United States District Court, D. Connecticut
WILSON RAMOS, As Administrator of The Estate of Jose A. Maldonado, and Individually, Plaintiffs,
v.
TOWN OF EAST HARTFORD et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT.
105]
VANESSA L. BRYANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Wilson Ramos (“Ramos”), as administrator of the
Estate of Jose A. Maldonado, and individually, initiated this
action against the Town of East Hartford and Officers Jason
Kaplan, James Lis, Jason Cohen, and Chief Scott Sansom
(collectively, “Defendants”), for various state
and federal claims stemming from an incident with Defendants
on April 13, 2014 which resulted in the death of Ramos's
brother, Jose Maldonado. On May 30, 2018, Plaintiffs moved
for leave to file a second amended complaint. See
Dkt. 105 [Pls.'s Mot. for Leave to File Second Am.
Compl.]. Plaintiffs claim that the proposed second amended
complaint merely amplifies their existing claims with facts
learned in discovery. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have
not shown good cause to amend the complaint and any amendment
would substantially prejudice them.
I.
Factual Background
Plaintiffs
move to amend two paragraphs of the first amended
complaint.[1] Plaintiffs' first suggested change is
set forth in full below with the proposed new language
underlined (“Paragraph 42”):
42. Defendant officers were indifferent to the risk of death
their use of force had caused Maldonado, and to their
obligation to provide immediate medical assistance to
preserve his life. They failed to assess his condition
immediately in the aftermath of the taser discharge into his
chest and the blunt trauma to his head (a) to learn that he
was unconscious and in need of immediate medical assistance,
or (b) to render life-saving assistance such as
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or the available
automated external defibrillator (AED) prior to the arrival
of emergency medical responders. They failed to summon
emergency medical assistance for more than seven minutes,
during which period Maldonado was dying from a sudden cardiac
arrest.
Plaintiffs'
second suggested change is the addition of the following new
paragraph which is set forth in full below (“Paragraph
54”):
54. Notwithstanding the known risk to life posed by firing a
taser into the anterior chest, East Hartford police officers
did so 16 times during 2014 and 2015. On no occasion did any
superior officer object to that improper and dangerous
practice, and none of the officers responsible were
disciplined, counseled, or singled out for retraining. Among
those incidents during that two-year period, four
officers, including defendant Kaplan, were
responsible for firing the taser into a civilian's chest
in multiple separate incidents. In the 16 incidents, East
Hartford police officers targeted black and Hispanic
civilians 14 times and white civilians 2 times. Defendant
East Hartford authorized, condoned, and ratified the
excessive, life-threatening, and unlawful use of the taser
weapon by its police officers in a manner that cost the life
of Jose Maldonado and placed at risk the lives of many other
individuals.
II.
Procedural History
On
February 2, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint.
On March 30, 2016, the Court adopted the parties' Rule
26(f) report which set May 2, 2016 as the deadline for
amending the complaint. See Dkt. 10. On February 25,
2017, Plaintiffs moved to extend the discovery deadlines, but
they did not request an additional opportunity to amend the
complaint. See Dkt. 44 [Mot. Upon Consent to Modify
Scheduling Order]. On March 8, 2017, the Court dismissed the
case without prejudice pending a decision by the State's
Attorney whether to prosecute any of the involved officers.
See Dkt. 47 [Order Dismissing Case]. Plaintiffs
filed a motion to reopen on June 28, 2017. See Dkt.
49 [Mot. to Reopen Case]. The Court granted the motion and
issued a new scheduling order. See Dkts. 51, 53. The
scheduling order did not include a new deadline for amending
the complaint. See Dkt. 53. Both parties completed
fact discovery by March 14, 2018 and expert discovery by
August 29, 2018. See Dkt. 100 [Mot. On Consent for
Enlargement of Time]. On May 30, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the
instant motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.
III.
Standard of Review
Leave
to amend a complaint after a responsive pleading has been
filed should be “freely” given “when
justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Courts should
grant applications to amend unless there is good reason to
deny the motion such as “futility, bad faith, undue
delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.”
Min Jin v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 184, 101
(2d Cir. 2002). However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
applies in cases such as this where a party seeks to modify
an existing scheduling order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16; see also
Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340
(2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]espite the lenient standard of Rule
15(a), a district court does not abuse its discretion in
denying leave to amend the pleadings after the deadline set
in the scheduling order where the moving party has failed to
establish good cause.”). Rule 16(b)(4) provides that a
district court's scheduling order “may be modified
only for good cause and with the judge's consent.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b).
The
more onerous “good cause” standard applies where
a scheduling order sets a deadline for amending a complaint.
See Parker, 204 F.3d at 339-40; see also
Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir.
2003); see also Lincoln v. Potter, 418 F.Supp.2d
8443, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“When a party moves to amend
the pleadings after the deadline to do so in the court's
scheduling order has passed, he must satisfy the good cause
requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b) . . .”).
“‘Good cause' requires a greater showing than
‘excusable neglect.' At a minimum, good cause
requires a showing by the moving party of an objectively
sufficient reason for extending a deadline such that the
deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of
the party needing the extension. The inquiry focuses on the
moving party's reason for requesting the
extension.” Pyke v. Cuomo, No.
92CV554(NPM/DRH), 2004 WL 1083244, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 12,
2004) (internal citations omitted). The Second Circuit has
emphasized that “the primary consideration” in
determining whether good cause has been shown “is
whether the moving party can demonstrate diligence.”
Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229,
244 (2d Cir. 2007).
If the
Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the good cause
standard set forth in Rule 16(b), it must then consider
whether the amended complaint survives scrutiny under Rule
15. Under Rule 15(a), “[t]he court should freely give
leave [to amend pleadings] when justice so requires.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The Supreme Court has instructed that
leave to amend should be granted “absent any apparent
or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, or futility of the amendment[.]” Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The
Second Circuit has “referred to the prejudice to the
opposing party resulting from a proposed amendment as among
the ‘most important' reasons to deny leave to
amend.” AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank
of Am. N.A., 626 F.3d 699, 725 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted); see also State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor
Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981). An
“[a]mendment may be prejudicial when, among other
things, it would require the opponent to expend significant
additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare ...