MARIA G.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES [*]
Argued
November 14, 2018
Procedural
History
Petition
for a writ of habeas corpus seeking custody of a minor child
from the respondent Commissioner of Children and Families,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Fairfield, where the matter was
transferred to the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk;
thereafter, the court, Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge
trial referee, granted the respondent's motion for
summary judgment, denied the petitioner's motion for
summary judgment, and rendered judgment dismissing the habeas
petition; subsequently, the court denied the petitioner's
motion to reargue and reconsider, and the petitioner appealed
to this court; thereafter, the court, Hon. Barbara M.
Quinn, judge trial referee, denied the petitioner's
motions to open judgment and for articulation; subsequently,
this court granted the petitioner's motion for review,
but denied the relief requested therein. Affirmed.
Dana
M. Hrelic, with whom were Brendon P. Lev-esque and, on the
brief, Karen L. Dowd, Scott T. Gaross-hen and Glenn Formica,
for the appellant (petitioner).
Michael Besso, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the
brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin
Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee
(respondent).
Joshua
Michtom, assistant public defender, for the minor child.
Alvord, Bright and Bear, Js.
OPINION
BEAR,
J.
The
petitioner, Maria G., appeals from the trial court's
rendering of summary judgment in favor of the respondent, the
Commissioner of Children and Families, on the
petitioner's writ of habeas corpus seeking custody of the
minor child, Santiago.[1] On appeal, the petitioner claims that the
court erroneously failed to credit a Guatemalan court's
decree, which purportedly granted her parental guardianship
rights over, and custody of, Santiago, when the court
concluded that (1) public policy prohibited recognition of
the decree because it was premised on a false birth
certificate, and (2) the decree was obtained without notice
to the respondent.[2] We affirm the judgment of the court.
The
following factual and procedural history is relevant to our
disposition of this appeal.[3] The petitioner is a citizen of
Argentina and a legal resident of the United States who
resides in Stamford, Connecticut. Shortly after
Santiago's birth in 2009, the petitioner, utilizing both
a birth certificate that falsely listed her, and her husband
at that time, as Santiago's parents and a fraudulent
United States passport, illegally brought him into the United
States.[4] Santiago remained in the petitioner's
care until October, 2012, when the Superior Court,
Heller, J., granted the respondent's motion for
an order of temporary custody. In re Santiago G.,
318 Conn. 449, 456-57, 121 A.3d 708 (2015). After initially
removing Santiago to a temporary foster home in November,
2012, the Department of Children and Families (department)
placed him in another foster home in December, 2012, where he
remains today. Id., 457.
On
November 8, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus seeking to regain custody of Santiago. The
petitioner alleged that the department's refusal to
release Santiago to her custody violated her and
Santiago's federal and state constitutional rights to due
process and was contrary to Santiago's best interest. On
July 3, 2014, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
petition claiming that the petitioner lacked standing because
she was neither the biological parent nor a properly declared
adoptive parent of Santiago, and she had not otherwise
claimed to be Santiago's legal guardian. The petitioner
filed an objection to the motion to dismiss, claiming that on
September 19, 2013, a Guatemalan court had recognized the
validity of the admittedly false birth certificate and,
therefore, recognized her as Santiago's parent. On
October 23, 2014, the court issued a memorandum of decision
in which it found that ‘‘the mere assertion by
the petitioner that she is the legal guardian of the child
under [Guatemalan] law, without more, is insufficient to
confer standing.'' As a result of this finding, the
court ordered the petitioner to offer proof, at a preliminary
evidentiary hearing on her standing, that she was
Santiago's legal guardian.
On June
17, 2015, prior to the evidentiary hearing, Santiago's
biological mother filed a declaratory action with a
Guatemalan court asking the court to grant custody of
Santiago to the petitioner. One day later, on June 18, 2015,
the Guatemalan court issued a declaratory judgment granting
the petitioner ‘‘parental rights, custody, and
representation [of Santiago] . . . .'' The Guatemalan
court relied on the false birth certificate as well as an
affidavit from Santiago's biological mother in granting
custody of Santiago to the petitioner.
