United States District Court, D. Connecticut
CRAIG L. BLAND, Plaintiff,
v.
EMMANUEL FRANCESCHI, RICHARD BUSH, CHRISTOPHER N. FONTAINE, THEODORE HOLMES, ANGELA JACKSON, S. JOHAR NAQVI, CARLOS PADRO, MALGORZATA ZUKOWSKA, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 88)
KARI
A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Preliminary
Statement of the Case
The
Plaintiff, Craig L. Bland, formerly in the custody of the
Connecticut Department of Corrections (“DOC”),
commenced this civil rights action pursuant to Title 42,
U.S.C. § 1983. He brings his claims against Correctional
Managed Health Care employees Dr. Naqvi, Health Services
Administrator Bush, Head Correctional Nurse Zukowska,
Correctional Nurse Jackson and former Correctional Nurse
Fontaine. He also brings claims against Department of
Correction employees former Lieutenant Holmes, Lieutenant
Padro and Correctional Officer Franceschi. The Plaintiff
alleges that all defendants were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. The Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, to which the Plaintiff objected. The Court heard
oral argument on January 16, 2019. For the following reasons,
the motion is GRANTED as to all Defendants.
Standard
of Review
The
standard under which the Court reviews motions for summary
judgment is well-established. “The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The
Court's inquiry focuses on “whether there is the
need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by
a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in
favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Once the movant meets
his burden, the nonmoving party must set forth
“‘specific facts' demonstrating that there is
‘a genuine issue for trial.'” Wright v.
Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “[T]he party opposing summary
judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of
his pleading” to establish the existence of a disputed
fact. Wright, 554 F.3d at 266; accord Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, until the moving party comes forward with evidence
that would establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter
of law, the non-moving party is under no obligation to
produce any evidence. Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677,
681 (2d Cir. 2001).
“[T]here
is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict
for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Indeed, summary judgment is evaluated in the same fashion as
a motion for a directed verdict. Id. at 250. The
Supreme Court has “noted that the ‘genuine
issue' summary judgment standard is ‘very
close' to the ‘reasonable jury' directed
verdict standard: The primary difference between the two
motions is procedural; summary judgment motions are usually
made before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while
directed verdict motions are made at trial and decided on the
evidence that has been admitted.” Id. at 251.
“In essence, though, the inquiry under each is the
same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Id. at 252-53.
However,
“at the summary judgment stage the judge's function
is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth
of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Id. at 249. “[C]ourts
may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence
when confronted with a motion for summary judgment. All
evidence presented by the nonmoving party must be taken as
true, and all inferences must be construed in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Catanzaro v.
Weiden, 140 F.3d 91, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1998), on
reh'g, 188 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing United
States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). In sum,
“where the facts specifically averred by [the
nonmovant] contradict facts specifically averred by the
movant, the motion must be denied.” Lujan, 497
U.S. at 888.
Facts
The
following facts are largely undisputed.
On
November 1, 2015, the Plaintiff was incarcerated at the New
Haven Correctional Center. At approximately 4:00 a.m. the
Plaintiff was escorted from the restricted housing unit to
the medical unit. At the medical unit, Defendant Nurse
Jackson, believing the Plaintiff to be an inmate named
Murphy, advised the Plaintiff that she was going to
administer the last dose of his medication. The Plaintiff did
not advise Nurse Jackson that he was not due to have any
medication. The Plaintiff cooperated while Nurse Jackson
opened two suboxone packets and poured the medicine into the
Plaintiff's mouth, under his tongue. At that point, the
Plaintiff told Nurse Jackson that he was not scheduled to
receive any medication, let alone suboxone. Upon learning
that she had mistakenly given the Plaintiff the suboxone,
Nurse Jackson immediately notified her supervisor, Defendant
Head Nurse Zukowska. Nurse Jackson was apologetic to the
Plaintiff. The Plaintiff admits that Nurse Jackson “did
not mistreat the plaintiff, answered his questions, notified
her supervisor of what happened and followed up with the
plaintiff later that morning.” The Plaintiff admits
that the administration of the suboxone to the wrong inmate
was unintentional.
Upon
learning of what had occurred, Nurse Zukowska spoke with the
Plaintiff and explained that he had been given suboxone by
accident and the protocol that she was required to follow.
Consistent with that protocol, she contacted the Health
Services Administrator, the custody supervisor, as well as
the on-call doctor, Defendant Dr. Naqvi. She also reviewed
the Plaintiff's file to check for any known allergies.
Nurse Zukowska told Dr. Naqvi what had happened and shared
the content of the Plaintiff's medical file with him. Dr.
Naqvi determined that the Plaintiff did not need outside
medical treatment. Later that same morning, Nurse Zukowska
visited the Plaintiff in his housing unit. While speaking
with him, she requested to take his vital signs. He refused,
telling her he wanted to see a “real doctor.” She
advised him that if his vital signs were abnormal, she would
take him to the doctor. He refused to have his vital signs
taken.
Although
the facts set forth above are largely undisputed, there are
numerous allegations contained in the Plaintiff's
complaint for which there is competing evidence. Principally,
the Plaintiff alleges that after he returned to his cell
following the accidental suboxone administration, he became
visibly and seriously ill and that he injured his head when
he fainted from the side effects. He claims to have
repeatedly sought help from the other named defendants, to
include officers and supervisors who work on his cell block,
to no avail. Admittedly, the Plaintiff was next seen in the
medical unit on November 3, 2015. Notwithstanding, he claims
the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical condition in violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights. The Defendants deny each of these allegations and
have supported the motion for summary judgment with multiple
affidavits, prison log books, and other records which refute,
they claim conclusively, the Plaintiff's affidavit and
other materials submitted by the Plaintiff in opposition to
the Defendants' motion.
Additional
facts will be set ...