Argued
October 11, 2018
Procedural
History
Action
to recover damages for, inter alia, wrongful termination of
employment, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the
jury before Hon. William B. Rush, judge trial
referee; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff; thereafter,
the court denied the defendants' motion for a new trial
and their motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and the defendants appealed and
the plaintiff cross appealed to this court. Reversed in
part; further proceedings.
Christopher M. Hodgson, with whom, on the brief, was Warren
L. Holcomb, for the appellants-cross appel- lees
(defendants).
Francis D. Burke, for the appellee-cross appellant
(plaintiff).
DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Moll, Js.
OPINION
MOLL,
J.
The
defendants, J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (J.B. Hunt), and David
Bryant, appeal, and the plaintiff, Dwight Daley, cross
appeals, from the judgment of the trial court rendered in
accordance with a jury verdict returned in favor of the
plaintiff. The threshold issue raised by the defendants on
appeal that we must resolve is whether the court erred in
declining to conduct a postverdict evidentiary hearing to
determine whether one of the jurors, R.L., [1] had been
competent to serve on the jury. We conclude that the court
committed error, and we reverse in part the judgment of the
court and remand the case for further proceedings while
retaining our jurisdiction over the remaining claims on
appeal and over the cross appeal pending the outcome of the
proceedings on remand.
The
following facts, as found by the trial court in its
memorandum of decision or as undisputed in the record, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the
threshold issue before us. In December, 2013, the plaintiff
commenced the underlying action against the defendants. In
the operative complaint (complaint), the plaintiff alleged,
inter alia, that the defendants terminated his employment
despite previously having assured him that he could return to
work after he recovered from injuries he had sustained as a
result of a motor vehicle accident unrelated to his
employment. The complaint included, inter alia, the following
counts asserted against the defendants: violation of the
Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes
§ 46a-60 et seq.; promissory estoppel; negligent
misrepresentation; fraudulent misrepresentation; and, as to
J.B. Hunt only, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The defendants denied the plaintiff's
substantive allegations and raised several special defenses.
The plaintiff denied the allegations of the defendants'
special defenses.
The
case was tried to a jury over the course of seven days in
August, 2016. Shortly after 5 p.m. on Thursday, August 11,
2016, following less than one day of deliberations,
[2] the
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding
him $200, 000 in economic damages and $25, 000 in noneconomic
damages. In reaching its verdict, the jury answered several
interrogatories.[3] On the record, the clerk twice read the
jury's verdict and its answers to the interrogatories,
and, after each recitation, the clerk asked the jury to
confirm its verdict. All of the jurors, including R.L.,
replied ‘‘yes'' on both
occasions.[4] The trial court, Hon. William B.
Rush, judge trial referee, thereupon accepted and
recorded the verdict at 5:08 p.m.
On
Friday, August 12, 2016, R.L. appeared at the courthouse
where the underlying case had been tried and notified court
staff that she was ready to continue jury
deliberations.[5] Judge Rush spoke with R.L. in the civil
caseflow office and reminded her that the jury had returned
its verdict in favor of the plaintiff the day before. Judge
Rush also reminded R.L. of the amount of the verdict. In
response to that information, R.L. became visibly upset and
stated that she did not remember the jury concluding its
deliberations or returning its verdict. Immediately
thereafter, the court scheduled a status conference, which
took place in chambers on August 16, 2016, during which he
apprised the parties' attorneys of the events that had
transpired regarding R.L. During the status conference, the
court also provided the attorneys with a copy of a
handwritten letter submitted by R.L. to the court,
[6]
which was dated August 12, 2016, in which R.L. wrote in
relevant part: Upon arriving at the courthouse for the
purpose of finishing the jury's deliberations, she was
‘‘surprise[d]'' to learn that the jury
had returned its verdict; she did not remember the jury
concluding its deliberations or returning its verdict the day
before; she did not have a prior history of
‘‘memory gaps, '' but she
‘‘definitely'' had experienced such a
memory lapse with regard to the jury's deliberations and
the return of its verdict; she was concerned that she may
have suffered ‘‘other gaps'' during the
trial; she was sixty-four years old and intended to undergo a
medical evaluation to determine whether she had
‘‘dementia/Alzheimer's [disease], ''
which had been recommended to her by a caregiver because her
mother had been diagnosed with early onset Alzheimer's
disease at sixty years of age; and she disagreed with the
amount of the verdict, as she would ‘‘never want
[the defendants] to pay any more than [thirty, forty,
maybe fifty] thousand [dollars].'' (Emphasis
in original.)
On
September 16, 2016, the defendants filed a motion seeking a
new trial on the ground that R.L. had been incompetent during
the trial, thereby depriving them of their right to due
process.[7] As alternative relief, the defendants
requested that the court conduct an evidentiary hearing to
evaluate R.L.'s competency.[8] The plaintiff opposed that
motion.
On
October 11, 2016, the trial court heard argument on, inter
alia, the defendants' motion seeking a new trial or,
alternatively, an evidentiary hearing addressing R.L.'s
competency during trial. By way of a memorandum of decision
dated November 4, 2016, the court denied the motion seeking a
new trial, including the alternative request for an
evidentiary hearing.[9] The court found that, during jury
selection, the parties had deemed R.L. to be an acceptable
juror, and that none of the parties had challenged the
competency of R.L. during the evidentiary portion of the
trial, jury deliberations, or the return and acceptance of
the jury's verdict. It also found that R.L., along with
the other jurors, twice confirmed the verdict on the record.
In
addition, the court determined that, although a specific
claim of juror misconduct generally would require an inquiry
by the court, a juror's failure to remember deliberations
that resulted in a verdict did not constitute juror
misconduct. The court further stated in relevant part:
‘‘The instructions to the jury by the court . . .
instructed the jury that each juror must decide the case for
themselves and not merely acquiesce in the verdict of their
fellow jurors. The fact that, after the lengthy deliberations
and the [rendition and acceptance of the verdict], a juror
does not remember those events does not mean that they did
not take place in accordance with our laws. The notes of the
court indicate the instructions to the jury were completed at
11:03 a.m. and that the verdict was accepted shortly after 5
p.m. so that it is not a short period of time that [R.L.]
cannot recall. However the failure to recall those events is
itself a postverdict event. The holding of a hearing on [the]
issue of the competence of [R.L.] during the course of the
trial, the deliberations of the jury and the rendition and
acceptance of the verdict would require, for a thorough
analysis, an inquiry into areas which, under the law, the
court cannot do. If [R.L.] cannot recall the deliberations
and the rendition of the verdict it is doubtful that [R.L.]
could reliably recall ...