On
November 17, 2015, the court held the evidentiary hearing.
During the hearing, the petitioner submitted a copy of the
judgment file from the Guatemalan court proceedings as a full
exhibit and presented testimony of the Guatemalan attorney
who had represented Santiago's biological mother
regarding the Guatemalan court's decree. The court
subsequently allowed both parties to file post hearing
briefs. The respondent argued in her brief that the
Guatemalan decree did not deserve recognition by Connecticut
courts because (1) the process underlying that decree
contained procedural irregularities fatal to recognition, and
(2) the substance of the decree was based on an admittedly
false birth certificate.
The
court, Colin, J., rendered its decision on February
16, 2016, and found that the petitioner had established prima
facie evidence of her standing, [5] but noted that
‘‘[t]he determination that a prima facie case has
been established in denying a motion to dismiss does not
necessarily mean that the court, at the time of the final
hearing on the merits, is required to take as true the
evidence offered by the petitioner at the standing
hearing.'' On March 7, 2016, the respondent filed a
motion to reargue. The court thereafter granted the
respondent's motion in part, denied it in part, and
reaffirmed its decision on the issue of standing.
The
parties subsequently filed separate motions for summary
judgment. The petitioner argued in her motion that the
court's previous recognition of prima facie evidence of
standing established that there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to the petitioner's legal right to
custody of Santiago. The respondent argued in her motion that
the Guatemalan court decree was not entitled to recognition
because it was based on a false birth certificate, and notice
of the Guatemalan proceedings had not been provided to the
respondent.
On
January 12, 2017, the court granted the respondent's
motion for summary judgment, denied the petitioner's
motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the habeas
petition.[6] In rendering its decision, the court
applied the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, General Statutes § 46b-115 et seq.
(act), and determined that the Guatemalan court decree was
not entitled to recognition because it was based on the
petitioner's fraudulent and illegal conduct that was
repugnant to the public policy of this state, it relied on
the false birth certificate, and it was secured without
adequate notice to the respondent. The court, therefore,
concluded that the petitioner could not demonstrate that she
is the biological parent or legal guardian of Santiago and
dismissed the habeas petition. On February 1, 2017, the
petitioner filed a motion to reargue, and the court
reaffirmed its decision on June 20, 2017. See footnote 1 of
this opinion. This appeal followed.[7]
We
first set forth the applicable standard of review.
‘‘Our review of the trial court's decision to
grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary. . . . In
seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden
of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts
are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary
judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine
issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable
principles of law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of
law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To
satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is
quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real
doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material
fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
opponent. . . . When documents submitted in support of a
motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party has
no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence
of such an issue. . . . Once the moving party has met its
burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence
that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual
issue.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Rickel v. Komaromi, 144 Conn.App.
775, 779-80, 73 A.3d 851 (2013).
I
The
petitioner claims that the same evidence used by the court to
rule in her favor on the motion to dismiss also established,
at the very least, a genuine issue of material fact that
precluded the court from granting the respondent's motion
for summary judgment. Specifically, the petitioner argues
that, despite the admittedly false birth certificate, the
Guatemalan court's decree created a genuine issue of
material fact that she was the legal guardian or custodian of
Santiago. The respondent claims that the court properly
determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact
that the Guatemalan decree was not entitled to recognition,
arguing that the petitioner's participation in the fraud
regarding the birth certificate made enforcement of the
decree repugnant to the public policy of this state.
We
first note that the false birth certificate cannot be the
basis for the petitioner's claim for custody because it
clearly was fraudulent, and the petitioner has conceded that
the birth certificate falsely listed her and her former
husband as Santiago's biological parents. Moreover, our
Supreme Court determined that the birth certificate has no
legal effect in the United States. See In re Santiago
G., supra, 318 Conn. 471-72 (‘‘[A]lthough
[the petitioner] was in possession of a birth certificate
naming her as Santiago's mother, she ultimately conceded
that that birth certificate was fraudulent. As we previously
have explained, [a] birth certificate is a vital record that
must accurately reflect legal relationships between parents
and children-it does not create those relationships. . . . In
...