hereinafter “the Act”) and denying him
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the
Act, based upon a finding that he is not
“disabled” under the Act. He seeks an order of
this Court reversing the Commissioner's decision on the
ground that the Commissioner's findings are not supported
by substantial evidence in the record. Alternatively, he
seeks a remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings on
the ground that he did not receive a full and fair hearing
before the ALJ. The Commissioner, on the other hand, avers
that the Commissioner's findings are supported by
substantial evidence in the record and were made following a
full and fair hearing. She asks this Court to affirm the
decision.
For the
reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff's motion is
DENIED. The Defendant Commissioner's motion is GRANTED.
Standard
of Review
The
Plaintiff sought a determination that he was disabled as of
November 22, 2012, the purported date of onset,
[1]
through the date of the hearing on his application. A person
is “disabled” under the Act if that person is
unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(a). A physical or mental impairment is one that
“results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(3). In addition, a
claimant must establish that his “physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that [he] is
not only unable to do [his] previous work but cannot,
considering [his] age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy ….” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
The
Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis
to which an ALJ must adhere when evaluating disability
claims. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. In brief, the five
steps are as follows: (1) the Commissioner determines whether
the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) if not, [2] the Commissioner determines whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits
his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work
activities; (3) if such a “severe impairment” is
established, the Commissioner next determines whether the
medical evidence establishes that the claimant's
impairment “meets or equals” an impairment listed
in Appendix 1 of the regulations; (4) if the claimant does
not establish the “meets or equals” requirement,
the Commissioner must then determine the claimant's
residual functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”)
to perform his or her past work; and (5) if the claimant is
unable to perform his or her past work, the Commissioner must
next determine whether there is other work in the national
economy which the claimant can perform. 20 C.F.R.
404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). The claimant bears the burden of proof
with respect to steps one through four. See Burgess v.
Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). The
Commissioner bears the burden as to step five, that is,
finding the existence of work in the national economy that
the claimant is capable of performing. McIntyre v
Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014).
It is
well-settled that the district court will reverse an
ALJ's decision only when it is based upon legal error or
when it is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See Beauvoir v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1432, 1433
(2d Cir. 1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive . . .”). “Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145,
151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
The
Court does not inquire as to whether the record might also
support the Plaintiff's claims, but only whether there is
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's
decision. See Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417
(2d Cir. 2013) (“If there is substantial evidence to
support the [agency's] determination, it must be
upheld”); Talavera, 697 F.3d at 151 (limiting
review to “determining whether the SSA's
conclusions were supported by substantial evidence”);
Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 Fed.Appx. 58, 59
(2d Cir. 2013) (“[W]hether there is substantial
evidence supporting [the Plaintiff's] view is not the
question here; we must decide whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ's decision”) (emphasis in
original). “Even where the administrative record may
also adequately support contrary findings on particular
issues, the ALJ's factual findings ‘must be given
conclusive effect' so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.” Genier v. Astrue, 606
F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Schauer v.
Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982)). Once an ALJ
finds facts, the Court can reject those facts “only if
a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude
otherwise.” Brault v. Social Sec. Admin., 683
F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012).
The
ALJ's Decision
At step
one, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff had not been
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the claimed
onset date, November 22, 2012. At step two, the ALJ found
that the Plaintiff had severe impairments, specifically,
lumbar spine degenerative disc disease with hypertrophic
changes at ¶ 5-S1, status-post cervical spine fusion
surgery associated with neck pain, and obesity. At step
three, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff did not establish an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of the listed impairments in
the regulations at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
At step four, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff had an
RFC to perform “light work” as defined in 20
C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). The ALJ placed limitations
on this determination, however, finding that the plaintiff
was limited to frequent climbing of ramps or stairs;
occasional climbing of ladder, ropes, or scaffolds; frequent
balancing, stooping kneeling, and crouching; and occasional
crawling. As a result, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff
could not perform past relevant work.[3] At step five, crediting the
testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ determined that
there are a significant number of jobs in the national
economy that the Plaintiff could perform even with the
limitations identified above. The ALJ therefore concluded
that the Plaintiff was not disabled as of November 22, 2012,
or at any time thereafter through the date of the hearing.
At
issue in this appeal is the Commissioner's determination
of the Plaintiff's RFC, specifically the finding that he
is able to perform light work subject to the stated
limitations. In reaching this decision, the ALJ did not fully
accept the Plaintiff's testimony regarding the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effect of his lower back and neck
pain. The ALJ also gave little weight to the opinion
statement submitted by the Plaintiff's chiropractor, Dr.
Kaczanowski. The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in her
assessment of the evidence, erred in not giving greater
credit to the Plaintiff's testimony, and erred in giving
little weight to Dr. Kaczanowski's opinion. Accordingly,
the Plaintiff avers that the RFC was wrong and that the
finding of “not disabled” must be reversed.
Discussion
The
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